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Abstract
Evaluating the capacity of consumer loyalty programs to generate additional sales is essen-
tial for marketers who run such programs. However, customers’ self selection into the loyalty
programs makes this evaluation difficult. This is the case especially in set-ups where the reward
is not granted automatically upon achieving a certain number of points. In the case of auto-
matic rewards, based on temporal discounting and the diminishing perceived distance to the
goal, marketing theory predicts that points accumulation accelerates as consumers approach
the threshold of necessary points for the reward, and is also boosted after the redemption, in
what is called ‘the rewarded behavior effect’. These mechanisms generate sales that are at-
tributed solely to the reward program.
In this thesis I use these insights to develop two models for evaluating loyalty programs
where the rewards are not granted automatically, but consumers accumulate points and are free
to decide the moment and the size of the redemption. These types of programs are expanding
in sectors such as retail and finance, so being able to evaluate them becomes increasingly
important. The first model applies to programs where consumers use the accumulated points
like cash, for groceries and other day-to-day expenses, while the second applies to programs
where consumers use the points for non-ordinary expenses or treats, which on average are much
larger. Both are models of consumer behavior, which retailers need to understand in order to
learn how to improve the profitability of their loyalty programs. The difference between these
two set ups is important because consumers plan for redemptions in different ways in these
two contexts. I estimate the parameters of both models using data provided by AIR MILES,
Canada’s largest coalition loyalty program. I show how sample heterogeneity and the non-
random timing of the reward cash-in can be confounded with true loyalty program effects and
I tease apart these effects to obtain non-biased estimates of program profitability. I use the
model insights to suggest ways in which the loyalty program owner can change the program to
further boost its profitability and discuss how the recommendations are contingent on retailers’
contribution margins. The dissertation advances the literature on loyalty program evaluation by
developing structural models for set ups where retailers do not impose automatic redemptions
upon consumers.
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Cultivating customers’ loyalty is key for any business. Besides the product’s intrinsic qualities
and promotion and advertising campaigns, one tool that companies use increasingly to build
customers’ loyalty is to offer reward programs (RPs). These programs offer consumers loyalty
points (LPs) or miles proportional to their purchases (e.g. 1 mile per $10 spent) and allow
them to use the amassed LPs to redeem different types of rewards. As RPs impose costs on
companies, one of the critical questions that managers need to answer is how effective the RP
is in generating sales that would have not been realized in the absence of the RP.
Evaluating the effectiveness of RPs is difficult, given consumers’ self selection into the
programs. Two main strategies have been followed: experimental or quasi-experimental ap-
proaches and structural approaches. The first approach aims to compare RP members to non-
members (after accounting for self-selection) and draw conclusions about the overall effective-
ness of the programs based on this comparison. Structural approaches are more analytical, in
the sense that they focus on identifying the theoretical mechanisms that make RPs effective and
measuring the impact of those specific mechanisms. Points pressure (the tendency to acceler-
ate LPs collection as one approaches the redemption moment) and the rewarded behavior effect
(the tendency to only gradually decrease collection after a redemption) are the prime mecha-
nisms that have been identified to enhance the effectiveness of the RPs. Chapter 2 presents
in detail both the experimental and the structural approaches and reviews their strengths and
challenges. Also, this chapter presents the empirical evidence on RP’s effectiveness.
Looking back at past research in this area, it is apparent that most work is done on RPs
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
where the reward is pre-set by the merchant and granted automatically to participants - like the
automatic status upgrades that frequent fliers receive upon accumulating a certain number of
flown miles. However, loyalty reward programs are rapidly expanding in areas such as retail
and financial services, where the main attraction is represented by the prizes that consumers
can redeem with their LPs, not the status upgrade. In these programs consumers typically
accumulate points which they can later use either to reduce their bills or redeem rewards from a
given set offered by the company that runs the program. The time and the size of the redemption
are usually entirely at consumers’ discretion.
Since the existing models are not well equipped to deal with this endogenous redemption
decision, I address this deficiency. In this thesis I propose two models that focus jointly on
how consumers collect and spend their LPs. The first model is applicable to RPs where prizes
are discounts offered to consumers on their bill (this will be called the ‘cash’ setup), while the
second is applicable to RPs that offer more substantial prizes, like flights, cruises or merchan-
dise (the ‘dream’ setup). The difference in the prize structure is important because it dictates
how consumers think about their LPs and organize their redemptions. I argue that in the ‘cash’
setup consumers plan to accumulate and spend LPs in a continuous way; they derive utility
from the rewards they receive for their points and they permanently struggle between giving
in to the temptation of redeeming something now and hoarding points in order to be able to
make large redemptions which seem to bring more utility per mile redeemed than smaller re-
demptions. No single redemption is a goal in itself, but part of the collection-redemption cycle
that consumers pursue in order to maximize their utility. Chapter 3 presents a model of the
collection-redemption cycle that is applicable in this context. The parameters of the model are
estimated using a sample of AIR MILES cash collectors (participants who chose to use their
AIR MILES only to obtain discounts at different retailers). Based on these parameters, policy
experiments are conducted to determine the sales generated exclusively due the RP and ways
in which the RP can be modified in order to further boost sales. The results show that different
program set ups are optimal depending on retailers’ contribution margins.
In contrast to RPs that offer cash discounts as prizes, in the ‘dream’ setup any individual
redemption stands out because it is larger in value and it usually represents a treat that is not
purchased habitually. At any point in time consumers may or may not have a specific target (or
3redemption goal), but once they form such goals (e.g., ‘I’m using my points to redeem gifts for
Christmas’ or ‘to book flights for the family’s summer holiday’), they focus entirely on that goal
and disregard goals that they might form into the future, after achieving (or failing to achieve)
the current goal. This is not to say that that consumers in the ‘dream’ setup are shortsighted,
but that they care about the future only up to a certain point - i.e., they bracket more narrowly
(Read et al., 1999). This is because each redemption is a different event in itself, while in the
case of cash discounts, it is easier for consumers to think about the redemptions collectively, as
they are more homogeneous. Chapter 4 presents a model where consumers are assumed to form
specific goal redemptions and work towards attaining their goals. The parameters of this model
are estimated using a sample of AIR MILES collectors who opted to accumulate points that
can be used to purchase ‘dream rewards’ such as flights, cruises or merchandise. Similarly to
the ‘cash’ model, the estimates are used to conduct policy experiments that tease out the share
of points accumulated due solely to the program vs. the share of points corresponding to sales
that would have been attained even in the absence of the RP. Also, the estimated parameters
are used to gain insights into how the efficiency of the program would improve if AIR MILES
managed to persuade the program participants to shorten their inter-redemption spells.
This thesis advances research on loyalty reward programs in several ways. First, there
are only two structural models that make the redemption moment endogenous: Kopalle et al.
(2007, 2012). These models are applicable to RPs in industries such as hospitality and travel
where consumers face the trade-off between redeeming rewards and amassing points in order
to gain status. However, this trade-off is not present in industries such as retail or the financial
sector; in these areas sacrificing a redemption in order to build balance for a status upgrade
is not a relevant consideration. So in this thesis I expand the set of models with endogenous
redemption to RPs in the retail and financial sectors, which have come to jointly account for
60% of RP memberships in the US (Berry, 2013). Furthermore, focusing on the timing of re-
demptions is important because it is redemptions that actually makes RPs successful, by setting
in motion mechanisms such as points pressure and the rewarded behavior effect. Unredeemed
LPs can apparently make a loyalty program seem more profitable, but redemptions are the
engine that power reward programs. For most customer loyalty programs, LP issuance is a
liability; earnings are recognized only when a redemption is made and a portion of that liabil-
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ity is converted to cash (Konsewicz, 2007). So in the short-run, it is the redemption, not the
issuance, that improves RPs books and allows them to reduce their liabilities and enhance their
financial situation. Redemption is also important for the long run success, especially in the
case of frequent-flyer programs that sell their LPs or miles to credit card companies (The Wall
Street Journal, 2010) and coalition programs administered by a third-party such as AIR MILES,
Nectar or FlyBuys. To work, a reward loyalty program should actually reward customers.
Secondly, this is the first attempt to use a structural approach in evaluating an on-going
retail RP (as opposed to an occasional retail program such the Thanksgiving turkey program
studied by Taylor and Neslin (2005)), where consumers accumulate LPs and are free to decide
when and how many of their points to use for redeeming rewards. Given consumers’ self-
selection into RPs, I believe that this is a more sound method of evaluation, compared to quasi-
experimental approaches. (Why structural approaches are more sound will become clearer later
in this dissertation.) Moreover, this method can be applied to coalition RPs, where consumers
can acquire points at dozens of sponsors in very different sectors, so finding adequate controls
for a quasi-experimental investigation would be even more challenging in respect of a coalition
program. With a structural approach I am able to evaluate how strong the points pressure and
rewarded behavior effects are and back out the effectiveness of the RP from these estimates.
Thirdly, I use the results of the structural models to emphasize how the sample hetero-
geneity and the fact that program participants select the timing of their redemptions can be
confounded with program effects. In other words, these two mechanisms give rise to pat-
terns of collection that are similar to the patterns of collection that one would expect if the RP
changes participants’ behavior. Therefore, in order to accurately determine the effect of the
RP in driving sales, it is essential that these concurrent effects are isolated and teased apart. In
Chapter 3 I show that failing to account for heterogeneity and the selection of the redemption
timing produces upward biased estimates of the efficiency of the program. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, it appears that heterogeniety plays a less significant role in the case of ‘dream’ collectors
(Chapter 4), as the model applied on the entire, heterogeneous sample produces similar results
to a specification where I apply the model separately to 3 a priori identified segments and then
I aggregate the results.
Fourthly, I build a rich structural model that captures consumers’ psychological processes
5(Chintagunta et al., 2006), by modeling fallible cognitive process such as limited foresight,
impulse purchases and fixed transaction costs for making a redemption. Theoretical models
that capture consumer thought processes are valuable because they bolster our confidence in
the results they produce and the recommendations that are based on those results. However,
these more complex models usually suffer from not being amenable to a closed from solution
for estimation. I overcome this problem by relying on simulation techniques. Both models are
estimated through indirect inference (Gourieroux et al., 1993; Smith, 2008), a class of GMM
estimators (Hansen, 1982), where the parameters of the structural model are pinned down by
matching selected moments observed in the data to the corresponding moments of a simulated
data set. My models are therefore an excellent managerial tool for evaluating retail RPs and
testing different ideas on how these RPs can be improved. The model can be used in deciding,
for example whether the amount of rewards given out for a given amount of points accumulated
should be increased or decreased.
The next chapter presents the existing work on loyalty programs, differentiating the wider
concept of customer loyalty from the ‘engineered’ loyalty that RPs aim to create. In this lit-
erature review, I focus both on the theoretical mechanisms through which RPs can increase
sales as well as on the empirical findings so far, emphasizing the different approaches of exper-
imental, quasi-experimental and structural approaches. Chapters 3 and 4 present two distinct
models of LPs acquisition and redemption. The main difference between the two models is the
set ups in which they apply. Chapter 3 is suitable to analyze RPs where the rewards are small,
in-store discounts and, conditional on having enough LPs for a reward, consumers decide in
every period whether they cash in points. In contrast, Chapter 4 is suitable to analyze RPs
that offer more significant rewards - like flights or hotel stays. In these programs, consumers
are assumed to form stable redemption goals and work towards attaining their goals. Both
chapters start by exposing the theoretical models, presenting the data used to estimate them
and then presenting the estimated parameters. I assess the implications for the break-even mar-
gin (the margin above which running a RP contributes positively to retailers’ profits) and the
share of sales attributable to the program. Furthermore, the estimated parameters are used to
conduct ‘what-if’ analysis (also called counterfactuals) - that is evaluate how profitable the
programs would be if retailers implemented certain changes (for example if they increased the
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amount of rewards per mile redeemed). Chapter 5 re-iterates the differences between the mod-
els presented in Chapters 3 and 4 and elaborates on the reasons for which the ‘dream’ rewards
program appears to be more profitable than the ‘cash’ rewards program. In this chapter I also
re-state the contribution to the field of loyalty programs that I make in this dissertation and I
outline fruitful areas for further research.
Chapter 2
Loyalty reward programs
Loyal customers are an asset for any company or brand. As intuition would suggest that,
all else equal, more loyal customers are less likely to be swayed by competition’s attractive
offers, more likely to spread positive word-of-mouth, more forgiving, and also more likely
to pay higher prices for the product/ brand towards which they are loyal. It is no surprise
then that loyalty occupies such a central place both in academic marketing research, as will
become apparent in the literature review that I am conducting, as well as on the agenda of
many practitioners (O’Brien and Jones, 1995; Reichheld, 1996).
A literature review conducted by Jacoby and Chestnut (1978) covering more than 50 years
of research (1923-1976) reveals that early attempts to operationalize the concept of brand loy-
alty focused almost exclusively on behavioral measures such as share of purchases or sequence
of purchases. However, in the 60’s, researchers started to suggest that besides the behavioral
component, brand loyalty should also include attitudinal measures that tap into consumers’
commitment to the brand. Day (1969) and Dick and Basu (1994) clearly argue that, besides the
behavioral aspect of repeated purchase, the customer loyalty construct should also comprise
an attitudinal element; thus true loyalty exists wherever there is both repeat patronage and
highly positive attitude for the focal brand relative to other brands. Chaudhuri and Holbrook
(2001) also explicitly differentiate between purchase loyalty and attitudinal loyalty, both types
of loyalty stemming from brand affect and brand trust. More recently Liu-Thompkins and Tam
(2013) differentiate between attitudinal loyalty and habit.
However, adding the attitudinal measure to the concept of brand loyalty doesn’t conclude
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the discussion around it. Positive attitudes towards brands can stem from their intrinsic qual-
ities or from the marketing programs that surround them. Researchers in this area have been
careful to emphasize the concept’s property of being different from brand qualities relative to
competition or contextual factors, such as lack of alternatives (Day, 1969; Aaker, 1991; Dick
and Basu, 1994; Oliver, 1999). For example, Oliver (1999) defines loyalty as ’a deeply held
commitment to rebuy or repatronize a preferred product/ service in the future (...) despite
situational influences and marketing efforts having the potential to cause switching behavior’.
Lemon et al. (2001) provide what I think is the most clean and rigorous definition of loy-
alty. For them programs meant to develop customer loyalty contribute to customer relationship
equity which they define as ‘the tendency of the customer to stick with the brand, above and
beyond customers’ objective and subjective assessment of the brand’ (emphasis added). Thus,
in this definition, even emotional ties that customers have with a certain product or brand, or
the attitudes they have towards it (the subjective assessment) are separated from brand loy-
alty, which is thus conceptualized as a ‘stickiness’ of the relationship that cannot be explained
either by the value proposition of the brand (the more objective attributes) or by consumers’
emotional ties to the brand. This contrasts with Day (1969)’s tentative conclusion that ‘loyalty
is based on a rational decision made after the evaluation of the benefits of competing brands’
which is later reinforced by the observation that ‘commitment is never total, the decision is
reviewed when competitive or other circumstances change’.
If the early literature in this area, as outlined so far, was more concerned to clarify con-
ceptually what customer loyalty is, recently the literature seems to have agreed on a definition
of loyalty that is closely aligned to the one provided by Lemon et al. (2001). This refinement
of the concept has evolved in step with the proliferation of loyalty programs offered by com-
panies for their customers. Through these programs companies try to enhance and prolong
the relationship with their consumers. Customers acquire points (sometimes called miles after
the successful programs launched in the American airline industry) based on the amounts they
spend with the company. As they collect enough points, consumers can then use them as a sort
of currency to redeem different rewards. Also, consumers who collect enough points within
given time frames are assigned to superior tier statuses (for example gold or platinum) that offer
prestige, different perks and/ or improved service. Conceptually, loyalty has been restricted to
9refer purely to the stickiness of the relationship, which gives a one to one relationship between
this concept and loyalty programs.
The questions that both academics and managers are now interested in, is whether, and
how, these sort of programs bring value to the brand. In other words the interest lies in un-
tangling between, on the one hand, the equity that is generated through the brand’s objective
qualities or through the emotional ties it fosters with consumers, and on the other hand, by the
loyalty program. The shift can be easily noticed in the managerial recommendations that the
academic loyalty literature provides. Early papers emphasized the role of loyalty antecedents
such as trust, relational benefits and value (Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002) trust and brand affect
(Chaudhuri and Holbrook, 2001), cognitive antecedents (accessibility, confidence, etc.), affec-
tive antecedents (emotion, satisfaction etc.) and conative antecedents (switching cost, sunk
cost and expectations) (Dick and Basu, 1994) or quality and perceived associations (Aaker,
1991). These authors follow a logic where these antecedents lead (somewhat mechanically)
to loyalty which in turn leads to outcomes of interest (market share, willingness to pay, word
of mouth, etc.). The focus on these antecedents of loyalty seems to be in contradiction with
the definition provided, which emphasized its property of being different from brand intrinsic
subjective or objective qualities as assessed by consumers. Loyalty seems to be rather the out-
come of good subjective and objective value provided by the company and not something that
can be fostered exogenously. In contrast, more recent articles focus on evaluating the return of
programs that that are strictly meant to increase loyalty, independently of programs meant to
increase the objective value provided by the brand or the emotional response it generates (Rust
et al., 2004).
In this research, I adopt a view similar to that of Lemon et al. (2001); Rust et al. (2004) and
refer to loyalty as a mechanism that leads to re-purchase or re-patronizing above and beyond
product quality or favorable emotional ties to the product. Specifically, I am interested in
loyalty as a cause of brand or firm superior performance, not as its effect (Reichheld, 1996).
I do not contest the fact that product quality or its capacity to generate positive attitudes are
important drivers of commitment towards, and re-purchase of the product, and that these drivers
can create what in lay terms would be called ‘loyalty’. But in this research I am interested in
loyalty as a driver (tool) that is separated from these other drivers, as loyalty programs represent
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a different managerial lever. Therefore, I study loyalty programs that reward consumers based
on the volume of the previous purchase and have the capacity to create sunk and switching costs
for consumers. This sort of programs may create repeated purchases, or loyalty, the mechanism
being completely orthogonal to product quality and advertising strategy.
In contrast to Kumar and Shah (2004), who are interested in developing programs that ‘pro-
actively reward customers “today” for their “future” shopping’, I am specifically interested in
programs that try to change current behavior by offering future rewards. In order to follow
Kumar and Shah (2004)’s suggestion companies would need to know who the customers with
high future shopping are, so that it can reward them. But if those customers are highly likely
to patronize the company in the future, why reward them? By rewarding them there is a risk of
creating a ceiling effect where their purchases cannot be further increased instead of offering
incentives to those customers who under the current state of affairs are not likely to buy that
much into the future, but who can be easily persuaded to change their purchase patterns by
offering them a reward? My emphasis on RPs as a managerial tool strongly favors the second
approach.
The history of modern loyalty (or frequency reward) programs can be traced back to the
trade stamps (Davis, 1959), that have been used by retailers as a means of increasing customers’
loyalty since the beginning of the 20th century. In the 80’s, this business model was adopted by
airlines in their frequent flyer programs and financial service and credit card companies; with
the advent of scanners in retailing and services, LPs have become common in hotel chains, car
rental companies, supermarkets, music and chemist stores (Financial Times, 2006). A recent
study (Nielsen, 2013), which surveyed 29,000 Internet respondents in 58 countries, revealed
that almost 60% said that loyalty programs were available where they shopped; 84% of these
reported that they are more likely to visit those retailers. The wide spread of such loyalty
programs warrants a special focus on them.
The next subsection presents the business model for loyalty programs, distinguishing be-
tween LPs that re run by a third party and those that are run ‘in-house’ by a single retailer.
The next two subsections present and systematize the research on loyalty programs: section
2.2 presents different theoretical mechanisms through which loyalty programs could generate
extra-sales and section 2.3 reviews the empirical evidence on this topic.







Figure 2.1: The business model for a retailer that does not offer a loyalty program
2.1 The business model
In this subsection I explain how loyalty programs work. I build the exposition from the simple
case of a single vendor with no LP to the most complex one of an LP run by a third party. A
merchant who does not use a loyalty program makes their profit from the difference between
the sales they generate and their costs - the cost of goods sold and any other administrative and
selling costs they may incur. This case is presented in Figure 2.1.
In Figure 2.2, I look at the set-up where the retailer runs an ‘in-house’ LP. In this set-up,
consumers purchase goods and services from retailers and pay for them with money, exactly
as in the previous case. But now, the retailer awards consumers with loyalty program points,
usually proportional with the amount of money they spend. Some customers sign up for the
LP program, some don’t. For those who don’t sign up for the program the business model is
the same as the one presented in Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.2, they are the non-LP consumers in
the left side of the figure.
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The consumers who sign up for the program (the LP consumers on the right side in Figure
2.2) now receive points for the goods and services they purchase. For example, a Shoppers
Drug Mart customer who spends $42 in store, receives 420 points (according to the rule that
each dollar spent by the consumer is rewarded with 10 points). In offering these rewards, the
retailer hopes that the quantity of goods and services purchased will increase compared to the
scenario without LP (Figure 2.1). This uncertain additional spending is captured in Figure 2.2
by the dotted line labeled incremental $. I used the dotted line precisely to emphasize that when
offering an LP, retailers cannot know for sure that the LP will generate incremental sales, or that
the margin on the incremental sales is large enough to cover the cost of the LP program. Once
consumers have accumulated enough points, they redeem these points for rewards (the gray
full arrows in Figure 2.2. A redemption means that consumers’ balance of points is decreased
and they receive a reward in exchange. The reward can be an in-store discount or a gift that
the consumer chooses. The retailer’s profit from the loyalty program is the margin from the
incremental sales due to the loyalty program minus the cost of running the LP. In turn, the cost
of running the LP is given by the sum between the cost of the rewards and the administrative
cost of running the loyalty program. The total profit is the profit from the loyalty program plus
the profit as calculated for the retailer in the case of no loyalty program, as described in the
previous paragraph.
Figure 2.3 shows the more complex case where the loyalty program is administered by a
third party. This third party issues the loyalty points, and sells them to the retailers. Like in the
previous set-up, the retailers award the miles to the consumers who participate in the loyalty
program, proportional with the amount of money that the consumers spend to acquire goods
and services from the retailers. As in the case of the in-house LP, retailers hope that the points
they award will generate incremental sales (captured in Figure 2.3 bu the dotted gray line).
Once the consumers have accumulated enough points, they go the party that issued the
loyalty points (the Reward Program, as labeled in the figure) and trade their points for rewards.
Note that the rewards can be of broad types. The Reward Program can procure them either
from the same retailers to which it sells the points, either from other vendors, but this choice
is not consequential for the models that I am developing, so this this part of the chain is not
shown either in Figure 2.2 or in Figure 2.3. The Reward Program’s profit is given by the money

















Figure 2.2: The business model for loyalty programs run ‘in-house’ by a single retailer
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it receives from the retailers for the points it sells minus the sum of the cost of the rewards and
administration costs. For example if the Reward Program retailers 12 cents for each loyalty
point and the average cost of rewards is 9 cents, the contribution per point for the Reward
Program is 3 cents.
Beyond this hypothetical example, it is difficult to know how profitable third party admin-
istered programs are, mainly because these programs are run by larger companies, that also run
marketing analytics and retail solutions divisions and who report their consolidated earnings
and profits. For example, in Canada, AIR MILES is the largest third-party run loyalty pro-
gram. But the program is run by LoyaltyOne, which according to Hoover’s 1 reported earnings
of $44 million. Other third-party run programs are Aeroplan (in Canada) and Nectar (in the
UK and Italy). Both these programs are run by Aimia which reported revenues of almost $600
million2. These numbers, while not specific for the LP divisions, still suggest that there is a
thriving market for third-party run LPs.
In the case where the program is run by a third party the retailers no longer incur a direct
cost of the reward program (the administrative expenses and the cost of the rewards), but they
simply pay for the loyalty points they hand out to their customers. Retailers’ profit from the
loyalty program is given by the difference between the margin from the incremental sales due
to the loyalty program and the cost of the points. For example if a certain retailer gives out
on average 10,000 loyalty points per day, the retailer’s LP cost is $1,200 per day. If the LP
generates incremental sales of say 5,000 per day and the margin on those sales is 30%, then
the daily profit from the LP for the retailer $300 (30%*$5,000-$1,200). Retailers’ total profit
is the profit from the loyalty program plus the profit as calculated for the retailer in the case of
no loyalty program, as described in the case of Figure 2.1.
So far I have used the term profit from the loyalty program. However, it is not clear whether,
or to what extent loyalty programs are profitable. This is actually the question that I am trying
to answer in this dissertation. While the costs of the LP are easily observable and measurable,
the incremental sales cannot be directly measured. If the margin from the incremental sales is
1http : //www.hoovers.com/company − in f ormation/company − search.html?term = loyaltyone accessed
July 28th 2016
2https : //www.aimia.com/content/dam/aimiawebsite/ f inancial reports/2016/First%20Quarter/AIMIA Q1%202016 Highlights FINAL.pd f
accessed July 28th 2016
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less than the cost of the program, then there will be a loss from the loyalty program.
The two models that I am proposing in this dissertation can be applied to both set-ups
described in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Since I am interested in how the rewards influence the con-
sumers’ purchase patterns, whether the program is administered in house by the retailer, or run
by a third party, is, in itself, irrelevant for how the model plays out.
2.2 In theory, can loyalty reward programs change behav-
ior?
A loyalty program is considered successful when it generates sales that otherwise would have
not been realized and when the cost of generating these sales doesn’t exceed the additional
profit that is garnered. This relatively simple definition of success however does not engen-
der an equally simple operationalization. The main difficulty, especially with secondary data
provided by loyalty programs, is, as in all social sciences that try to gauge causal effects of
different programs or polices (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), assessing the counterfactual,
i.e., assessing how much consumers would have purchased from the focal firm in the absence
of the loyalty program. Given that consumers cannot be randomly placed in conditions that
either enroll or don’t enroll them in a loyalty program, self-selection is always a concern in
empirical studies that try to draw conclusions about the efficacy of a loyalty program based on
comparisons between members and non-members.
In this review I will discuss how previous research has tried to circumvent this problem. But
before moving in this direction I will discuss some theoretical reasons that previous researchers
have put forth either to support or to argue against loyalty programs. First of all, reward loyalty
programs are built on the idea that by promising and eventually offering rewards to customers
whose purchases from the target company are over a certain threshold, or making the reward
contingent on the amount spent, companies transform a spot market to a multi-period market
where consumers take into account not only the present but also the future (Beggs and Klem-
perer, 1992; Dowling and Uncles, 1997). This change can alter consumers’ decision process
and make them allocate a larger share of wallet than they would have done in the absence of















Figure 2.3: The business model for loyalty programs run by third parties
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the program and also increase retention.
2.2.1 Switching costs
Loyalty programs have the ability to lock in consumers into a relationship and thus prevent
them from switching to a competitor. The idea here is that once a consumer has already accu-
mulated a number of points that can be used to obtain a reward from a certain competitor in the
market, switching away from that competitor may entail the loss of the already accumulated
points.
In the two-period theoretical model presented by Kim et al. (2001) the heavy users (i.e.
those who consume the product in both periods) do not switch providers in the second period
because they don’t want to lose the reward offered to those who buy in two consequent periods
from the same provider. However, Hartman and Viard (2004), point to the fact that two-period
models overstate switching costs. In a two-period model the switching cost is equal to the
reward value, but in a multi-period consumers can redeem a reward in any of the many future
periods, so failing to re-patronize the target retailer in a certain period does not necessarily
thwart consumers’ chances of gaining the reward.
To the extent that they generate switching costs, loyalty programs have a potential to lock-in
consumers in a relationship with a provider even in a model where consumers realize that firms
have an incentive to increase prices in the second period precisely because of the switching
costs. Based on an analytic model, Kim et al. (2001) find that in most cases, in a duopoly,
firms are better off with than without a reward program. The same conclusion is drawn in a
model where two firms compete in an infinite number of periods (Beggs and Klemperer, 1992).
However, Dowling and Uncles (1997) notice that in the cases of the British grocery market and
the American air carriers, after the competitors started introducing loyalty programs, market
shares remained steady; even more germane is the observation that in Britain, Asda, the only
chain not offering a loyalty program among the top 4, was the fastest growing one (Passingham,
1999). This may appear to contradict the theoretical findings exposed above, but in the absence
of data on how the loyalty programs affected the profitability of each competitor, it is hard to
draw a firm conclusion.
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Kopalle and Neslin (2003) suggest that the major airlines introduced reward programs to
counteract a stronger outside category - i.e. low-cost new entrants that were allowed to enter
the market after the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act. This idea is derived from their analytical
model which shows that when competitors have a potential to expand the market, they are
better off by offering reward programs. Also, in another analytic model of two retailers located
on a Hotelling line, Lal and Bell (2003) show that when only one of the competitors (or both)
introduces a frequent shopper program, customers’ cherry picking is reduced or eliminated and
the profits of both competitors are increased relative to the situation where no retailer offers a
loyalty program. However, their analytic model shows that with heterogeneous consumers,
competing loyalty programs do not always result in higher profits.
In markets where competitors offer more or less similar or homogeneous products, loyalty
programs act as a tool that help to create differentiation, which in turn makes demand more
inelastic and thus can give rise to a non cooperative equilibrium that looks like a collusive
equilibrium (Klemperer, 1987). However, the incentives that companies offer to consumers
in the early stages, in the hope that this initial commitment will keep them captive in the later
stages, increase competition and may leave firms worse-off than in a world without reward pro-
grams (Klemperer, 1987). The extra-returns anticipated from the loyalty programs may never
materialize or be dwarfed by the costs. Authors who are pessimistic abut loyalty programs’
value and the likelihood that they increase profitability (Dowling and Uncles, 1997; Shugan,
2005) put more emphasis on these costs rather than on the uncertain and difficult to measure
benefits; in this sense reward programs are seen as producing liabilities that are not compen-
sated by the increase in purchases. Dowling and Uncles (1997) argue that such programs are
easy-to-replicate ad-ons (i.e. they don’t provide durable differentiation), especially those pro-
grams with non relation specific benefits (Deighton, 2000), that can be easily emulated by
competition. Moreover, these programs, by offering delayed rewards, do not even create such a
strong responses as an immediate reward that is given to consumers through a price cut (Dowl-
ing and Uncles, 1997). This observation is qualified by the findings of Zhang et al. (2000). In
comparing immediate versus delayed rewards (or front-loaded vs. real-loaded promotion), they
find that the latter generate higher profits in a market where consumers seek variety, because in
this case front-loaded rewards subsidize purchases that would have occurred even without the
2.2. In theory, can loyalty reward programs change behavior? 19
subsidy, while rear-loaded promotions retain customers that would have otherwise switched.
2.2.2 Points pressure
Blattberg and Neslin (2008) suggest that there are three specific mechanisms through which
firms can use loyalty programs to increase sales: points pressure, rewarded behavior and per-
sonalized marketing. In this subsection I am focusing on the first one, which is best illustrated
in Figure 2.4 through the black ascending portions that lead to redemption. Additionally, this
figure illustrates the rewarded behavior mechanism, which is explained in section 2.2.3.
In this figure the X axis shows the time periods and Y axis the number of loyalty points
collected per period. There are spikes in collection in the periods right before a redemption
takes place. This pattern can be explained by future discounting. For example, if someone
needs 1,000 points to redeem a reward, and is in a situation where they have only 10 points
into their account, exerting some effort to collect more points doesn’t pay off because the cost
of the effort is immediate, while the reward is obtained with delay, when enough points will be
accumulated. The discounted reward is simply not large enough to compensate for the cost of
effort. However, if the same person is in a situation where they already have, say, 950 points
into their account, a small effort to expedite the moment when one can claim the 1000 points
worth prize, seems justified. Consequently consumers will accelerate collection as they near
the requirements for a reward (the black portions of the line in the figure).
The idea of cost of effort behind the points pressure mechanism is perfectly aligned with the
definition of loyalty programs that stresses the fact that they can drive additional sales beyond
those driven by product qualities, be they objective and measurable or subjective emotions
felt by consumers for that product. Without any loyalty program, consumers choose products
that they find the best based on their own criteria and goals (Bettman et al., 1981). The loyalty
program alters these decision criteria. The additional sales generated by the loyalty program are
obtained at the expense of other products or by encouraging consumers to purchase something
that they would have not necessarily purchased. Therefore they represent departures from the
optimal or normal course of action that the consumer would have taken, so the effort and cost
are relative to the course of action where a loyalty program wouldn’t have been available. This
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isn’t to say that consumers who incur these costs are overall worse-off. They accept to incur
the costs precisely because they are compensated by the reward.
Kivetz et al. (2006) depart from the strictly calculative arguments (current effort vs. dis-
counted reward) and rely on the research in the behaviorist and motivation literatures to build
a goal distance model that explains the acceleration in collection through the fact that achieve-
ment motivation increases with smaller goal distance. They call this idea the goal gradient
hypothesis. This explanation doesn’t contradict the first account, but rather emphasizes the
fact that what matters is the perceived, rather than the real progress towards the goal.
Dorotic et al. (2014) propose a new mechanism related to points pressure which they call re-
demption momentum. In their conceptualization redemption momentum motivates consumers
to collect more points in the periods leading to redemption even when consumers aim to make
a redemption for which they already have the sufficient number of points. In my models I do
not specifically refer to this effect, but I capture it in two ways: 1) by allowing consumers to
have uncertainty around the size of the redemption that they will make (Chapter 3) and 2) by
allowing consumers to be forward looking: after any given redemption the program partici-
pants are likely to extract more utility from future redemptions when they are left with a higher
balance which allows them to make higher redemptions in the future (Chapters 3 and 4).
The points pressure and the switching costs are closely related mechanisms. Both effects
increase as the consumers approach the requirements that qualify them for the reward. They
both express the idea that RP entrenchment happens progressively: at low levels of accumu-
lated points the program is less relevant in altering choice than at high level of accumulated
points. One difference between these two constructs can be understood in terms of continuity.
With switching costs, the focus is on the discrete choice of whether to buy or not from the focal
retailer that offers the RP; with points pressure the focus is on how much to buy from the focal
retailer.
The other, more important difference between switching costs and points pressure stems
only from their optics on competition. Switching costs clearly emphasize the idea of a com-
petitor; Hartman and Viard (2004) outline them as difference-in-differences measure: suppos-
ing that A offers the RP and B is the outside option, switching costs are defined as the value of
choosing A over B when A offers the RP minus the value of choosing A over B when A doesn’t
2.2. In theory, can loyalty reward programs change behavior? 21
Figure 2.4: Stylized facts on the dynamics of loyalty points collection
offer the RP. In contrast, the points pressure mechanism may be exerted even in the absence of
a competitor; additional sales realized by the firm offering the program may stem either from
gain share from competition, from advancing future purchases or from, category expansion,
the mechanism being agnostic with respect to which of these sources is at play.
The distinction between different sources of additional sales becomes important in the an-
alytic model of Kopalle and Neslin (2003). In an environment with two competitors and one
outside option, they find that RPs are more likely to be adopted when the category is highly
expandable (i.e. when consumers have a high utility from the outside good). The logic is that
when the outside option is unattractive (the market is served at full potential), if a company
introduces a PR, most of the additional sales come from competition, which thus has an incen-
tive to respond and wash away any benefits. In contrast, when the market is expandable, by
introducing an RP, a company is less likely ruﬄe its competitor; both can enjoy higher profits
by introducing RPs and expanding the market.
Finally, besides switching costs and points pressure another related mechanism which can
contribute to increased sales as a result of the introduction of reward program is the zero-cost
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or effortless switching. For example if a consumer is indifferent between the product or retailer
which offers the reward and another product or retailer that doesn’t adopt such a program,
before the introduction of the program the consumer might choose randomly between the two.
After the introduction he or she only buys from the provider with the RP without making
any sacrifice. While this effect may be significant, unfortunately without data on individual
purchases at all competitors both before and after the introduction of the reward program, it
cannot be identified. In Figure 2.4 this effect is represented by the difference between the dotted
line (the baseline) and the leftmost red line.
2.2.3 Rewarded behavior
The second mechanism emphasized by Blattberg and Neslin (2008) - rewarded behavior - is
illustrated in Figure 2.4 through increased collection rates after the redemption moment (the
blue portions): the drop from the pre-redemption highest point is not sudden and then the
collection flattens out a level that is superior to the previous level. This effect follows from be-
havioral learning theory which states that ‘behavior that is positively reinforced is more likely
to recur’ (Rothschild and Gaidis, 1981). Simply put, the reward obtained by consumers repre-
sent an unconditioned stimulus - something that that generates positive feelings and is desired
in itself. The product or brand that offers the reward is the conditioned stimulus that, through
its association with the unconditioned stimulus elicits the same positive feelings (Blattberg
and Neslin, 1990, p. 22). This association becomes more apparent after a redemption, so the
post-redemption increased collection stems from the goodwill that is projected over the brand
through its association with the reward.
This theory, inspired by classical conditioning seems to denude human decision making of
any higher order motivation or cognition, relegating it ‘to the same level as pigeons pecking
levers to obtain their food’ (Blattberg and Neslin, 1990, p. 27). While this critique seems
valid, Blattberg and Neslin (1990) argue that there is little cognitive activity in low-involvement
decision making, so in these type of situations consumers can indeed become susceptible to
behavioral conditioning.
Another theoretical explanation for sustained collection effort after a reward redemption is
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provided by Dre`ze and Nunes (2011). They argue that being able to achieve challenging goals
(for example earning enough miles to be eligible for superior status tier in an airline frequent
flyer program), ‘can lead to self-learning, resulting in an enhanced sense of proficiency’ (p.270)
which, in turn, leads to an increased base level of effort.
While both the rewarded behavior (Blattberg and Neslin, 1990) and the partial post-reward
reset hypotheses (Dre`ze and Nunes, 2011) aim to explain the post-redemption increased ef-
forts towards collection, their specific predictions are different. First, the rewarded behavior
mechanism seems more likely to be applicable for rewards that are smaller in size, where con-
sumers are not highly involved either with the category, the product or the reward. In contrast,
the partial post-reward reset seems more fitted for high-involvement categories. Secondly,
while the rewarded behavior hypothesis predicts a gradual decrease in effort after redemption,
as the association between the conditional and unconditional stimuli starts to fade away, (the
blue portions in figure 2.4) the partial post-reward reset predicts that after a successful goal
achievement, the baseline collection is higher than the baseline collection before the reward
was achieved (the difference between the red segments in figure 2.4).
Finally, the rewarded behavior effect can also manifest through the reciprocity norm (Ku-
mar and Shah, 2004) - customers feeling that they need to make up to the company for the
reward they have received.
Even though the continuous line in Figure 2.4 shows points collected, it is easily apparent
that sales follow the same pattern. All the departures from the dotted baseline represent thus
sales that would have not been realized in the absence of the loyalty program. In my models
I will focus on the points pressure and rewarded behavior mechanisms, since the impact of
effortless switching can only be evaluated in contexts where consumers’ purchase patterns are
available across competitors both before and after the introduction of the RP. But before I con-
clude this section on the theoretical mechanisms through which customer reward programs can
benefit companies, in the next subsection I discuss the third mechanism proposed by Blattberg
and Neslin (2008).
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2.2.4 Building customer relationships
The last mechanism through which loyalty programs can increase sales of the three described
by Blattberg and Neslin (2008) refers to the provision of personalized marketing. This mech-
anism comprises actions like targeted promotions, cross-selling or personalized customer ser-
vice to meet individual customers’ needs better (Sopanen, 1996). When marketers have access
to customer’s purchase patterns, they can provide them private offers, that aren’t visible to
competitors (‘stealth marketing’) and thus can’t be easily copied (Deighton, 2000; Kumar and
Shah, 2004).
It seems that this mechanism is in the early stages of theoretical development as the cur-
rent theory can’t answer specific questions such as ‘how should targeted promotions be im-
plemented in order to maximize revenues?’ or ‘how can personalized marketing be used to
stimulate cross-selling better than traditional methods?’. So far the answers have been vague,
such as ‘the answer lies in sophisticated data collection and analytical techniques’ (Kumar and
Shah, 2004).
Another theoretical argument for loyalty programs is that they allow companies to collect
large amounts of data on their customers, which they can subsequently use to better analyze
and diagnose their market and eventually implement changes that would increase their prof-
itability. According to Deighton (2000), retailers can sell the data collected from their shoppers
to manufacturers, who can thus contact specific buyers with targeted offers.
However, this data is only partial; it doesn’t allow us to observe purchases from competitors
and moreover is made up of self-selected customers (Dowling and Uncles, 1997; Passingham,
1999) so the data may not be representative. While these draw backs are not fatal, it is worth
mentioning that the data collected through a loyalty program can’t be relied on as the only
source of market intelligence (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990).
Those loyalty programs that assign customers to tiers can make them feel special by as-
signing them to an elite tier, that provides improved service to the customer, but doesn’t cost
the company too much - for example priority boarding in the airline industry or annual ex-
penditure reports for heavy users of credit cards (Deighton, 2000). Experimental research by
Dre`ze and Nunes (2009) showed that three-tier programs (e.g. gold, silver and no status) is
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more satisfying to all involved than a two-tier program (gold and no status). However, whether
the preference that respondents have shown for three-tier programs is translated into behav-
ioral measures (such as incidence of re-purchase) remains a still unaddressed question. Also,
RPs may induce consumers ‘a feeling of participation, the anticipation of future rewards, and
a sense of belonging’ (Dowling and Uncles, 1997), but how these benefits translate in sales is
again an under-research area.
Thus, from a theoretical point of view, loyalty programs can bring value to companies
through several mechanisms as summarized in Table 2.1. However, for most of these mech-
anisms, there are factors that impinge on their effectiveness. Given that strong theoretical
arguments have been laid both for and against the effectiveness of loyalty programs, next, I
will review the empirical evidence.
2.3 Measuring loyalty programs’ effectiveness
In this subsection, I review empirical studies that try to asses the effects of loyalty programs on
outcomes of interest such as purchases (defined either in absolute value per period of time or
as share of wallet) or retention. I focus on studies that measure this impact either by observing
transaction data or consumer diaries and exclude those that rely solely on survey data (Liber-
man, 1999). Also, I exclude those that focus on estimating brand loyalty rather than its effect
on other outcomes (Che and Seetharaman, 2009), as well as those studies that focus on other
aspects of loyalty programs, such as speed of adoption (Allaway et al., 2003).
Two main approaches have been used in order to identify such effects: experimental or
quasi-experimental and structural. In the first type of approach, the main challenge is finding
the appropriate counter factual, or the appropriate comparison term against which to evalu-
ate the changes observed with a loyalty program treatment (Heckman et al., 1999). Experi-
mental studies with random assignment are considered best at illuminating causal inference
(Shadish et al., 2002, p.18), but having customers randomly assigned to either loyalty program
or non-loyalty program regime is not how companies run their businesses, so my review of the
literature revealed just two such field experiments. Moreover, as I will show, even random as-
signment may not always rule out all the alternative explanations. Quasi-experimental designs
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Positive effects Negative effects or weaknesses of the posi-
tive effects
• create switching costs for consumers (Beggs
and Klemperer, 1992; Kim et al., 2001)
• the incentives provided are costly (Dowling
and Uncles, 1997; Shugan, 2005)
• create differentiation (Klemperer, 1987) • this differentiation is easily replicated
(Dowling and Uncles, 1997)
• points pressure effect (Blattberg and Neslin,
2008; Kivetz et al., 2006)
• points pressure sets in motion only at high
levels of accumulated points (Dowling and Un-
cles, 1997)
• rewarded behavior effect (Blattberg and Nes-
lin, 2008)
• partial post-reward resetting (Dre`ze and
Nunes, 2011)
• possibility of personalized marketing (Blat-
tberg and Neslin, 2008)
• make data collection easy (Dowling and Un-
cles, 1997)
• gathered data is limited (Dowling and Uncles,
1997)
• customer tiers can make customers feel
special (Dre`ze and Nunes, 2009)
• may not translate into increased purchases
• the anticipation of future rewards and a
sense of belonging (Dowling and Uncles, 1997)
• may not translate into increased purchases
Table 2.1: Summary: Theoretical mechanisms through which loyalty programs can affect firm
performance
require even stronger assumptions that allow one to interpret the differences between the con-
trol and the treatment group as attributable to the loyalty reward program. Quasi-experimental
approaches may appear to be interested only in the overall results, by trying to assess whether
there a difference between the two treatments, and neglecting the process or the explanation
that drives the difference. However, by looking for differences among the RP regime and non-
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RP regime in different theoretically driven contexts (why measure something unless having an
apriori expectation, or an expectation deducted from some theory?), this approach implicitly
builds in theory in its development.
The second approach (structural modeling) places more accent up front on the process,
or the theoretical mechanisms outlined in section 2.2. This approach prioritizes theory (typ-
ically derived from an optimizing behavior) as the guiding source for empirical specification
(Chintagunta et al., 2006). While these models have been criticized for relying on numerous
assumptions, their defenders (Keane, 2010) argue that data cannot simply ‘speak’ and assump-
tions are always necessary in order to learn anything from the data (Shugan, 2005). Moreover,
the data itself cannot speak on unobservable constructs that only exist in theory. Here Keane
(2010) lists concepts such as the opportunity cost of time; for loyalty programs such constructs
would be reward valuation, switching cost or cost of effort to increase loyalty points collection.
It is important to note that the division between the two approaches is not as clear cut as the
short descriptions above may seem to imply. As I will underline in the literature review, some
studies exhibit the features of both approaches, with the advantage that the obtained results
are more robust. In addition, both approaches agree on the necessity of being clear on the
assumptions that allow inferring causal effects of the RPs and conducting sensitivity analysis
to see how results change with changes in assumptions and on the necessity of running out-of-
sample validations.
2.3.1 Experimental and quasi-experimental studies
In two field experiments Kivetz et al. (2006) were able to assign participants randomly to either
a loyalty program or non-loyalty program condition. Both studies involved a campus cafe´. In
the first study, willing participants were randomly assigned to either a ‘reward program’ or a
‘purchase-habit’ condition. Participants in the first condition were given cards that allowed
collecting stamps with the purchase date on 10 purchase occasions. After completing the 10
purchases, they would receive a free coffee. In the ‘purchase-habit’ condition, participants also
received a stampable card and were asked to collect a stamp each time they purchase coffee.
As a reward they were offered $5 when receiving the card and another $15 when returning the
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card at the end of the observation period, no matter how many stamps they collected.
In line with the points pressure hypothesis, the authors found that participants in the ‘reward
program’ condition showed decreased inter-purchase times as they approached the goal (i.e.
the 10th purchase). In contrast, those in the ‘purchase-habit’ condition showed deceleration,
i.e. the inter-purchase times in their case increased as they approached the completion of the
card. Kivetz et al. (2006) were able to rule out alternative explanations such as time effects
by using controls, or habituation, by analyzing the data of respondents in the‘reward program’
condition who after receiving the first reward, were reengaged in the program for a second
reward. These participants showed longer inter-purchase times at the beginning of their second
streak than at the end of their first streak.
What makes this design robust is fact that the effect of the program is emphasized though a
difference-in-differences approach: inter-purchase times when far vs. close to the goal between
the randomly assigned treatment and control conditions. The authors thus don’t rely solely on
comparing the treated to the non-treated (the experimental approach), but also on checking
whether, in line with the theory, the inter-purchase time decreases with decreasing distance
to goal for those on the ‘reward program’ condition (the more structural approach). Testing
specific theoretical mechanisms (such as the points pressure, as in this case), is, I think, one
way in which empirical research in this area can overcome the major problem of self-selection
into loyalty programs.
But even in this felicitous case where selection into the treated and non-treated group is
random, internal validity is not guaranteed. We are interested in the effects of the ‘reward’ and
‘no reward’ treatments on purchases. However, both treatments are included in more complex
packages, that include elements extraneous to our interest - in Shadish et al. (2002)’s con-
ceptualization, the causes in the field experiment are molar, not molecular. Thus, the reward
treatment might have implicitly brought in a higher motivation to record purchases accurately
(the reward being contingent on the purchases) than the no reward treatment, where there was
no such contingency. Thus, it is plausible that the participants in the second condition might
have made un-recorded purchases (either they didn’t have the card with them or were unmoti-
vated to pull it out of their wallet), so their recordings might be negatively biased. Moreover,
if participants in this condition were more likely to neglect using their card towards the end
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of the study than at the beginning (perhaps researchers [posing as cafe´ employees]’ instruc-
tions were followed more closely at the beginning), then the observed difference-in-differences
approach can no longer be entirely attributable to the reward treatment. By exposing this argu-
ment, I don’t want to imply that Kivetz et al. (2006)’s results should be discarded, but merely
to show that the golden standard of random assignment does not necessarily take care of all the
problems in causal inferences.
In second field study reported by Kivetz et al. (2006), participants in the cafe´ reward pro-
gram were again randomly assigned either to a condition where they received a card that re-
quired 10 stamps for a free coffee, either to a condition that required 12 stamps, but had the first
two already marked, presumably as a bonus. So even if in both conditions participants needed
to make 10 purchases to obtain the reward, the illusion of progress was manipulated such that
participants in the second condition perceived that they had a smaller distance proportion to
the goal (1010 vs
10
12 ). Consistent with the goal gradient hypothesis, on average, participants in
the second condition reached their goal faster than participants in the first condition.
Finally, Kivetz et al. (2006) report the results of an analysis performed on secondary data
provided by a site that rewards participants for rating songs: $25 Amazon gift certificates are
provided for participants who rate 51 songs. They find that participants visit the site more fre-
quently and increase the number of songs rated per session as they approach the reward. Even
though this set-up is somewhat different from retailing contexts where consumers are rewarded
for previous purchases, the results lend further support to the goal gradient hypothesis.
While in their interpretation of the results Kivetz et al. (2006) emphasized only the points
pressure mechanism, Dre`ze and Nunes (2011) note that these results are also consistent with
post-reward partial reset effect, in the sense that the observed inter-purchase times after re-
engagement are slightly lower than the inter-purchase times observed in the beginning, when
participants first joined the rewards program. Dre`ze and Nunes (2011) use data provided by the
loyalty program of an air carrier that grants tier 1, 2 or 3 statuses to customers who fly more than
a number of miles in each year. Consistent with the points pressure mechanism, the authors
show that customers reduce their inter-flight times as they get closer to the threshold that grants
them a superior status. Moreover, they show that after successfully achieving status, customers
work harder for the next year’s status - which is consistent with their partial post-reward reset
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hypothesis. The alternative explanation that customers who are able to achieve status already
have a higher propensity to fly with the company than those who don’t is ruled out by using a
regression discontinuity design. Dre`ze and Nunes (2011) also provide experimental evidence
to show that only non-trivial rewards are motivating and elicit partial post-reward rest and to
support the proposed mechanism (success increases self-efficacy).
Using transaction data provided by a grocery retailer, augmented by matched survey data,
Taylor and Neslin (2005) also test both for the points pressure and a rewarded behavior hy-
potheses. Customers who spent enough during the period in which the program lasted were
eligible to receive a turkey. By comparing the purchase levels in the pre-program period to
those during the program period, they noted that the program had a positive impact on sales
(the points pressure mechanism). Furthermore, by comparing the difference between the post-
program and pre-program purchases among redeemers and non-redeemers, Taylor and Neslin
(2005) conclude that a rewarded behavior effect is also supported, even though this effect is
smaller than the points pressure effect. In order to account for the fact that there is self-section
among reward redeemers, they use a switching regression model, where the probability of
redeeming is estimated from customer characteristics, collected through the survey data.
Even though Taylor and Neslin (2005); Dre`ze and Nunes (2011); Kivetz et al. (2006) (study
3) did not use random assignment into treatment and control conditions, their evaluation of the
effects of the reward programs they study are relevant, as they relied on theoretical insights to
create meaningful controls.
A less usual approach to build a comparison term (or a counterfactual) is followed by
Sharp and Sharp (1997): they rely on somewhat intricate ‘secondary source contrasts’ (Shadish
et al., 2002, p.127-128). They exploit the observed empirical generality of positive correlation
between brand penetration (i.e. the share of those buying the brand at least once out of the
total number of potential customers) and share of customer requirements (SCR) where SCR
represents the average share of purchases of the focal brand by those who purchased at least
once, out of their total purchases in the category, being therefore a measure of brand loyalty.
Their logic is that the effect of the introduction of a loyalty program should be visible in altering
this empirical generality, as a loyalty program is expected to increase SCR, but not penetration.
More precisely, those who don’t buy at all in a category won’t be swayed by a loyalty program,
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but those who already buy in the category are more likely to purchase more from the brand that
offers the loyalty program, that is to increase the SCR for that brand
In fact, Sharp and Sharp (1997) focus on a coalition program, namely Fly Buys. This coali-
tion program was launched in Australia in 1994 and it allowed consumers to collect points at
different retailers or gas stations or by using a specific credit card. They could then redeem the
points for air travel or accommodation. The authors survey a panel of consumers in the weeks
following the launch of the program and used the data to estimate a descriptive Dirichlet model
of repeated purchase patters (Ehrenberg et al., 2004). The model can be fit using data on cate-
gory penetration, penetration of one particular brand, average frequency of buying the category
per category buyer and the average frequency of buying the particular brand. It captures the
well-established empirical generality of positive correlation between a brand’s penetration and
its share of purchases for the customer who already makes purchases in the category. So their
strategy is to use the Dirichlet prediction for penetration and SCR as baselines and compare
these predictions with the observed measures. Upward deviations from the model predictions
in SCR and downward deviations from the model predictions for penetration are interpreted as
evidence that the loyalty program is effective. Their finding is that ‘there is a trend of excess
loyalty for Fly Buys brands, though for most it is disappointingly small’ (p. 480).
The other way in which the authors exploit the predictions of the Dirichlet model is by look-
ing at the observed and theoretical percentages of the customers who bought from two coalition
members. The logic here is that the loyalty program could potentially partition the market and
increase the duplication of purchase among coalition members relative to the Dirichlet predic-
tion. The finding here is again that the deviations are very minor. However, the conclusions
of this study rely on the implicit assumption that the studied markets should obey the em-
pirical generalization of double jeopardy captured by the Dirichlet model, which states that
there should be a positive correlation between a brand’s penetration and its SOR (Bendle et al.,
2016). This relationship has been observed in a series of markets, but it is an inductive, a-
theoretical observation that may not be entirely accurate, so the conclusion drawn based on it
may not be valid, either.
In loyalty programs, measuring customers propensity to purchase from the target company
before the introduction of the program is most of the times impossible, because purchases are
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tracked using precisely the loyalty cards that are part of the treatment. Also, the data collected
through loyalty programs offers information only on members, i.e. only on the ‘treated’ group,
so obtaining purchase information on the (yet) non-treated is often impossible. However, there
several ways in which researchers have tried to overcome this challenge: considering purchases
in the first month after joining the program as the ‘untreated’ outcome (Liu, 2007); using data
from industries where data is collected for all customers, not only loyalty program members
(Bolton et al., 2000; Verhoef, 2003); collecting panel data on people’s purchases at all com-
peting retailers (Nako, 1992; Ma¨gi, 2003; Leenheer et al., 2007; Meyer-Waarden, 2008), using
data provided by special promotions ran though the loyalty program (Lal and Bell, 2003; Tay-
lor and Neslin, 2005), or promotions where the RP is implemented only for a category of goods
(Dre`ze and Hoch, 1998). While each of these approaches comes with strings attached, in the
sense that additional assumptions of non-selection need to hold in order to be able to identify
the effect of the loyalty program on purchases, they still represent worthwhile endeavors.
Industries such as insurance or financial services record information about their customers
irrespective of whether they are or not members of the loyalty program. This feature provides
researchers with an easily available comparison group, even though the customers self-select
to participate into the program. Bolton et al. (2000) use data provided by a financial services
company, while Verhoef (2003) use data from an insurance company. In the absence of instru-
ments, or even control variables to account for self-selection into these programs, the positive
estimates of loyalty program membership on outcomes such as retention, account usage or
share development (defined as the change in the share of type of insurances typically pur-
chased by consumers from the target provider), are not informative with respect to the causal
effect of the loyalty programs.
Dre`ze and Hoch (1998) implement a quasi-experimental design, where consumers are
awarded loyalty points only for purchases made in a certain category (baby products, in their
case). Once consumers accumulate 100 ‘Baby Bucks’, they can use them to redeem a $10
coupon for other store purchases. The results of the program are evaluated using a difference
in differences approach with two sources of contrasts: sales in the baby category during the
program compared to one year earlier at the target chain vs. the same difference in the baby
products market; and also sales in the baby category during the program compared to one year
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earlier vs. the same difference for grocery sales at the target chain.
Liu (2007) observes the behavior of a sample of customers who have just joined a loy-
alty program offered by a convenience store. The data is truncated to include only customers
who made at least two purchases during the observation period. She assigns members to three
groups (light, medium and heavy) based on their spending in the first month of the program.The
first month is considered the baseline. She then compares the change in inter-purchase fre-
quency and the transaction size over time for each group. While the heavy buyers maintain
their behavior, the other two groups show a decrease in inter-purchase frequency and an in-
crease in transaction size. Excluding explanations such as learning effects or overall positive
trends in the market, she concludes that the loyalty program made the light and medium buyers
more profitable and it hasn’t affected the heavy buyers. This conclusion relies on the assump-
tion that the behavior during the first month after joining the program isn’t affected by the
participation in the program and therefore the effect of the loyalty program on the heavy buy-
ers may be underestimated. However, excluding customers with less than two purchases is
likely to overestimate the impact of the program. Moreover, including a control on whether the
current month is the last month in which the customer makes a transaction at the store (effec-
tively using future information to construct an explanatory variable) is also likely to introduce
positive bias in the estimated effects of the program. The reason is that this dummy variable
partials out all the decreases in transaction size and increases in inter-purchase frequency and
attributes them to the ‘last month effect’ which works against the effects of the RP.
By using data from a consumer panel, Meyer-Waarden and Benavent (2009), are in a better
position to draw a causal inference from a pre-test \post-test contrast, as they observe the
purchases of a group of customers who join the loyalty program both before and after they sign
up (group 1), as well as the behavior of a group of customers who don’t join the program during
the observation period (group 2). Thus, they also have access to a control group. However, their
modeling efforts are concentrated towards self selection (hazard model for the time to sign up),
mean comparisons between group 1 and group 2 over time, but without controls. They also
use a vector-autoregressive model and its associated impulse-response functions to test the
relationship between the number of cards distributed and outcomes of interest for the store,
such as share of wallet, frequency of purchase and mean basket.
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Lal and Bell (2003) also find that reward programs affect light and moderate users more
than heavy users. Their conclusion is based on data provided by a retailer who offers rewards
to customers whose purchases are above given thresholds within certain periods of time (for
example, spend more than $475 in a five-week period and receive through mail a coupon for
a full ham). Comparing the changes in spending between the the promo period and the period
before the promo among redeemers (i.e. presumably those who are interested and involved in
the program) and non-redeemers within each category (light, medium, heavy), they note that
these differences are largest for the light buyers and smallest for the heavy buyers.
Another approach (Ma¨gi, 2003; Meyer-Waarden, 2008) is to simply compare loyalty pro-
gram members and non-members, without measuring the differences between the two groups
before the introduction of the program. In order to conduct this comparison, researchers use
a panel of consumers whose purchases at any of the grocery stores in their area are recorded.
Some of the stores offer loyalty programs. Ma¨gi (2003) finds that having a loyalty card is asso-
ciated with increased purchases at the focal chain, while Meyer-Waarden (2008) conclude that
the members of the loyalty programs purchase more frequently, have larger basket sizes and
make purchases in more categories from the store whose loyalty program members they are.
However, given these data sets and the methodology, it is impossible to assess whether these ef-
fects are attributable to the reward programs themselves or are driven by a self-selection effect.
If customers who already have a preference for a certain store are more likely to join that store’s
loyalty program, then the observed positive outcomes are certainly driven by self-selection. In
this context, an unbiased estimation of the loyalty program’s contribution to increased sales
becomes impossible.
Nako (1992) also observes the purchases made by a panel of customers in the airline in-
dustry. As expected, similarly to the grocery examples above, members of a given airline’s
loyalty program are more likely to choose that airline vs. a competitor. But again, selection
into the program is endogenous. However, in his data there are additional sources of variation,
such as fares and service characteristics (average travel time, total flights - a proxy for conve-
nience, percent of direct service and on-time performance for each airline). So he includes in
the choice model interactions between frequent-flyer membership status and these variables;
none of them turns out to be significant, but the sign of the coefficients suggests that for ex-
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ample the members of the frequent-flyers are less sensitive to price. Assuming that those who
chose to join the frequency program were not less price sensitive to begin with, these estimates
can better answer the question of how the program influenced sales.
In order to account for this self-selection problem, Leenheer et al. (2007), use instrumen-
tal variables to separate the effect of the loyalty program from that of the selection into the
program. The Dutch households panel that they use contains information on all the supermar-
ket purchases done by the members of the panel over two years, as well as loyalty program
membership. A distinctive feature of the programs offered by the studied grocery chain is that
they have both a discount feature (that offers instant discounts to members) and a saving fea-
ture (that allows accumulating points that can be later exchanged for rewards). Moreover, the
authors have access to survey data on panel member’s attitude towards loyalty programs in gen-
eral (such as perceived costs and benefits and privacy concerns) and membership in gasoline
loyalty programs. These variables serve as instrumental variables since they affect participa-
tion in loyalty programs, but don’t affect the preference for a specify grocery chain. Their
estimates show that on average a loyalty program membership yields e 240 additional revenue
per customer per year.
Dorotic et al. (2014) analyze a Dutch coalition program where consumers accumulate
points at the participating retailers and then choose themselves when and how much to re-
deem. This is exactly the type of program that I study, but my methodological approach is
structural, while they rely on a reduced form Bayesian model which describes jointly the re-
demption and purchase patterns of program participants. They present point estimates which
quantify the effect of different explanatory variables on the purchase incidence and amount and
on the redemption incidence and amount. However, they do not use these point estimates to
quantify the amount of sales that are due to the program and the minimum margin at which the
program is profitable. Their conclusion is centered around the idea that redemption is the key
mechanism that drives profitability for RPs. Therefore, I think that the structural approach that
I develop in this dissertation can provide additional insights and complement this study.
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2.3.2 Structural studies
Structural models lay out explicit equations capturing that utility that the consumer obtains
from choosing the good that offers the reward, as well as the utility from the reward itself. The
choice of whether (or how much) to buy represents the solution of a dynamic model in which
consumers are assumed to maximize the utility derived from the good and from the reward.
The dynamic aspect is important because loyalty programs shift consumers from optimizing
‘myopically’ each purchase occasion separately, to optimizing over longer sequences of pur-
chases (Lewis, 2004) - i.e. taking into account the future consequences of their current actions.
The different parameters of the model are typically estimated such that the likelihood of the
observed sequence of choices is maximized.
Lewis (2004) uses data from an Internet grocer that rewards customers with frequent-flyer
miles based on the value of the cumulative purchases they realize with one year (rewards are
awarded for crossing each of the 3 thresholds set by the retailer). Given the finite-horizon in
which the RP is applicable, the author uses backward recursion to solve the dynamic problem.
The results show that at relatively high levels of cumulative spending, the probability of pur-
chase increases as the expiration time (52 weeks) approaches. This is in line with the points
pressure mechanism explained in section 2.2.2. However, for a low cumulative spending, the
probability of spending stays almost flat for the first 35 weeks and then it decreases continu-
ously, reflecting the lost hope of winning the reward. The policy simulations suggest that the
loyalty program as effective, as its removal would drop the purchase incidence from 19.7% to
19.2% per week.
Hartman and Viard (2004) analyze a loyalty program offered by a golf course, that offers
in-kind benefits to members: every 10 credits entitle members to a free round. Credits can be
earned by either purchasing or using an earned round. Their primary focus is on estimating
switching costs, as explained in section 2.2.1, using a dynamic structural model. In line with
their expectation, they find that less frequent customers face higher switching costs when they
get close to the reward, compared to customers with higher frequency purchases. However,
it is not often the case that low-frequency consumers have earned enough credits to be in
a high-switching cost state. Three factors contribute to this result: when holding a reward,
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frequent customers are more likely to use it quicker; credit expiration deadlines are less likely
to affect frequent customers; and the discount effect is smaller for frequent customers, as the
time between accruing the first and last credit needed for a reward is shorter.
Kopalle et al. (2007) and Kopalle et al. (2012) propose models applicable to RPs that of-
fer two different types of benefits: free in-kind rewards (flights or hotel stays) for which the
consumers decide the redemption time and status upgrades that are granted automatically to
participants who accumulate enough points within a period of time. This structure creates a
trade-off between redeeming rewards and amassing points in order to gain status. The struc-
tural dynamic models that they propose capture the conflicting goals that the programs create.
They emphasize both the rewarded behavior and the points pressure mechanisms and conclude
that both components of the programs are effective in generating incremental sales.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2 summarizes the extant empirical research on the effectiveness of RPs, organizing it
along important dimensions. Since random assignment is credited as facilitating causal infer-
ences (Shadish et al., 2002, p.248), one such important dimension is whether the study follows
an experimental design or not. Unsurprisingly, given how businesses implement loyalty pro-
grams, there is only one experimental random assignment study (Kivetz et al., 2006). Another
important feature is whether the study relies on transaction data, obtained from the records of
the company implementing the RP, which is less prone to errors than other data sources, such
as interviews or consumer diaries. As loyalty programs offer rewards at the end of sequences
of purchases, they shift the consumer’s horizon from single to multiple periods. Therefore,
acknowledging that consumers are forward looking, is likely to better capture and explain the
mechanisms of RPs, such as points pressure. The specific mechanisms through which RPs
affect behavior are important because they provide more structure and allow researchers to
make more tight predictions. When one just compares the molar outcomes in an RP condition
to those in a control condition, there may be potential threats to internal consistency, as the
RP treatment itself, or other components of the treatment packages may be responsible for the
effect. However, when the molar treatment is unpackaged into specific mechanisms, more pre-
cise, and thus more falsifiable hypotheses can be advanced. Unless refuted, such hypotheses
build better theories than less precise hypotheses (Chalmers, 1999).
Finally, another important feature of the research on RPs is whether it investigates programs
where the reward is granted automatically (such as status upgrades), or programs where the
decision to cash-in is deliberate. With two notable exceptions (Kopalle et al., 2007, 2012), the
structural models reviewed here are focused exclusively on the first type of programs. However,
most of the loyalty programs implemented by companies (frequent flyer, retailing or financial
services schemes) allow participants to accumulate points and exchange those points for a
reward at the moment they choose to. Moreover, it was observed that consumers are not very
active at redeeming (Abu-Shalback Zid, 2004; Davis, 2004; Andrew, 2006; InsideFlyer, 2006)
and have a tendency not to drain-out their points accounts after making a redemption. While
in the case of airlines, hotels and cruise lines redemption may be limited by availability or
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lack of sufficient points, in the retail sector the rewards are always available and they comprise
wide ranges, including more accessible rewards. Why consumers keep hoarding points in such
contexts where redemption should be relatively easy and where the value of the rewards doesn’t
increase convexly in the number of points required is a question that current research has not
addressed yet.
The models that have so far been advanced in the literature cannot account for consumers’
preference for maintaining high balances of unredeemed points, again with the exception of
(Kopalle et al., 2007, 2012) who focus on specific frequent flyer or hotel programs, where
participants have conflicting goals - gaining status vs. cashing-in a reward. In the case of
flights or hotel stays, consumers collect points in large, relatively infrequent lumps. In order to
accumulate sufficient points for status tier upgrade, consumers may prefer to hold on to their
points, which explains the accumulation of large balances. For example, in the frequent flyer
program studied by Kopalle et al. (2007), the average customer earns 6500 miles during an
average trip and they need to accumulate 25000 miles within an year for the silver tier, 50000
for the gold and 75000 for the platinum; at 50000 accumulated miles, consumers can redeem a
free flight. A consumer who already has 50000 accumulated miles might not wish to cash-in a
free flight, but rather pay for it and thus accumulate in one shot 14 of the additional miles they
need for the platinum status.
However, this tendency of clinging to the loyalty points and miles has also been observed in
programs where redeeming a reward is much less likely to interfere with one’s goals of gaining
status. In retailing and financial services loyalty programs, consumers collect small amounts of
points almost every week and also the choice of rewards tends to include low value options; by
redeeming such a low valued option, consumers don’t really threaten the objective of gaining
sufficient points for a status upgrade. At the loyalty program that I am studying, consumers can
redeem 95 miles for a $10 grocery gift certificate. In the same time, by refraining to use up the
loyalty points and paying with cash in order to obtain the necessary 1000 points per year that
would grant them gold status, they would barely earn about .5 miles. In this case substituting
cash for loyalty points in order to improve one’s chances of acceding to a superior status is
simply not a sensible plan. Given that in US only 31% of the loyalty program memberships are
in travel and hospitality, while 39% of the memberships are in retail, 21% in financial services
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and 9% in other industries(Berry, 2013), we need a more general model that accounts for miles
accumulation in the absence of competing goals (free rewards vs. status). In the next two
chapters I outline two such models.
One of the key takeaways from this chapter is that while some studies focus on the overall
effectiveness of RPs, for example comparing the outcomes of different groups in before/ after
quasi experiments, others provide more depth, by measuring one or all of the three main spe-
cific effects that were discussed: points pressure, switching costs and the rewarded behavior
effect. The second approach is more robust as a method of investigation, as it allows researchers
to point out specific mechanisms, which are more informative and more actionable than general
mechanisms.
However, all these three specific mechanisms are in one way or another related to the
redemption moment. Switching costs are effectively created when consumers have already
accumulated a sufficient number of points that make defection to a competitor more costly.
Similarly, the points pressure becomes apparent when the reward is ‘in sight’, while the re-
warded behavior effect appears only after a redemption. Redemption seems thus to be a key
component, that sets in motion the mechanisms which actually make RPs effective. As in most
RPs consumers keep accumulating points and are free to decide when and how many points to
use for a redemption, designing models that don’t impose a certain redemption, is crucial for
marketers in this area.
Next I develop two models that account for the preference for high balances and make the
redemption timing and size endogenous (Chapter 3) or keep the redemption timing exogenous
but enodogenize the size of the reward (Chapter 4). These models are applicable to sectors
where there is no trade-off between status and rewards, therefore they represent a useful and
robust tool for assessing how effective the most common types of RPs are.
Chapter 3
A collection-redemption cycle: the ‘cash’
model
As noted in the previous chapter, research so far, especially in structural models, has little to say
about redemption timing and size. The previous structural models focused mostly on rewards
that are granted automatically to RP members, such as upgrades to superior status tires or other
types of rewards that are transferred automatically to participants as soon as they reach certain
thresholds of accumulated points in given time intervals. This lack of interest may be justified
if the problem was uninteresting. This would be the case if either consumers were completely
disengaged and redeemed whenever they happened to remember or, in in programs with re-
wards that are linear in the number of points, they redeemed as soon as they had enough points
for the minimal reward. However, the data does not support either of these two conjectures.
Firstly, I see a large share of consumers hoarding their points, even if rewards are not convex
in the amount of LPs and for someone who discounts the future, there is no value in waiting
to receive a reward later when the reward can be obtained immediately. Secondly, I observe
consumers who redeem a part of their available LPs, so obviously they haven’t forgotten about
them.
One may say that this partial redemption can be attributed to ceiling effects (consumers
simply not needing/ wanting a reward that they can afford but choose not to have). This is
indeed a possibility when the rewards are large in size, and the model outlined in the next
chapter makes provisions for such situations. In this chapter I focus on the situation when the
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rewards are relatively small and consumers have many options of spending them and therefore
ceiling effects are not likely. It is difficult to imagine that someone who used their points for
a $10 grocery discount in a week simply didn’t need more groceries in that week. So in this
chapter I propose a model for, and analyze programs that offer rewards as in-store discounts
redeemable at consumers’ chosen time. I use the terms ‘reward’, ‘gift certificate’ and ‘coupon’
interchangeably.
This chapter is organized as following: first I lay out a theoretical model which describes
how participants in the program behave. The two main aspects of behavior are points collec-
tion (specifically how points pressure and the rewarded behavior effect can influence points
collection) and points redemption, which is governed by the utility of different redemption
sizes. Since collectors are not myopic, the actions that they choose to take (in terms of collec-
tion and redemption) are driven not only by the immediate utility, but by ‘today’s’ utility and
‘tomorrow’s’ discounted utility. The model captures this dynamic by using a Bellman equation.
Secondly, I present the data that I am using to estimate the parameters of the model outlined
in Section 3.1. This data comprises AIR MILES participants who joined the AIR MILES Cash
program. Section 3.2 presents details on the specifics of this program, as well as descriptive
statistics of the sample that I use. The Empirical Strategy Section presents details on the
estimation method for the parameters of the model described in Section 3.1. I am using indirect
inference, a method that belongs to the larger class of general method of moments estimators.
The key aspect of indirect inference is the fact that it relies on simulations and on auxiliary
moments to pin down the parameters of interest. This section also provides arguments to
support the claim that the model is well identified, i.e. that just one set of parameters can
‘explain’ the patterns observed in the data.
The Results Section shows how different specifications of the model fit the data, the esti-
mated parameters, and, most importantly counter factual analyses that assess how profitable
the program is and how different changes in the structure of the program will affect its prof-
itability. The Chapter concludes with Section 3.5, which recaps the main features of the model
presented in this chapter and the main findings.
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3.1 Theoretical model
Participants in an RP are not always engaged with the program (Ashley et al., 2011), especially
in low-involvement categories. In the model I assume that in some periods consumers are
disengaged; in these periods they are oblivious to any marketing efforts meant to attract their
attention; they don’t collect and don’t redeem any point.
When they are not disengaged, I assume that participants are engaged at one of the two
levels. The first level of engagement is that where consumers collect only ‘regular’ points -
that is the type of points that are handed out by the retailer who offers the program according
to their standard policy (for example 1 point for every $10 spent). At the second level of
engagement, program participants are also responsive to the special offers or promotions that
allow them to accumulate bonus points; in these bonus periods, participants collect both regular
and bonus points. For example retailers may offer bonus points to customers who spend above
a certain threshold, or who buy particular products that are on a limited-time ‘bonus points’
promotion.
I consider that the probability of being disengaged, denoted by qd is exogenous. When
engaged, consumers can collect bonus (or promotional) points with an exogenous probability
qb. I assume these probabilities to be exogenous because they are not easily changed by the
company’s activities and they are more a matter of personal characteristics. For example,
consumers have either high or low propensities to take advantage of promotions and they will
do so across retailers or categories. I allow qd and qb to be different among different segments
in the population reflecting the idea that people have different propensities to be disengaged
with the program or to take up ‘bonus points’ offers. When they are not either disengaged or
collecting bonus points, consumers collect only regular, non-bonus points and the probability
of this state is given by 1 − qd − qb. Equation 3.1 captures the distribution of points m1 for
individual i in period t in any of the three period types: disengaged, only non-bonus (or regular)
1Throughout the dissertation I use ‘points’ and ‘miles’ interchangeably, hence the notation m for points.
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points, or both regular and bonus points.
mit

= 0 with probability qdi
∼ lnN(Φ1 + Φ2ρit + Φ3Bonusit + I[HasRedeemedi = 1](Φ4 · TimeS inceRedemption−Φ5it ), σ2)
with probability qbi
∼ lnN(Φ1 + Φ2ρit + I[HasRedeemedi = 1](Φ4 · TimeS inceRedemption−Φ5it ), σ1)
with probability 1 − qdi − qbi
(3.1)
When engaged (rows two and three of equation 3.1) participants have a ‘baseline collec-
tion’, captured by parameter Φ1, which is equivalent to points they receive for the purchases
that they would make if there was no points pressure and no rewarded behavior effect. Note
that this baseline collection, as captured by Φ1 may include purchases that are still generated
by the zero-cost or effortless switching mechanism - i.e. still due to the RP. However, since in
the absence of data before the enrollment into the RP there is no variation in this mechanism, I
cannot identify it. RPs can be effective thorough any of these three mechanisms (points pres-
sure, effortless switching and rewarded behavior effect). But since I am only able to identify
the points pressure and the rewarded behavior effect, my estimates of the impact of the program
will be lower bounds of the true effectiveness.
As they keep accumulating points, consumers find it optimal to exert more effort in ac-
quiring LPs (Kivetz et al., 2006; Blattberg and Neslin, 2008). This is due to the fact that the
cost of effort is fully offset by the increasingly large rewards that become available, which are
valued non-linearly. In contrast, when they have few points in their accounts, the rewards, and
especially the larger rewards, are distant into the future and heavily discounted, such that they
can’t compensate for the cost of effort. This is the points pressure mechanism and is captured
in equation 3.1 by Φ2ρit, where Φ2 is a parameter to be estimated and ρit is the optimal (un-
observed) level of effort chosen by the consumer i in period t. I assume that effort is discrete,
reflecting different actions that consumers can take to increase their collection - for example
buying a small item just to make sure they spend enough to obtain a loyalty point on a specific
visit, buying something that is on ‘points offer’ (or ‘miles offer’), despite that product not being
one’s first choice, giving up cherry-picking among retailers, or driving longer to shop from a
retailer that offers the RP instead of a competitor in the consumer’s proximity. Furthermore,
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consumers can have a boost in collection if they come across a promotion, this effect being
captured by Φ3.
The baseline collection, the additional collection due to effort, and the effect of a bonus
promotion, are all anticipated components. However, post-redemption, consumers can also ex-
hibit unanticipated boosts in collection due to the rewarded behavior effect, because the asso-
ciation between the reward (the unconditional stimulus) and the RP (the conditional stimulus)
is strongest at the time of redemption and fades away over time (Rothschild and Gaidis, 1981;
Blattberg and Neslin, 1990, 2008). Therefore I use two parameters to capture this effect - Φ4
and Φ5 in equation 3.1, where I[·] is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the statement within the
brackets is true and 0 otherwise (HasRedeemedit = 1 means the consumer i already redeemed
something by time t). Φ5 is expected to be positive, showing that the effect of a previous
redemption decays as the time since the last redemption increases. I model this effect as unan-
ticipated because it has been theorized as a very basic phenomena that goes below consumers’
conscious radar. Moreover, the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated effects is
important because my model assumes forward-looking consumers with rational expectations.
I use R to denote the minimal number of points that can be redeemed. All redemptions
are multiples of R; these multiples are denoted by k and referred to as ‘number of redeemed
certificates’ or ‘coupons’. However, consumers cannot redeem more points than the points they
have. Denoting with S the stock of points they have at the beginning of an observation period
and with m the number of points acquired in that period, the largest number of coupons that
they can redeem is bS +mR c.
Consumers enjoy redeeming LPs and even if the reward is linear (i.e., P points correspond
to αP dollars in in-store discounts). I allow consumers’ utility to be non-linear in the sense
that redeeming 2R might feel better than redeeming R on two separate occasions. The main
argument for this specification is that retail grocery discounts are relatively small and redeem-
ing only one discount certificate might not be enough to entirely cover the price of most items
available in a store. Since consumers are more willing to spend LPs on treats on which they
don’t like to spend money, they may have a preference for redeeming more certificates at once,
such that the points can entirely cover the price of the treat being purchased. Moreover, by
computing the utility not in absolute numbers of certificates redeemed, but in logs of the num-
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ber of certificates redeemed, I put a countervailing pressure on utility increasing convexly in
the number of certificates, which becomes apparent especially at hight levels of redemptions.
Without logs, any utility function that would give a certain difference in utility between re-
deeming say 1 or 2 certificates, (that would match the choices observed in the data) would tend
to imply an unrealistically high difference in utility between redeeming say 7 or 8 certificates,
which are less frequent choices in the data, but which would hamper the ability to conduct
thought experiments.
The non-linear utility function that I described above is meant to capture average, system-
atic effects. Depending on the parameters, it may imply for example that redeeming 2 cer-
tificates brings 3 times more utility than redeeming one certificate. However, consumers who
have enough points to redeem 3 certificates may still redeem only 2, due to idiosyncratic, un-
observed influences - for example they really wanted a reward that required only 2 certificates.
I use itk to denote the unobserved taste for a redemption of size k in period t by consumer i
and I assume that itk are distributed Extreme Value.
Exerting effort to acquire additional points is costly. I assume that the cost of effort in-
creases exponentially, such that when ρ = 0 (i.e. there is no effort), there is zero cost as well.
The exponential cost of effort is justified by the idea that people first take the low hanging fruit
(i.e. they first take those actions meant to increase their collection of LPs that are the least
costly). In retail RPs, an example of low cost action would be buying a small item to make sure
one’s bill is large enough to receive one LP, while a high cost action could be purchasing 100%
of one’s grocery needs from the retailer that offers the RP despite it having higher prices and
being more inconveniently located than a competitor. Equation 3.2 shows the instantaneous
utility that consumers have from redeeming certificates and the their disutility of effort. In this
expression a1 to a3 are model parameters and eρ is the exponentiated effort. In practice I allow
participants to have different utilities from redemption, by allowing a1 to be different among
different population segments.
Equation 3.2 specifies the utility derived by consumer i in period t who redeemed k certifi-
cates. It comprises the non-linear systematic effects, the disutility produced by effort and the
idiosyncratic components discussed above. ε is a positive constant added so that the log of the
number of certificates redeemed can be taken even at 0.
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Uitk(ρ) = a1log(kit + ε) + a2log(kit + ε)log(kit + ε) + a3(eρit − 1) + itk (3.2)
I assume that different redemption sizes are realized proportional with the utility they bring.
So what matters is the relative utility of each redemption size as compared to other redemption
sizes. I use the utility of a non-redemption (κ = 0) as the baseline; the utilities for other
redemption sizes are calculated relative to κ = 0. Equation 3.3 below gives the probability that
κ numbers of certificates will be redeemed, based on the relative utility of different redemption
sizes.
Pr(K = κ) =
exp
(







a1[log(k + ε) − log(ε)] + a2[log(k + ε)2 − log(ε)2]
) (3.3)
One thing to note in equation 3.3 is that the probability for each redemption size is given
only by the differences in the flow utility, i.e. utility associated only with the redemption
itself and not with the position in which the participant is left for future redemptions. It is
conceivable that sometimes consumers prefer to make a smaller redemption now in order to be
able to make larger redemptions into the future; but this specification does not allow for such
effects. The reason is quite technical; to explain it here I will foreshadow some of the features
of the model, that I will explain in more detail later. In a nutshell, I develop a dynamic model
which allows program participants to put in effort ‘today’ even if the redemption only takes
place ‘tomorrow’. This infinite-horizon dynamic model is of the following form:
V(state space today) = maxactions I can take Flow utility today+
βΣProb(tomorrow I end up in state ∫ )V(state space ∫ ) (3.4)
In other words the value of the world in which I ‘wake up’ today is given by the best
action(s) that I can take today in order to maximize my utility today and the discounted utility
for the set-up in which I will wake up tomorrow (weighted by the probability that I end up in
that set-up). β is the discount factor. The fact that β is sub unitary is key in solving this type
of model, because this makes the general equation above a contraction mapping, which can be
solved iteratively by starting from any V0(state space∫ ), plugging that guess into the right hand
side of the equation 3.4 to obtain a new V1(state space ∫ ), until the difference between Vn and
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Vn+1 is very small. By introducing V(·) into the Flow utility today, equation 3.4 is no longer
a contraction mapping and I can no longer solve the model through value function iteration.
To recap, equation 3.3 shows the probability with which each rewards size is chosen. These
probabilities are influenced by the current-period utility only.
As mentioned above, the main feature of RPs is that they transform a spot market into a
multi-period market where consumers take into account not only the present but also the future
(Beggs and Klemperer, 1992; Dowling and Uncles, 1997). So the forward-looking consumers
choose their actions not in order to maximize utility at time t (equation 3.2), but that utility
plus their prospects at time t + 1. For example, consumers may choose to exert effort (and
incur the cost of effort) in the current period even though they know that they are not likely
to make a redemption in this period; however exerting effort ‘today’ may allow them to make
a larger redemption ‘tomorrow’, so for a forward-looking consumer, putting in effort today is
still worth, even though the benefits are delayed.
The actions consumers can choose are the following: 1) how many certificates to redeem
(k), and 2) how much effort to put into collection (ρ). The first choice is limited, such that
participants can’t redeem more points than what they have - i.e. stock of points at the beginning
of the period (S it) plus whatever they accumulate during the period (mit).
In each period consumes consumers know the period type (PTit) - i.e. whether they are
disengaged (PT = 0, or period type is ‘disengaged’), collecting non-bonus points only (PT = 1
or period type is ‘base points only’) or collecting both non-bonus and bonus points (PT = 2
or period type is ‘both regular and bonus points’), as well as the stock of points they have in
their account (S it). The stock of miles is an observed state variable, but the period type is not
observed - for example if a consumer collects zero miles in a period it may be because they
were disengaged (PTit = 0) or they were engaged (PTit = 1), but still did not collect any mile.
There are another two state variables which are unobserved by the econometrician - ξit - to
which I refer to as the ‘luck of the draw’, i.e. the realized number of points corresponding to
any combination of state and choice variables for participant i in time t, and itk - which is the
taste for different redemption sizes, or consumers’ impulses of spending.
As shown in Figure 3.1, in my specification, at the beginning of each time period partici-
pants know their stock of miles (S ), the period type (PT ) and their average taste for different
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of actions
redemption sizes (Pr(K = κ)). Knowing this, they first decide on the optimal level of effort (ρ).
This corresponds to a scenario where consumers decide in advance how much effort they will
put into collection (e.g. which retailer to visit), but they don’t know for sure how many points
this decision will bring them, as this outcome also depends on random factors such as specific
offers and prices of the retailer (this randomness being captured by ξ), which the consumer
doesn’t know in advance. Depending on their choice of effort and on the how lucky they are
in collecting miles , the number of miles collected in that period (m) is realized. After miles
collection took place, participants learn the set of ’s - i.e. the random components that affect
their taste for each redemption size and make the redemption that maximizes their utility in
that period (if no redemption brings the highest utility, then no redemption is made). Note that
the decision to spend is done at the end of the period, allowing consumers to spend the newly
acquired points as well. In the next period (denoted by t = 2 in the Figure), this cycle is played
again.
When they join the program, consumers’ stock of miles is zero - hence S 1 = 0 in Figure
3.1. Equation 3.5 below shows the law of motion for the stock of miles: the next period’s stock
(S ′) is given by the previous period stock (S ), plus the number of miles acquired in the current
period (m) minus the number of certificates redeemed in the current period (K) multiplied by
the number of miles required for one certificate (R).
S ′ = S + m − Rk (3.5)
I assume that there is no dependency between period types over time. As shown in the
transition matrix below, the probability of each period type is the same, irrespective of the
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0 q0 1 − q0 − qb qb
1 q0 1 − q0 − qb qb
2 q0 1 − q0 − qb qb
(3.6)
As alluded above, the two choices that consumers make are ρ (the effort which influences
the number of miles acquired and k - the size of the redemption. The number of certificates to
be redeemed is an integer between 0 and the maximum number of certificates that participants
can afford given their starting stock of miles in that period (S ) and the number of miles acquired
in that period (m):
k ∈
{





Effort is constrained arbitrarily at 6 distinct levels as shown in equation 3.8. I will talk more
about this arbitrary constraint in the ‘Identification’ subsection.
ρ ∈ {0, .2, .4, .6, .8, 1} (3.8)
However, effort is costly. The cost function is given by the following expression:
cost = −a3(eρ − 1) (3.9)
where a3 (a parameter) is expected to be negative. When ρ = 0, the cost is also 0. Higher levels
of effort increase the cost exponentially.
Despite effort being costly, program participants are motivated to exercise effort, because
it can bring them more miles and having more miles gives them the possibility to make higher
redemptions, which bring positive utility. However, I assume that participants only learn their
taste for different redemption sizes right before the end of the period, so when they decide the
optimal effort, they only know the probability with which redemption sizes k is selected (the
probabilities being proportional to the utilities) and the utility brought by each k. As explained
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for Equation 3.2, the utility of redemption is quadratic in the logs of the number of certificates
redeemed and ε is a constant added so that I can take logarithm when k = 0. So the objective







a1log(κ + ε) + a2log(κ + ε)2
]
(3.10)
In the equation above the summation is from 0 (consumers can always choose to redeem
nothing) to max κ = b S +mR c. As shown in the equation the maximum number of certificates that
can be redeemed (max κ) depends on the number of miles acquired in the current period (m),
which in turn depends on the effort ρ.
Equation 3.11 shows the Bellman equation that describes consumers’ maximization prob-
lem (the i and t subscripts have been omitted to simplify exposition). In this equation EPT ′ de-
notes the expectation over the future period type (disengagement, collection of regular points
only or collection of both non-bonus and bonus points). In principle participants can differ with
respect to their propensities of being disengaged or to collect bonus points and EPT ′ are taken
to accurately reflect those different propensities. Ema(ρ)[·] is the expectation over the number
of points to be realized in the current period, but this expectation takes into account only the
anticipated points (see discussion above) - in this notation subscript m refers to points and su-
perscript a refers to ‘anticipated’. The choice of effort (ρ) influences the number of acquired
points, which in turn influences the maximum number of gift certificates that can be redeemed.
δ is the per-period discount (including both the time discount and any risks consumers may
associated with the continuation of the RP into the future).
When consumers are disengaged (PT = 0), they don’t make any decision and the stock of
points for the next period stays unchanged, so in this situation the value function is given by the
discounted value of the next period’s value function (δV(S , PT ′)). However, if consumers are
engaged (PT , 0), they choose the optimal effort ρ, based on their expectations of the realized
number of points Ema(ρ)[·] and their expectation of redemption. The bottom line in equation
3.11 represents the expected utility from redemption, given that consumers don’t know the taste
shocks (itk) at the time when they make the choice of effort. The utility from each possible
redemption is weighted by the probability that that redemption is optimal.
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This is a stationary infinite-horizon dynamic problem, the working assumption here being
that consumers expect to remain enrolled into the LP program over indeterminate time. In
order to solve it I use both value function and policy function iterations for given sets of struc-
tural parameters. The solution of this problem is a policy function which, for each S and PT
specifies the optimal effort ρ that consumers should put into collection. Note that only effort
(ρ) is a solution of the dynamic problem, not k.
V(S , PT ) = EPT ′
(








a1log(κ + ε) + a2log(κ + ε)2 + a3(eρ − 1) + δV(S + m − Rκ, PT ′)]}))
(3.11)
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 summarize the state and choice variables that characterize con-
sumers’ problem, respectively the structural parameters that characterize the model.
Table 3.1: Summary: state and choice variables
State variables Choice variables
Symbol Interpretation Symbol Interpretation
S balance of points at the beginning of the period ρ effort put into collection
PT period type k number of redeemed coupons
(disengaged, regular only, regular+bonus)
 unobserved taste shock for different redemption sizes
ξ unobserved points shock
3.2 The data
The data is provided by the AIR MILES Rewards Program, the largest customer loyalty coali-
tion program in Canada. In a coalition program participants (shoppers) can collect points at any
of the sponsors of the program - i.e. retailers that have joined the program. In the AIR MILES
program the points are referred to as miles. As it is typical in such programs, the sponsors are
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Table 3.2: Summary: structural parameters
Symbol Interpretation
Φ1 baseline points collection
Φ2 rate of transformation of effort into points
Φ3 effect of promotional activity on points collection
Φ4/Φ5 effect of previous redemption on points collection as function of time since redemption
σ1/ σ2 scale parameters of the log-normal distribution in regular/ regular+bonus periods
a1, a2 quantify the utility derived from redeeming coupons
(allowing for non-linear utility in the number of coupons)
a3 the dis utility produced by the cost of effort
not direct competitors. For example, among gas stations, Shell is a member of the AIR MILES
coalition program in Canada, but Petro Canada is not. AIR MILES sponsors span a wide range
of sectors, from courier and logistics to apparel and grocery. Sponsor offer LPs on regular pur-
chases, ranging from 1 LP for $5 spent to 1 LP for $500 spent, but sometimes they also have
time-limited promotional offers where more points can be earned for the same amount or, in
retailing, certain items are sold with bonus points. By the company’s estimates, two thirds of
the Canadian households are members of the program. In the word of Brian Pearson, the CEO
of LoyaltyOne - the company which runs the AIR MILES Rewards Program - ‘in Canada, our
brand has higher penetration than any credit card, higher usage than any laundry soap, and
higher retention than any wireless service’ (Pearson, 2012, p. 3).
In January 2012 AIR MILES introduced a program called ‘AIR MILES Cash’ which al-
lowed participants to select a share of the miles they collect which should be directed towards
what they called ‘the cash account’. Miles in the cash account can only be used to redeem
discounts (or gift certificates/ vouchers) at partner stores in a wide range of sectors such as
groceries, gas stations, pharmacy, house renovation, coffee shops, toys, movies, etc. 95 AIR
MILES are worth 10 Canadian dollars in instant discounts or vouchers which the program
participant can also offer to someone else should they wish.
For this chapter I use transaction and redemption data of AIR MILES program participants
who have collected at least 100 miles in 2008 and who chose to direct all of their collected miles
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into the cash account at any point between January 2012, when the option was introduced,
until 2013 when the observation period ends, without reverting that decision while observed.
The first restriction reduces the likelihood that the sample contains inactive participants - i.e.
shoppers who stopped using their card altogether.
The company provided data on 31,020 participants who do not have an AIR MILES branded
credit card linked to their AIR MILES account and who live in one of Canada’s Eastern
provinces. I focus on this subset of participants because those with credit cards have many
more opportunities to amass AIR MILES, so their collection patterns look different. Partici-
pants are observed from the moment they switched their collection to ’cash only’ (i.e. chose
that all the miles they collect are directed towards the cash account that can only be used for
discounts) up to the end of the observation period - December 2013. For each account, I ag-
gregated the total miles collected in each 2-week period, as well as the miles redeemed within
the same interval. I define an observation as an unique account-period combination. I consider
the two weeks period to be the optimal aggregation level that captures trends in consumers’
collection and redemption patterns, without picking up much noise (as it is the risk with higher
frequency aggregations) and without missing much information (as it is the case with lower
frequency aggregations).
It is important to know that the distribution of miles collected by participants in each period
is markedly right skewed, with a mean of 14.9 and and median of 6. In the top .1% of observa-
tions, the number of collected LPs is larger than 342. In order to acquire this number of miles
within two weeks, participants should have spent about $1,700 at Holiday Inn (one of the most
generous sponsors offering 1 mile per $5 spent), or around $6,840 at Metro - a grocery store.
I consider collections above this threshold as outliers, reflecting one-time unusual expenses,
so I remove from the data set all the 944 accounts (3%) that had at least one instance where
they collected more than 342 miles within a period. Another 190 participants are eliminated
for inaccuracies in their records of regular and bonus miles collections. This results in a usable
sample of 29,886 participants.
Of the 29,886 participants, during the observation period 4.2% have reached a balance of
miles equal to or greater than 792 LPs, which is the top 1% of the observed balances in the
data. These accounts are labeled as ‘censored’ and they are followed only up to the moment
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when they reach this threshold - giving a data set of 1,202,417 observations. I use the balance
cap because the balance of miles is one of the state variables and keeping the size of the state
space under control helps speed up the estimation. Calculating what the best effort policy is
for someone who has for example 1,000 miles in their account takes time and chances are that
very few program participants are ever in this situation. Moreover, with a balance of 1,000
miles a program participant can redeem anywhere between 0 and 10 coupons; calculating the
chances for each of these eleven redemption sizes is again computationally costly. However the
cap doesn’t imply completely ignoring these accounts. Both in the data and in the estimation,
program participants who cross this limit are followed up to the moment they have crossed it.
The collection of miles shows a significant spike around the redemption moment. In Figure
3.2 I plot the average number of miles collected as a function of time to the moment when a
redemption takes place (the left panel) and the average number of miles collected as a function
of time from the moment when a redemption takes place (the right panel), emphasizing sepa-
rately the regular and the bonus miles. Since counting always starts with 1 from a redemption
moment, both series have the same value at 1 (in the redemption periods). In both cases, the
collection decreases significantly with time.
This represents model-free evidence for the points pressure and for the rewarded behavior
effect, especially since in both cases the decrease is progressive. It appears that the increase in
collection is not associated only with the redemption period, case in which it could be that a
large random collection triggers redemption, not that participants actively increase their collec-
tion in order to make a redemption. Moreover, both effects are apparent both for the baseline
and for the bonus miles.
A valid concern regarding the above interpretation of Figure 3.2 is that collectors with high
propensities to collect bonus miles and low propensities to be disengaged can accumulate miles
more easily and thus they will always be a short distance away either to or from a redemption.
Thus, the increased collection around redemption times might be the outcome of a heteroge-
neous sample rather than genuine points pressure and rewarded behavior effects. Separating
the points pressure from sample heterogeneity is very important in order to accurately assess
the effectiveness of the program. Therefore, a key aspect of the model is to take into account
heterogeneous propensities to be disengaged or to collect bonus miles.
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Moreover, for the left panel (accumulation of points leading to an observed redemption)
another possible interpretation is that there is some selection in the timing of the reward: that
participants may be more likely to choose to make a redemption after a streak of lucky col-
lections - i.e. increases in their collection that are not due to systematic effort exertion, but to
luck. So the redemption moment is selected based on the random draws that characterize miles
collection. The model that I estimate helps to quantify these 3 different effects: true loyalty
program effect, heterogeneity and selection. By teasing out the last two effects, I can be more
confident that the estimated RP effect is not upward biased.
Figure 3.2: Average collection as a function of time to/ after a redemption
The upper panel of Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of miles balances at the end of
a redemption period by redemption size - e.g. the leftmost box plot is the distribution of
miles that participants who redeemed 1 coupon (95 miles) have in their account at the end of a
redemption period. What is most striking is the fact between one quarter and half (depending on
the redemption size) of the balances are larger than 95 miles which is the minimal redemption.
Given that after cleaning the data the mean number of miles collected per period is 13.2 it is
hard to believe that all this extra stock of miles was built after the redemption. Moreover, given
that 95 miles offer a $10 discount which can be used at several retailers it is also hard to believe
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that participants simply didn’t need to make more expenses within that period. This implies
that keeping a relatively high balance is an active strategy, not the outcome of circumstantial
constraints.
Figure 3.3: The distribution of miles balances after a redemption (top panel), one period before
a redemption (middle panel) and two periods before a redemption (bottom panel) by the size
of the redemption
Furthermore, the middle and bottom panels of Figure 3.3 show the distributions of the
balances one and two periods before the redemption. These plots show that about half of
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the redemptions could have taken place 2 periods (4 weeks) before the moment they actually
took place. Two mechanisms can explain this patterns: 1) participants are disengaged, or 2)
they strive to accumulate high balances which allow for larger redemptions that provide larger
utility, but in the same time they have impulses (or random utility shocks - ’s), that make them
redeem ‘now’, even if that redemption size has a systematic utility which is lower than a larger
redemption size which could be attained in the future - call this ‘an option value’. The model
that I propose accommodates both mechanisms: disengagement through qd and the random
utility shocks through the specification of the utility function (equation 3.2).
3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 Indirect inference
The outlined model poses a challenge for estimation, as its complexity impinges on one’s
ability to derive closed form expressions that can be estimated through maximum likelihood.
Therefore, I use indirect inference (Gourieroux et al., 1993; Smith, 2008), a method that relies
on certain key features (moments) - usually denoted by θˆ and simulations, in order to derive
the structural parameters of interest. The moments are collectively called the auxiliary model.
Indirect inference has been previously used in economics and business, especially finance,
for similarly complex problems such as showing the impact of social interactions on unem-
ployment (Topa, 2001), of social security on saving and retirement decisions (van der Klaauw
and Wolpin, 2008), estimating companies’ cost of financing (Hennessy and Whited, 2007) or
estimating CEO entrenchment (Taylor, 2010).
Since in the sample there are 29,886 participants, I simulate an equal number of individuals
over a number of periods equal to that observed in the data (since the participants in my sample
joined the AIR MILES cash program at different times, they are observed over different lengths
of time). In the simulation each individual collects points and makes redemptions until they
either reach a balance of 792 miles (the ceiling level mentioned above) or until their number
of observation periods ends (again, the number of observations are exactly those observed
for individuals in the real data). For a given set of structural parameters (β) the choices of the
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simulated individuals are based on the optimal policy (equation 3.11) and their specific random
errors. The optimal policy depends on the structural parameters and prescribes the best actions
(in terms of effort and number of certificates to be redeemed) for each situation (state) in which
the simulated individuals may be. There are three sets of errors and they remain fixed for
different β’s: 1) the period type (disengaged; only regular miles; regular and bonus miles),
denoted by e; 2) the specific draw of miles from the normal distribution (ξ); 3) the specific
taste shocks for different redemption sizes ().
Once the optimal policy has been calculated (for a given β), a collection-redemption pattern
is generated for each simulated individual. Now the task is to see how close the simulated data
is to the real data and find that β which generates simulated data that is as close as possible
to the real data. In order to measure this degree of closeness I use key descriptive statistics of
both data sets, or moments, such as means or regression coefficients (the next section describes
them in detail). The moments of the true data are denoted by θˆ and those of the simulated data
are denoted by θ˜(β). In mathematical terms:
βˆ = arg min
β
(θˆ − θ˜(β))′W(θˆ − θ˜(β)) (3.12)
where W is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of θˆ obtained by bootstrapping, where
the off-diagonal elements have been replaced by 0s.
3.3.2 Identification
The model outlined above features a disutility produced by the cost of effort (a3) and two
parameters associated with the non-linear benefits (a1 and a2) of redemption. Since both costs
and benefits are constructs that exist only in theory (the observed data doesn’t contain any
measure of them), I fixed a3 to 1. Moreover, the levels of effort are set to 6 discrete values,
between 0 and 1 in .2 increments. The discretization of effort is in line with the observation
that consumers increase their collection above baseline by taking certain individual actions like
switching retailers, products or accepting higher prices.
The parameters that define the non-linear utility of the redemption size (a1 and a2) are
identified mainly from the average redemption (R · E(kit|kit > 0) - where R is the number of
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points required to redeem one certificate and k is the number of redeemed certificates) and
from the average balance left into one’s account at the end of a redemption period (E(S it|kit >
0)). A more convex shape of the utility function should mean that participants make larger
redemptions and also leave fewer miles into their accounts when they can afford to redeem
higher numbers of certificates.
Since I allow a1 to be different for different segments in the population - call them ‘re-
deemers’ and ‘non-redeemers’, I will estimate ar1, a
nr
1 , as well as pr - the percentage of partici-
pants who belong to the ‘redeemers segment’. To identify these parameters I use two additional
moments related to the pattern of redemption: one is the percentage of observed participants
who don not make any redemption while observed, E(I[NonRedeemer = 1]) and the second is
the average observed inter-redemption time E(τ|cens = 0) - i.e. including only the completely
observed, non-censored spells.
I emphasize that ‘redeemer’ and ‘non-redeemer’ are only labels. I expect anr1 < a
r
1, such that
participants classified as non-redeemers (NR) derive less utility from any positive redemption
than the participants who are classified as redeemers (R). This decreased utility from redemp-
tion will make participants in the non-redeemer segment redeem less often, but they can still
make redemptions. I use the label ‘non-redeemers’ for brevity, but the proper label should be
‘less inclined to redeem’.
In order to identify the baseline collection (Φ1) and the boost generated by the bonus miles
(Φ2), I look separately at the mean collection in periods when no-bonus miles are collected
(E(mit|PTit < 2)) and the mean collection in periods when both regular and bonus miles are
collected (E(mit|PTit = 2)). To pin down the two scale parameters of the log-normal distribu-
tions (σ1 and σ2), I rely on the variance in collections: Var(mit|PTit < 2) and Var(mit|PTit = 2).
However, the observed average collection is also influenced by the effort which consumers
put into it, which, in line with the theory, is expected to increase as participants approach a
redemption moment. Thus, in order to disentangle the effect of effort (Φ3) from the baseline
collection (Φ1) and bonus (Φ2) I use a regression (denoted R1) which includes only the subset
of observations that contain collection streaks that eventually lead to an observed redemption.
For example if a participant is observed for 40 periods and makes only one redemption in
period 20, I use only the data up to and including period 20. In this regression the LHS is
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the number of collected miles and the explanatory variable is the logarithm of the number
of the period starting with 1 from a redemption period and going backwards up the the last
redemption or to the moment when participants switched their collection to the ‘cash account’
(log(Count back)). As effort is expected to increase as log(Count back) decreases (i.e. as the
redemption moment is getting closer), the coefficients of this regression are key in identifying
the the points pressure mechanism. Furthermore, the rewarded behavior effect (Φ4 and Φ5) are
identified from a regression of the number of miles collected on the logarithm of time since
the most recent redemption (log(Count f wd)), using the subset of observations that follow a
redemption (regression R2 in Table 3.3).
Without heterogeneity in the propensities to be disengaged or to collect bonus points, in
each period each participant to the program has a probability equal to qd of being disengaged
(PT = 0), a probability equal to qb of collecting bonus points (PT = 2) and a probability equal
to 1 − qd − qb of collecting only regular miles (PT = 1). By introducing heterogeneity, I allow
qd and qb to be specific for each segment. The shares of the different segments are captured by
parameters denoted by QI and QII; the share of the third segment is simply 1 − QI − QII . In
order to identify the share of these different segments, as well as the specific characteristics of
each type (e.g. the probability that an individual of type I is disengaged - qId, or the probability
that an individual of type II collects bonus miles - qIIb ), I rely on several other moments. Two
of these moments are simple averages of the instances when either zero miles or bonus miles
are accumulated - using I[·] as an indicator variable, these moments are simply E(I[mit = 0])
and E(I[PTit = 2]). The other moments require input obtained at the individual level - namely
the percentage of times an individual collects zero miles µ0i = Ei(I[mt = 0]), the percentage
of times an individual collects bonus miles µbi = Ei(I[PTt = 2]), the average number of miles
collected in a bonus period µmbi = Ei(mt|PTt = 2) and the average number of miles collected in a
non-bonus period, conditional on a positive number of miles being acquired µmri = Ei(mt|PTt =
1 and mt > 0). The difference between the average miles collected by each individual in bonus
periods and the average miles collected in non-bonus, non-zero-collection periods is denoted
by ∆i, so ∆i = µmbi − µmri .












, E(∆i), Q25(∆i), Q75(∆i), where Qx stands for the xth quantile of
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the distribution. Since these moments are used in estimation, I need them to be responsive
to even small changes in the sample and quantiles typically do not change easily with small
changes in the sample (e.g. removing one individual). For this reason I use a ratios of quantiles.
Also, for the zero miles individual indicator, µ0i , the 20
th quantile observed in the data is zero,
which renders any information provided by the 80th quantile useless - therefore I used the 25th
and 75th quantiles. The eight moments discussed in this paragraph, together with the intercept
of regression R1 allow identifying up to 3 distinct segments (each segment being characterized
by the probability of being disengaged (qd) and the probability of collecting bonus miles (qb) -
while the probability of collecting only regular miles is the balance up to 1). The last three mo-
ments are especially important for distinguishing between variance in the collection of miles
in the regular-only and bonus periods (σ1 and σ2) and a more systematic source of variance
driven by membership into specific subsegments.
To recap, the auxiliary model that I use for estimation allows me to identify up to 6 distinct
latent segments: 2 in terms of redemption propensity x 3 in terms of the propensity to be disen-
gaged, collect regular miles only or collect both regular and bonus miles. These segments are
orthogonal - there is no correlation structure between the two factors (redemption propensity
and collection type propensity). In other words a redeemer is as likely as a non-redeemer to be
in any of the 3 ‘engagement’ level segments.
In theory, the number of latent segments can be expanded by including more moments into
the auxiliary model. However, in doing so I encounter two problems. The first (and easier to
solve) is computational power, since calculating the optimal effort and redemption for is done
separately for each segment. The second and more difficult problem is identification. With
more latent segments it becomes difficult to separately identify each segment’s parameters
and size, because different latent segments become more and more similar to each other. To
differentiate among them, even more auxiliary moments are needed.
A case in point is the inclusion of the last three moments (E(∆i), Q25(∆i), Q75(∆i)). The
model with 6 latent segments has 19 parameters, so in theory 19 informative moments would
have been sufficient to identify the parameters in a just-identified model. However, when I con-
ducted an exercise trying to recover known parameters and confirm that the model is identified
(details in Appendix A) using only the first 19 moments listed in Table 3.3, I noticed that these
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were not sufficient. Relying only on them failed to properly identify the ‘natural’ variance in
collection (σ1 and σ2) from the shares of different latent segments (QI and QII). E(∆i), Q25(∆i),
Q75(∆i) were specifically chosen to help identify these parameters and, as shown in Appendix
A, their inclusion renders the model with 6 latent segments well identified.
3.4 Results
Table 3.3 shows the data moments (θˆ), their weights, as well as the simulated moments for 3
different specifications. In all the three specifications there are two distinct segments that differ
in their utilities for redemption ar1 and a
nr
1 . The difference between the 3 specifications lies in
the number of assumed latent segments with different propensities to be disengaged or collect
bonus points. The bottom line shows the value of the objective function (equation 4.3.2), the
number of parameters used in each specification and the moment and model selection crite-
ria (MMSC) suggested by Andrews and Lu (2001) to select among competing models. The
MMSC-BIC criterion is analogous to the BIC criterion used for maximum likelihood estima-
tion; it is computed as
MMS C − BIC = JN − (|c| − |b|)ln(N) (3.13)
where JN is the J-test statistic, (the minimized value of the objective function), |c| is the size of
moments vector (22 in this case), |b| is the size of the parameter vector (13, 16 or 19 - depending
on the specification), and N is the number of observations. The second term of the equation
above is called ‘the bonus term’ by Andrews and Lu (2001). The idea is that models with less
parameters fit the data worse (JN is larger) so a higher ‘bonus term’ is subtracted in the case of
these models to compensate for the fact that they use fewer parameters. The best model is the
one with the smallest MMSC-BIC, in this case the model with 3 distinct segments that differ
in their propensities to collect bonus miles or to be disengaged.
Several aspects stand out in Table 3.3. First there is wide variance in terms of the weights
attached to the moments. Failing to match closely those moments with higher weights is penal-
ized more heavily in the objective function than failing to match moments with lower weights.
The different weights reflect partly different orders of magnitude and partly different signal to
noise ratios in the data: those moments that vary little among different bootstrapped samples
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Table 3.3: The data moments, their weights and the simulated moments under the assumption
of 1, 2 or 3 latent segments in terms of propensity to be disengaged or to collect bonus miles
Data Simulation
Moment Weight Number of latent segments
1 2 3
1 E(I[mit = 0]) 0.1813 5,213,973.36 0.0350 0.1846 0.1778
2 E(I[PTit = 2]) 0.3403 3,566,749.65 0.3533 0.3542 0.3452
3 Var(µ0i ) 0.0474 25,941,859.74 0.0009 0.0365 0.0480
4 Var(µbi ) 0.0508 29,394,953.33 0.0060 0.0416 0.0494
5 E(mit|PTit < 2) 5.1735 6,658.79 5.6197 5.6104 5.6787
6 Var(mit|PTit < 2) 73.9440 1.13 38.5401 81.8024 78.9505
7 E(mit|PTit = 2) 28.6410 1,258.38 27.4059 27.9105 27.7448
8 Var(mit|PTit = 2) 970.0255 0.04 1002.0170 1093.1159 908.9943
9 R1 intercept 29.5357 5,913.00 28.5268 29.2824 29.4459
10 R1 log(Count back) -7.2306 17,984.40 -7.6953 -7.4223 -7.3330
11 RE(kit|kit > 0) 138.8113 41.52 141.7780 140.6499 138.3464
12 E(S it|kit > 0) 74.1151 11.70 48.0090 69.0921 66.5987
13 R2 intercept 29.4471 1,749.28 30.5328 29.4467 29.6445
14 R2 log(Count f wd) -7.7196 3,181.87 -8.7309 -7.8834 -7.9078
15 Cov(µ0i , µ
b










0.2456 479,566.74 0.6922 0.2089 0.2176
18 Ei(I[NonRedeemer = 1]) 0.2642 273,715.34 0.2320 0.3173 0.2747
19 E(τit|cens = 0) 9.8707 4,509.34 10.4069 10.0782 10.2739
20 E(∆i) 19.4621 538.89 21.3075 20.5216 20.5311
21 Q25(∆i) 9.8461 453.36 13.5885 13.3534 13.1296
22 Q75(∆i) 24.6995 147.63 26.6769 25.2383 25.6036
objective function 500,314.63 20,476.53 11,096.58
number of parameters 13 16 19
MMSC-BIC 500,188.63 20,392.53 11,054.58
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have higher weight than those which vary a lot. Secondly, the model which does not include
heterogeneity produces moments that are noticeably further from the true moments in the data,
than the two models that include heterogeneity.
The models (especially the one that uses 3 latent segments) produces moments that resem-
ble well the true moments observed in the data and the fit is comparable to other models that
use a similar approach (e.g. Goettler and Gordon (2011)). The most dramatic difference is for
Q25(∆i), the 25th quantile of the individual differences between miles collected in bonus periods
and miles collected in non-bonus periods with positive collection; in the real data this value is
9.85, while in the simulation it is 13.13. The reason is that in the simulation, the collection in
bonus periods is systematically and consistently higher than in non-bonus periods, while in the
real data, there is less consistency to this pattern. That said, the 3 segments model produces
moments that are reasonably close to those observed in the data.
The parameters in Table 3.3 were chosen purposefully to match these moments. Another
test is to assess how well the model does on other moments, that were not used in the estima-
tion. Table 3.4 shows a sample of 8 such moments. The first one is the average balance across
all periods; it is lower in the data than in the simulation (127.8 vs 140.8) and the whole distri-
bution of balances seems shifted to the right in the simulation. A possible explanation for this
discrepancy is the fact that in the model I assumed that being a non-redeemer type is orthogo-
nal to the disengaged/ core/ bonus types. Likely, in reality collectors who collect many bonus
miles are less likely to be non-redeemers, so those who are in a position to accumulate large
balances are also less likely not to spend them. However, when looking at the percentage of
times different redemption sizes are redeemed, the simulated data appears in closer agreement
to the true data.
Table 3.5 shows the estimated parameters with their standard errors. In order to calculate
the standard errors, I first calculated numerically the matrix of derivatives of each moment with
respect to each parameter at the value of the parameters that minimize the objective function
(the Jacobian, denoted with J). The standard errors are the squared root of the diagonal of
the following matrix: (Λ · W · Λ′)−1, where W is the weighting matrix used in the estimation.
With the exception of the last parameter (segment 3 propensity to be disengaged) all the other
parameters have narrow confidence intervals and are more than two standard deviations away
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Table 3.4: True and simulated moments not used in the estimation
Moment In the data In the simulation
average balance across all periods 127. 8 140.8
Q25 balance across all periods 43 49
Q50 balance across all periods 86 93
Q75 balance across all periods 160 190
% redemptions equal to minimum redemption (95) 72.32 71.31
% redemptions equal to 190 17.24 19.07
% redemptions equal to 285 5.91 5.86
% redemptions larger than 285 4.53 3.76
from 0.
An interesting observation is that the estimated rate of transformation of effort into points
(Φ2) decreases with the number of assumed latent segments, suggesting lower estimates for
the points pressure effect in the model with 3 segments. Also, the parameters that quantify
rewarded behavior effect (Φ4 and Φ5) seem to point to a lower effect in the model with 3 seg-
ments, compared to the other two models: the initial effect is smaller and the decay rate of the
effect is markedly higher in this model. These findings support the hint expressed when an-
alyzing the descriptive statistics (Section 3.2), that heterogeneity among program participants
can be mistaken for positive effects of the program. In Section 3.4.1, I will come back to this
aspect and assess whether the implied effectiveness of the program is higher when not consid-
ering heterogeneity (1 segment model) or considering it in a more limited fashion (2 segments
model).
Looking at the last column of Table 3.5 it appears that almost 47% of the observed par-
ticipants are ‘redeemers’ (pr = 0.4672), while the remaining 53% are‘non-redeemers’. Or-
thogonal on this classification, there are 3 other distinct groups in terms of propensities to be
disengaged or collect bonus miles. I call the first group, comprising about 15% of the popu-
lation, the ‘disengaged’, because almost 64% of the times they are disengaged: do not collect
any mile and do not make any redemption. The second group, almost 38% of the population
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Table 3.5: Estimated structural parameters
Number of latent segments
Parameter Description 1 2 3
Φ1 baseline collection 1.3777 1.5771 1.5989
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0040)
Φ2 rate of transformation of effort into miles 1.1420 1.0984 0.8823
(0.0056) (0.0106) (0.0029)
Φ3 effect of bonus periods on collection 1.3077 1.2368 1.2156
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0074)
σ1 scale parameter; distribution of miles in non-bonus periods 0.4820 0.8533 0.8308
(0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0075)
σ2 scale parameter; distribution of miles in bonus periods 0.4676 0.6582 0.5768
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0025)
ar1 utility redeemers -4.4569 -3.6787 -2.6242
(0.0235) (0.0270) (0.0298)
anr1 utility non-redeemers -8.7220 -8.8437 -6.6646
(0.0635) (0.0734) (0.0330)
pr share of the ‘redeemers’ segment 0.6714 0.6595 0.4672
(0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0033)
a2 utility non-linear term 3.9030 2.5622 2.4932
(0.0321) (0.0171) (0.0198)
Φ4 rewarded behavior 1.1425 0.6181 0.5553
(0.0060) (0.0046) (0.0096)
Φ5 decay in rewarded behavior 1.1295 1.5308 2.4999
(0.0039) (0.0206) (0.0442)
qIb bonus probability for ‘the disengaged’ 0.3523 0.1161 0.1466
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0022)
qId disengagement probability for ‘the disengaged’ 0.0238 0.3914 0.6356
(0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0020)
QI share of ‘the disengaged’ segment 0.3917 0.1520
(0.0017) (0.0043)
qIIb bonus probability for ‘the core’ 0.5077 0.1476
(0.0004) (0.0028)
qIId disengagement probability for ‘the core’ 0.0199 0.1643
(0.0005) (0.0018)
QII share of ‘the core’ segment 0.3781
(0.0097)
qIIIb bonus probability for ‘the bonus’ segment 0.5706
(0.0021)
qIIId disengagement probability for ‘the bonus’ segment 0.0010
(0.0009)
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is characterized by less extreme behavior - they collect bonus miles in about 15% of the pe-
riod times and are disengaged in about 16% of the period times; I call them the ‘core’. The
remaining 47% are referred to as the ‘bonus’ collectors, because 57% of the times they collect
bonus points. The combination between redemption and collection propensities gives rise to 6
different segments that will be analyzed in more detail in section 3.4.1.
In Figure 3.4 I further analyze the distinct effects of heterogeneity, choice of redemption
timing and true program effects. All the lines in this figure are based on simulated data, gener-
ated under different assumptions, as I will explain below. The lines show the expected number
of miles collected as a function of time to or from redemption, obtained by regressing the col-
lected number of miles on the logarithm of the period number to or from redemption. The
different lines reflect the different effects of timing selection, heterogeneity and true effects of
the loyalty program (points pressure and rewarded behavior). Looking at the left panel of the
figure, the 6 thin lines show the collection pattern of each of the 6 latent groups ( redeemers/
non-redeemers x bonus/core/disengaged) when there is no points pressure and no rewarded
behavior effect. All the 6 groups show increased collection towards redemption (the redeemers
more than non-redeemers and the bonus redeemers showing the most pronounced effect) which
is only induced by timing selection: participants are more likely to make a redemption after a
streak of higher than usual collections. This is the opposite of the points pressure effect which
states that participants collect more points in order to make a redemption.
Furthermore, the black thick solid line of the left panel represents the expected collection
for the entire sample - simply aggregating over the 6 latent segments. The slope of this line
captures both the time selection and the heterogeneity effects. Because ‘bonus’ collectors
collect more miles due to their propensity to acquire bonus miles, they are also more likely
to be closer to a redemption moment at any given point in time. So the increased collection
in periods that are closed to the redemption period is also partially given by the fact that high
collectors are more likely to always be close to a redemption.
The thick broken line adds the true points pressure effect to the timing selection and un-
served heterogeneity effects and the thick dotted line also adds the rewarded behavior effect.
The fact that adding the rewarded behavior effect increases the slope of the collection towards
redemption suggests that serial collectors (those who make frequent redemptions) are benefit-
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ing from both effects.
The right panel of Figure 3.4 tells a similar story. It plots the expected number of miles
collected as a function of the period number after a redemption, again using a regression of the
numbers of miles collected on the logarithm of the period number from redemption. Since post-
redemption there is no selection effect, it analyzes only the effect of unobserved heterogeneity
as opposed to true program effects. The solid line shows that when there are different types of
collectors, those high types are more likely to be ‘right after a redemption’, creating average
collections that are higher in periods that are closer to a previous redemption. The broken
line shows the expected collection when both the unobserved heterogeneity and the rewarded
behavior effect are at work, but there is no points pressure. Finally the dotted line allows
for the true rewarded behavior effect to be manifest along heterogeneity and points pressure.
This is the steepest line and it shows that the points pressure effect plays a significant role
even after redemptions: as I will discuss later, about 65% of the points that are collected
due to the program are actually collected due to points pressure, as opposed to the rewarded
behavior effect. The fact that different latent segments have different propensities to exert
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Another interesting implication of the results is the shape of the static utility functions (Fig-
ure 3.5), for both redeemers and non-redeemers which I calculated using the point estimates
of parameters ar1, a
nr
1 and a2 taking ε = .9
2. It appears that for redeemers the average utility
derived from redeeming 1 certificate is less than that of redeeming nothing; at redemptions
larger or equal to 1 certificate the utility starts to increase linearly in the redemption size. For
non-redeemers, even the utility from 10 certificates appears lower than the utility of redeeming
nothing.
These are the shapes which best mimic the pattern of redemptions in the data. They sug-
gest that consumers have a fixed cost of making redemptions, which encourages them to keep
accumulating miles. As seen in Figure 3.3, participants do not rush to exhaust their available
balance when making a redemption and they wait, sometimes a few periods, to make a re-
demption even though they already have the necessary number of miles. While on average
consumers would have higher utilities from redeeming larger amounts, they ask many times
the question ‘Should I redeem or not ?’ before getting to build those high balances needed for
larger redemptions; in each period when asking this question, consumers also have idiosyn-
cratic taste shocks for the different redemption sizes which they can afford, so chances are that
in one of these instances they will have a relatively large shock for one of the redemption sizes
with a low mean utility, so they make this redemption, because in that specific period it offered
the highest utility.3
Figure 3.6 below shows how the estimated utility functions translated into different prob-
abilities of redemption both for redeemers and non-redeemers. When not enough miles are
available, there is no redemption. However, when participants can afford to redeem one cer-
tificate, only in 35% of the cases they actually make the redemption and in 65% of the cases
they choose to redeem nothing. However, if, for example, a consumer needs 4 periods to build
his balance from 95 to 189 miles, and on each period he asks the question ‘Should I redeem
or not?, there is only an 18% (.654) chance that he doesn’t make a redemption by the time he
2A different value of ε would have likely lead to slightly different estimated parameters of the utility function:
ar1, a
nr
1 and a2. Neither ε, nor these parameters are important in themselves - they only serve to produce redemption
probabilities that are observed in the data.
3This logic is similar to Benartzi and Thaler (1995)’s explanation for the equity premium puzzle: people end
up making poor decisions because they make the evaluation to frequently.
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Figure 3.5: The mean utility of each redemption size from 0 to 10 for both ‘Redeemers’ and
’Non redeemers’.
accumulated 189 miles in his account. These patterns of redemption are very similar among
the bonus/core and disengaged types, so here I only plotted the patterns for the core segment.
Figure 3.6: Probability that different rewards are redeemed by the number of available miles.
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Table 3.6: Fixed parameters
discount factor (δ) 0.9784
effort cost (a3) 1
effort choice (ρ) 0 to 1 in .2 increments
The outcome of the model is that it specifies the optimal effort to be put into collection as a
function of the state variables: balance of miles at the beginning of the period and period type -
i.e. periods when only regular miles are available for collection and periods when bonus miles
are also available for collection for each of the 6 distinct segments. Unsurprisingly, one finding
is that it pays more to put in effort during the bonus periods, than during the non-bonus periods.
However, before reaching a stock of 95 miles, it is not optimal to put in any effort - which was
again expected, since redeeming 1 certificate brings the least average utility (Figure 3.5). For
balances higher than 190 miles, when they barely have enough miles for one redemption size,
participants do not put in any effort in the non-bonus periods, but as they approach a new
threshold, they are motivated to put in effort, since in this region the utility increases linearly
with the redemption size.
It is worth noting that, even if the effort level is constrained between 0 and 1 in .2 incre-
ments, it is rarely optimal to put in efforts that are either not the minimum or the maximum.
I think this is the case because the stock of miles changes fast relatively to the redeemable
amounts. As I will show in the next chapter, when participants need many periods to accumu-
late miles for a redemption, the optimal policy is a gradual increase in effort.
Table 3.6 shows the parameters that were not estimated. The discount factor (δ) was set to
0.9784 for a two weeks period, a low value compared to the interest rates or discounts used
previously in the literature. However, this choice reflects the fact that the discount factor in
this problem also captures any risks that consumers associate with the reward program, such




As explained in Chapter 2, the main interest is in disentangling the miles collected without
effort from those collected due to the effort and those collected due the good will generated
after a redemption, in order to assess how profitable the program is. The other important goal
is to assess how changes in the program that are within merchant’s power to implement can
affect the profitability of the program.The estimated parameters can be used to achieve these
goals. I present the results below.
Program evaluation
By setting to 0 the 3 parameters (Φ2, Φ4 and Φ5) that capture the two effects of the program
(points pressure and rewarded behavior effect), I create a counterfactual where the only way in
which the loyalty program can influence consumers is through effortless switching. Throughout
this section I assume that the effortless switching is zero and equate this counterfactual to the
‘no loyalty program’ situation. By contrasting this counterfactual with the observed reality, I
can gauge the effect of the program. Table 3.7 shows the result of this comparison for each
of the 6 distinct segments, where ‘R’ stands for redeemer and ‘NR’ stands for non-redeemer.
The first two rows show the average number of extra miles that the typical consumer in each
segment collects because of the program - i.e. for which they spend money they would have
not otherwise spent. The last two rows show the percentage of these extra miles that is due to
points pressure, as opposed to rewarded behavior effect, obtained by building a counterfactual
where participants are only allowed to put in effort to collect more points (points pressure), but
there is no rewarded behavior effect.
Several things stand out in Table 3.7. First, as expected, redeemers changed their behavior
more than non-redeemers, who are only affected by the rewarded behavior effect. As seen in
Figure 3.5, the estimated utility function for non-redeemers is very low for each positive re-
demption, so for the participants in this segment the rewards are not a strong enough incentive
to elicit effort over the observed range of available stock of miles. There is nothing in the model
that constrains these participants to abstain from effort. Second, participants increase their col-
lection more in bonus periods than in periods when only regular miles are available, reflecting
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the fact that putting in effort in a bonus period pays off more than putting effort in a non-bonus
period. Thirdly, it appears that for redeemers, who are affected by both forces, points pressure
is stronger than the rewarded behavior effect. Taking into account each segment’s size and the
customers in each segment’s different propensities to find themselves into a bonus period, it
turns out that 65% of the extra miles acquired due to the loyalty program are actually acquired
due to the points pressure effect.
Table 3.7: The effect of the loyalty program on each of the 6 distinct segments
Disengaged Core Bonus
R NR R NR R NR
Segment share 7.11% 8.11% 17.65% 20.14% 21.95% 25.04%
% of bonus periods 14.67% 14.68% 14.76% 14.77% 57.06% 57.04%
Extra miles non-bonus period 0.100 0.006 0.490 0.069 1.577 0.174
due to program bonus period 6.384 0.069 8.314 0.252 14.004 0.521
% due to non-bonus period 45% 0% 21% 0% 29% 0%
points pressure bonus period 87% 0% 77% 0% 67% 0%
The results above are expressed in miles, but the real interest is in estimating a monetary
value of the program. To do that, I need additional assumptions, because what I observe in the
data is miles collected, not money spent by the consumers. There are three assumptions that
I need to make: 1) the amount of money that program participants need to spend to acquire a
regular, non-bonus mile; 2) the amount of money that program participants need to spend to
acquire a bonus mile; 3) the share of regular miles accumulated in a bonus period.
The first assumption is the most straightforward. Since most of the sponsors of the program
offer 1 mile for either $20 or $30 spent, I make the assumption that a mile collected in a
‘regular mile only’ type of period is associated with $25 of sales. Establishing the amount of
sales associated with a mile in a ‘regular and bonus miles’ type of period is more complicated,
because the sponsors offer bonus miles for amounts of expenditure that cannot always be easily
quantified. For example, Metro (a grocery stores chain) offers 95 bonus miles when spending
$95 or more on Thursdays and Saturdays, while Goodyear offers 100 bonus miles when you
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spend $50 or more. There are also examples where the amount spent to obtain a bonus mile
may be more clear: Metro offered 5 bonus miles to anyone who buys the Bertolli olive oil in a
specified period. The price of this product was $8.99, which implies that the consumers needed
to spend around $1.80 for a bonus mile. However, it is difficult to tell whether Metro’s bonus
miles promotion caused consumers to buy oil in the first place (case in which indeed consumers
spend $1.8 to obtain a bonus mile) or it merely determines them to shift to a more expensive
product, say $1 more expensive, (case in which consumers only need to spend $.2 - the $1
divided by 5 miles - to obtain a bonus mile). Given the difficulty of establishing the amount
of money that consumers need to spend to acquire a bonus mile, I use the following range of
values {$.2, $.5, $1, $1.5} and I evaluate the program under all the 4 different assumptions.
Finally, since I do not model separately the bonus and regular miles, I need to make an as-
sumption on the mix of regular and bonus miles that participants collect in a bonus period. The
model shows that in an average, non-bonus period, participants collect 23% of the miles they
collect in an average period when they also collect bonus miles. However, this result dilutes the
value of miles obtained in non-bonus periods, as it includes zero collections. By considering
only non-bonus periods with positive collection of miles, it appears that the collection in these
periods is almost 30% of the collection in bonus periods. Furthermore, looking at data, where
I have precise recordings of each type of miles collected in each period, it appears that 50% of
the miles collected in a bonus period are regular miles. The data seems to suggest that bonus
miles, instead of crowding out regular miles, actually make participants collect more regular
miles.4 Since I have no strong argument for any particular mix of regular and bonus miles in
the bonus periods, again I use a range form 20% to 50% regular miles in bonus periods, in 10%
increments.
Table 3.8 shows specific outcomes, for each segment for the particular assumption that
a bonus mile is associated with $.2 of sales and that 30% of the miles collected in a bonus
period are regular miles. The additional revenue is calculated using these assumptions and by
taking into account the miles acquired by each segment due to the program and their different
4For each participant I calculated the average number of regular miles collected both in bonus and in non-
bonus periods; it appears that on average they collect 3 regular miles more in bonus periods than in non-bonus
periods.
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propensities to be in a bonus period. The last column, aggregates over the 6 distinct segments
taking into account their shares, giving thus the result for the average participant in the program.
The second row, the cost, is the cost of providing rewards. The assumption I used here is that
each redeemed mile cost 12 cents (9.5 cents for the reward and 2.5 cents for administrative
costs of running the program). Also, this row is built using the estimated redemptions (which
are in line with the observed redemptions); but the observed redemptions are only about 60% of
the observed collection, which gives a breakage rate of 40%. Using the observed redemptions,
it appears that over the whole sample, the cost of the program is 4.3% of the sales it generates.
A 20% breakage (or non-redemption) rate implies that the cost of the program is 5.7% of the
sales it generates; a breakage rate of 10% implies hat the cost of the program is 6.4% of the
sales it generates, while 0 breakage implies a cost of 7.1% of sales.
The cost as percentage of extra sales generated is in effect a break-even margin. If the
retailer’s margin is less than this value (4.3% in this case), then all the additional revenue is not
enough to cover the cost of the program, so the retailer’s contribution is smaller in the scenario
where there is a loyalty program in place then in the scenario where there is no loyalty program.
Alternatively, when the margin is higher than the break-even value, the additional revenue is
more than enough to cover the cost of the program, so it it makes a positive contribution to the
bottom line.
The bottom part of Table 3.8 shows explicitly the revenue in the two scenarios, for each
segment. Unsurprisingly, those segments that require the lowest margin for the program to
be profitable are those who are most responsive to the program, i.e. whose share of the total
purchases that is attributable to the program is the greatest: the bonus redeemers, followed
by the core redeemers and then followed by the disengaged redeemers. Overall 13.6% of the
current sales are generated by the loyalty program through either points pressure or rewarded
behavior effect. This should be a lower bound of the true program effect, as it does not include
any switching - cases when consumers effortlessly switch to the retailer who offers the loyalty
program.
The share of the revenue generated by the loyalty program appears to be in between the
values estimated for two other loyalty programs. Based on the results provided by Lewis
(2004), I calculated that that the program he studies (offered by an online grocery), generates
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2% of the sales, while the results shown by Kopalle et al. (2012) who study the loyalty program
offered by a hotel chain, imply that 24% of the sales are generated by the loyalty program.
To further check the face validity of these results, I assessed the implied effectiveness of
the program also based on the results of the models where instead of 6, there were only 2 and
respectively 4 latent segments (2 types of redeemers x 1 and respectively 2 types of collectors).
The reason for which I did this exercise is that, according to Figure 3.4, sample heterogeneity
gives rise to patterns that resemble the points pressure and rewarded behavior effects patterns.
This implies that the model(s) where all program participants have the same propensity to
collect bonus miles or to be disengaged should give upward biased estimates of the true effect
of the program. To see if this is the case, I conducted policy simulations (with the current
program vs. in its absence) for the two simpler models, where either everyone has the same
probability of collecting bonus miles and being disengaged, either there are only two segments
with different propensities to collect bonus miles and be disengaged. As expected, the model
which assumed homogeneity implied that the program generates $44.33 in additional sales (as
opposed to $22.68 for the model with 3 segments), giving a break-even margin of only 2.4%.
However, the second model, which assumed 2 segments, was very close to the model with 3
latent segments, implying even a slightly lower additional revenue generated by the program
($21.9).
The results presented so far use the assumption that a bonus mile is associated with $.2
of sales and that 30% of the miles collected in a bonus period are regular miles. Tables 3.9,
3.10, show how the break-even margin and respectively the share of revenue generated by the
program vary with the assumptions. The break-even margin ranges from 5.64% in the least
favorable case, to 2.84% in the most favorable, while the share of revenue generated by the
program (Table 3.10) ranges from 12.2% in the least favorable case to 15.65% in the most
favorable case. It is worth noting that when it is assumed that regular miles make up a large
share of the miles acquired in bonus periods, the results are less sensitive to the specific revenue
associated with a bonus mile; in other words, there is less variation in the last column than in
the first column of each of the two tables.
One of the advantages of using a structural model is that it allows obtaining such crisp
measures of the minimum required margin to sustain a profitable program and the share of
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Table 3.8: Detailed results assuming a bonus mile is associated with $.2 of sales and that 30%
of the miles collected in a bonus period are regular miles
Disengaged Core Bonus Average
R NR R NR R NR
Segment share 7.11% 8.11% 17.65% 20.14% 21.95% 25.04%
Additional revenue 9.28 0.20 19.82 1.75 77.98 4.14 22.68
Cost 0.45 0.05 0.94 0.19 2.62 0.67 0.98
Cost as % of extra sales 4.9% 23.0% 4.7% 10.9% 3.4% 16.1% 4.3%
Revenue with program 71.83 62.73 164.77 146.57 247.92 173.90 166.77
Revenue w/out program 62.55 62.52 144.95 144.82 169.95 169.77 144.09
%revenue due to program 12.9% 0.3% 12.0% 1.2% 31.5% 2.4% 13.6%
revenue attributable to the program for those who participate. Moreover it can be used to see
how these measures vary with the assumptions (as shown in Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Whether
businesses should continue with the program/ adopt such a program depends on their mar-
gins. A survey conduced by PricewaterhouseCoopers, a consultancy, and the Retail Council of
Canada revealed that in 2013 the median gross margin for a grocery retailer was 30% and the
median gross margin for retailers who were neither in groceries nor selling apparel was 41.4%
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). These benchmarks suggest that the loyalty program that I
have studied requires a relatively low margin (5.64% using the least favorable assumptions) to
be profitable. Therefore, most likely the ARI MILES sponsors that participate improve their
profitability considerably as a result.
Policy changes
In this subsection I analyze how changes that retailers could implement affect the efficiency
of the program. It is important to note that the previous analysis of outcomes under different
assumptions was not a policy change analysis. For example the results above showed that the
retailers are better off when a bonus mile is associated with $1.5 of sales than when it is asso-
ciated with $1 of sales. However, we cannot conclude from here that the best recommendation
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Table 3.9: Break-even margin as a function of revenue associated with a bonus mile and per-
centage of non-bonus miles collected in bonus periods
Percentage of non-bonus miles
collected in a bonus period
Revenue associated 20% 30% 40% 50%
with a bonus mile ($)
0.2 5.64% 4.33% 3.52% 2.96%
0.5 5.48% 4.25% 3.47% 2.93%
1 5.23% 4.12% 3.39% 2.89%
1.5 5.01% 3.99% 3.32% 2.84%
Table 3.10: Share of revenue generated by the program as a function of revenue associated
with a bonus mile and percentage of non-bonus miles collected in bonus periods
Percentage of non-bonus miles
collected in a bonus period
Revenue associated 20% 30% 40% 50%
with a bonus mile ($)
0.2 12.20% 13.60% 14.65% 15.47%
0.5 12.35% 13.70% 14.72% 15.51%
1 12.60% 13.86% 14.82% 15.58%
1.5 12.84% 14.02% 14.93% 15.65%
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for the retailer is to give out less bonus points in order to increase the value of sales associ-
ated with 1 bonus point (e.g. offering 1 bonus point instead of 5 for the Bertolli oil), because
this change will likely affect the pattern of collection and implicitly the effectiveness of the
program.
There are two types of policy changes that I analyze. The first one changes the multiple
of miles that consumers can use to make a redemption and adjusts the size of the reward to
maintain the same ‘rewarded dollars’/mile ratio. The current program allows consumers to
make redemptions in multiples of 95 miles and offers $10 for each multiple of 95. This set
up can be changed to offer either $5 for each multiple of 48 miles, $15 for reach multiple of
145 miles or $20 for each multiple of 190 miles (I adjusted slightly the multiples, so that the
multiples are round, easy to remember numbers). The second change is related to the ‘rewarded
dollars’/mile ratio; it keeps fixed the 95 miles multiple but assumes that this gives consumers
either $9, $11 or $12 in rewards.
Allowing consumers to make redemptions at every multiple of 48 miles, effectively dis-
courages points pressure. With the current program, the points pressure starts to kick in at a
stock of 92 miles in bonus periods at a stock of 171 miles in non-bonus periods. By giving the
consumers the opportunity to redeem sooner, many of them will do so, therefore they will no
longer be able to build the balances at which it becomes optimal to put in effort, this being es-
pecially true for redeemers, who put in effort in the first place. The non-redeemers are slightly
advantaged, as they too redeem more often and thus benefit more from the rewarded behavior
effect, but this increase is not enough to compensate for redeemers putting in less effort. As
shown in Table 3.11, this policy generates $164.54 in revenue for the average participant on a
two weeks period, while generating costs of $1.06 per participant, per period. In this set up,
the revenue is smaller than the revenue with the current policy ($166.77), and the cost is larger
than the cost of the current policy ($0.98), so there is no reason for which it should be adopted.
One may think that I should allow the consumer to redeem only at higher multiples. I
conducted the exercise by allowing consumers to redeem every multiple of 145 miles for $15
dollars. The results showed that this policy decreases revenues even further. The reason is that,
according to the estimated utility function (Figure 3.5), the average utility of redeeming $15 is
still lower than the average utility of making no redemption, so program participants are not
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motivated to put in effort in a bonus period until they have build a stock of 137 (as opposed
to 92 with the current program) and 222 in the no-bonus period (as opposed to 171 currently).
Furthermore, the fact that the number of miles required to make a redemption increases implies
that there are less redemptions per unit of time, therefore less rewarded behavior effect. This
policy is estimated to bring a revenue of $158.67 per participant, per period at a cost of $.80
per participant per period. Compared to the current policy, it appears that this alternative policy
would be better at margin rates less than 2.2%. But at this level of the margin, no program is
actually the best alternative.
Increasing the multiple even more (from 145 miles to 190 miles) with a corresponding
increase in the reward from $15 to $20 improves the outcomes, but not by much. The reason
is that, since now it takes longer to build the stock for a minimal redemption, redeemers only
start to put in effort at a stock of 140 miles in the bonus periods and 284 miles in regular
miles only periods. More importantly, since on the one hand redeeming 190 miles brings more
utility than redeeming nothing, and on the other hand waiting to accumulate 380 points is not
appealing, in this scenario the chances of redeeming the minimum allowable quantity increase
significantly. Thus participants have less chances to put in effort. The sales per the average
program participant in this set-up are $161.69 and the costs $.82. Compared to the current
policy, it appears that this alternative policy would be better at margin rates less than 3.15%.
But at this level of the margin, no program is actually the best alternative.
From the analysis of the 3 policy changes above it appears that AIR MILES has chosen the
best redemption multiple. However another change that could be implemented is in the amount
of money offered for a 95 miles redemption. I evaluated changes to 9, 11 and 12 dollars. As
expected, offering $9 instead of $10 reduces the effort that participants put into collection, thus
the average revenue per participant decreases from $166.77 to $156.25. The redemption rates
under this alternative program change only slightly form the redemption rates with the current
program; however, the cost is reduced from 12 cents per redeemed mile to 10.8 cents. This
program would be better than the current program at margins lower than 2.17%, but at this
level no program at all is the best option.
Increasing the value of the reward to either $11 or $12 increases both the revenue and the
cost, as participants put in more effort and the cost, as the cost of a redeemed mile increases.
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These programs are better than the current one only at higher margin rates - 8.25% and re-
spectively 7.72%. These results imply that for margins less than 7.72% retailers should prefer
the current version of the program, while for margins higher than this threshold, they should
implement a program which rewards consumers with $12 for each multiple of 95 miles. It is
interesting to note that the break-even margin between a policy with $11 in rewards and a pol-
icy with $12 in rewards (not shown in Table 3.11) is 7.3%. When choosing only among these
two policies, at rates below 7.3%, rewards of $11 produce higher contribution. However, when
$10 is also an option, at margins of 7.3% this is the policy which maximizes contribution.
Table 3.11: Policy changes - summary of findings
Policy Revenue Cost Break-even margin Break-even margin
change ($) ($) vs. no program vs. current program
No program 144.09
Current program 166.77 0.98 4.33%
Redemption 48 164.54 1.06 5.16% -
multiples (miles) 145 158.67 0.80 5.51% 2.20%
190 161.69 0.82 4.67% 3.15%
Value 9 156.25 0.75 6.20% 2.17%
of 11 168.20 1.10 4.57% 8.25%
reward ($) 12 169.97 1.23 4.75% 7.72%
In the analysis of the policy changes I assumed that the rewarded behavior does not change
with changes in the amount of reward per redeemed mile and that in their utility consumers
actually care about the amount of money they receive for each redemption, not the number of
certificates redeemed - e.g. consumers derive the same utility from redeeming one 95 miles
certificate which rewards them with $10 as from redeeming two 48 miles certificates which
reward them with $5 each. I also assumed that changes in the structure of the rewards do
not determine any participants of the ‘redeemer’ type to become non-redeemers or vice versa.
Finally, I assumed that there are no competitive reactions.
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3.5 Discussion
In this chapter I developed a model for loyalty programs where consumers accumulate frequent
small amounts of points, which can be used for relatively small in store discounts at many
participant stores. A main feature of this context is that ceiling or idiosyncratic effects (not
needing the reward in a given period) can be safely excluded. Thus I think that the most
plausible explanation for the observation that sometimes, even when engaged with the RP,
consumers fail to make redemptions or make only partial redemptions is that the loyalty points
are kept in a separate mental account - i.e. consumer’s regular currency and the loyalty points
are not fungible (Shefrin and Thaler, 1988). Otherwise consumers should be spending the
LPs as soon as they have the opportunity and save up the regular money which is in fact
an universal means of exchange and on which they can earn interest. Moreover, consumers
have a propensity to spend spend loyalty points on indulgences (Kivetz and Simonson, 2002).
The separate mental accounts and the preference to use miles in order to purchase hedonistic
items for which consumers have different taste shocks in each period provide a parsimonious
explanation for the observed patterns in the data, where sometimes consumers postpone their
redemptions or make redemptions smaller than their available amount. I translate this set of
assumptions in my model by allowing the utility of each redemption size in each period to be
influenced both by a systematic component, as well as a random utility shock (). In periods
with low shocks for redemption consumers won’t redeem, while in periods with a large shock
for a low redemption size they will make the small redemption even though they may have
enough miles for a larger redemption.
The model comprises both the collection and redemption aspects. As discussed above, the
redemption of rewards is driven by both a systematic and a random component. The collection
of miles is driven by a baseline factor (miles corresponding to purchases that would have been
realized even in the absence of the program or when only effortless switching is at work) and by
the two effects of interest: points pressure and the rewarded behavior effect. These components
introduce dynamics into the model, as the two effects are are stronger around the redemption
time.
To estimate the model I used data provided by AIR MILES comprising only participants
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who opted to collect all their miles into the‘cash’ account that can only be used for in-store
discounts. Given its complexity, I used indirect inference, an estimation method based on
simulation, in order to pin down the structural parameters. The model achieved very good
results in terms of fit, similar to other models that use a similar estimation method - e.g. Topa
(2001); Hennessy and Whited (2007); van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008); Goettler and Gordon
(2011).
The results of the estimation showed that consumers exhibit different collection and re-
demption patterns. In terms of collection, post-hoc I labeled the two groups ‘redeemers’ and
‘non-redeemers’, while in terms of collection (more precisely propensity to collect bonus miles
or be disengaged), I labeled the three groups ‘bonus’, ‘core’ and ‘disengaged’. As shown in
Figure 3.4, heterogeneity can be confounded with true program effects, so it needs to be teased
apart, in order to be able to evaluate the program accurately. The other effect that I account for
for in order to obtain accurate evaluations of the program is the fact that even in the absence
of points pressure, consumers are more likely to make a redemption in a period with a large
collection of points that is due only to chance.
I use the estimated parameters to quantify he changes in sales induced by the program.
However, translating the changes in miles collected to changes in money spent requires further
assumptions. For this reason Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present ranges of possible outcomes, rather
than a single outcome in terms of the minimal contribution margin needed to sustain a profitable
RP in its current design and respectively the share of sales that are attributable exclusivley to
the loyalty program.
Based on the counterfactual analysis (and using the assumption of a bonus mile being
associated with $.2 of sales and 30% of the miles collected in a bonus period being regular), it
appears that the current program is more profitable than a situation with no loyalty program at
all at margin rates higher than 4.33%. At margin rates higher than 7.72% offering $12 instead
of $10 for the same amount of redeemed miles should further boost profitability. Furthermore,
it appears that for the average program participant 13.6% of the sales are generated because of
the RP. Without knowing what percentage of customers are members of the RP, it is difficult
to estimate the role that the program plays in retailer’s overall sales.
In Chapter 5 I further elaborate on the contributions of this model, its limitations and future
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The previous chapter focused on the particular case when rewards are homogeneous in-store
discounts or gift certificates. However, many loyalty programs offer consumers rewards that
are much more varied in terms of size and also more substantial. This chapter presents a model
that applies to this type of programs. The main conceptual difference between the two setups
is the way participants think about redemptions. In the first case consumers manage an on-
going process where they balance the impulse to use their miles for a redemption in the current
period and the tendency to keep accumulating the miles so that they can obtain a larger, more
meaningful redemption in the future. In the other case consumers do not decide in every period
whether to use their points for a redemption or not and how large should the redemption be, but
they form redemption goals (Kivetz et al., 2006) and try to achieve those goals - for example
they might decide that they’ll use their points to buy airline tickets to fly home for Christmas.
The size and nature of the rewards dictates how often consumers make the redemption decision.
It is likely that for small treats, consumers decide in every period whether they will have the
treat or not - i.e. whether they will spend their points to obtain the treat or not, but for large
rewards, consumers make decisions less frequently and stick to those decisions over longer
periods. In the case of programs that offer in-store discounts, consumers are likely to ponder
on every shopping trip on whether they should use their available points to buy, for example,
ice cream or not. With programs that offer larger rewards this is not likely the case. Building
on the previous example, if the consumer has decided that he or she will use the points to fly
home for Christmas, it is unlikely that every other week or so, the consumer in my hypothetical
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example will ponder on whether to use them for a gift, to buy furniture or for a cruise.
So the key aspect of the model proposed in this chapter is that consumers form specific
redemption goals in terms of reward size and timing. Participants look forward to the moment
when they make that redemption; beyond the redemption time, they know that they will form
new redemption goals, so they still care about the points that they have in their account (as
these will be used for those future goals), but they are not aware of the specifics of any future
redemption beyond the closest one. Again using the example above, if the airline tickets costs
10,000 points the participant would be happier to have 7,000 still left into his or her account
than to have nothing left; once the tickets have been purchased, the consumer will start thinking
about a new redemption and having 7,000 points offers better prospects than having no point.
The estimable version of the model that I present in this chapter adds the amount of points
left at the end of a redemption period to the flow utility of the program participants, empha-
sizing that consumers treat loyalty points as if they have intrinsic value (Hsee et al., 2003; van
Osselaer et al., 2004). In other words, at the end of a redemption period having points left
into one’s account increases utility because these points allow participants to have a head start
in their collection for the next goal. Moreover, having available points into one’s account is
valuable because they allow participants to entertain the thought of future redemptions and thus
provide anticipatory utility for the reward to be redeemed (Loewenstein, 1987).
Another important assumption of this model is that, whenever consumers fail to attain their
goal (they do not have enough points to cover the cost of their desired reward), they will use all
the available points they have and make up for the difference using cash. This is in agreement
with the observation that most loyalty programs allow consumers to pay for the rewards with a
combination of points and cash (Dre`ze and Nunes, 2004).
To summarize, the main difference between the new model described in this chapter and
the model presented in Chapter 3, is the way consumers think about the rewards, given their
different scales. This difference, which might appear minor, actually triggers substantive dif-
ferences in the way the model plays out. Given that the rewards in this set-up are larger and
more hedonistic, I call this model the ‘dream rewards’ model to emphasize the difference from
the previous model where the rewards were meant to be spent pretty much like cash.
In this chapter I start by laying out a theoretical model of points collection and redemption.
90 Chapter 4. Dream rewards
The points collection is influenced by the same type of factors that were outlined in the model
for ‘cash’ collectors: a baseline rate of collection plus the influence of the RP through points
pressure and the rewarded behavior effect. The points pressure introduces dynamics to the
model, as effort ‘today’ becomes more and more valuable as the collector gets closer to the
redemption moment. One of the important features of this model is the fact that the inter-
redemption times are given and consumers choose only the size of the reward that they aim
to redeem. At the end of a redemption period consumers care about the balance of points that
they have left into their accounts since this balance allows them to make other redemptions into
the future. The theoretical model that I outlay in Section 4.1 is likely to be difficult to estimate
due to a combination of computational intensity, data requirements and identification issues.
Therefore, in Subsection 4.1.1 I discuss three ways in which the model is simplified in order to
be able to estimate it.
Section 4.2 describes the AIR MILES data used in the estimation. Section 4.3 is divided
into two subsections. In Subsection 4.3.1 I discuss the identification strategy and bring argu-
ments that the model is well identified - i.e. the data used in the estimation is rich enough such
that only one set of parameters can best fit it. In Subsection 4.3.2 I revisit indirect inference,
the estimator that I used for the model in Chapter 3.
The results are presented in Section 4.4. There are two sets of results that I examine. The
first set was derived by applying the model in Subsection 4.1.1 on the whole sample, while
the second set was derived by applying the same model to 3 different sub-samples, that were
obtained by a priori partitioning the data using k means analysis. Contrary to my expectations,
the two sets of result imply the same level of profitability of the RP. I further used the estimated
parameters to assess how much the efficiency of the program would improve if the program
provider managed to persuade participants to decrease their inter-collection times. Section 4.5
concludes with a discussion of the main features of the estimated model and of the results.
4.1 Theoretical model
In this model I consider τ the timing between two consecutive redemptions (the inter-redemption
time, or spell) which is driven by observable individual characteristics Zi (for example whether
4.1. Theoretical model 91
the participant agreed to receive promotional emails or not). t denotes the amount of time that
is left out of spell τ until redemption, so t takes values between 0 and τ − 1. For example if
there are 30 periods between two consecutive redemptions, then τ = 30; in the redemption
period t = 0, one period before the redemption period t = 1 and so forth.
Equation 4.1 shows the law of motion for t, where t′ denotes the value that t will take in the
next period. It shows that in every non-redemption period, the next period’s t is decreased by
1. After a redemption period at the end of spell τ (i.e. when t = 0), there is a new redemption
spell τ′, so the next period’s t becomes τ′ − 1.
t′ =

t − 1 for t ∈ [1, τ − 1]
τ′ − 1 for t = 0
(4.1)
The first step is to use data to estimate a survival model for the inter-redemption spells.
Depending on how frequently participants make redemptions, long observation periods may
be needed in order to obtain reliable estimates for the distribution of τ. Should this data be
unavailable, I describe a simplified version of the model (see section 4.1.1) that circumvents
this step. But first I will lay out the complete model.
While the inter-redemption spells are exogenous to the structural model (hence the need to
estimate their distribution from the data), the redemption goals themselves (denoted by G∗τ and
expressed in number of points) are a choice variable. I assume that the goals are distributed
Γ(k, θ). The important aspect of this choice is that it is only made when joining the program or
after a redemption. Subscript τ indicates that the choice of the goal G is made at the beginning
of the spell τ and superscript ∗ indicates that this choice is optimal. In all the other periods
G∗τ is fixed, so this is why in equations 4.7 and 4.9, as I will discuss later, it appears as a state
variable.
As described above, G∗τ is optimal from the point of view of a consumer for whom only
the value of the reward matters, not the specific content of the reward - i.e. all it matters is
that the reward is worth 10,000, not that it consists of flight tickets or a cruise. However, in
reality participants in reward programs are likely to have strong preferences for the particular
type of reward that is being redeemed and the offer of rewards is finite, so they will end up
making trade-offs between, on the one hand, goals that are a good deal from the point of view







t = τ1 − 1 = 1decide ρ
t = τ1 − 2 = 0decide ρ
t = τ2 − 1
decide ρ
t = τ2 − 2
decide ρ
t = τ2 − 3
decide ρ
...
Figure 4.1: Sequence of spells. The goal (G*) is chosen at the beginning of each spell. Effort
is chosen in each period. The utility of redemption is realized at the end of the spell.
of redemption spreading over time and matching of goals to existing stock of points and on the
other hand goals that are appealing to them for idiosyncratic reasons. I model this compromise
by stating that the chosen goal is distributed according to a normal distribution around the
optimal goal G∗τ. The dispersion around G
∗
τ is captured by σξ - a parameter to be estimated.
Effort put into collection is the other choice variable. It is contingent on the time left from
the current spell and is decided in every period. By putting in more effort, the participants can
collect more points and increase their chances of being able to attain their goals and if the goals
are achieved, they increase the stock of points which will enable them make new, perhaps larger
redemptions into the future. But putting in effort is assumed to be costly, because it means that
participants would change their shopping routine, the routine being the course of action which
was precisely the least costly for them. I denote the cost of effort by c(ρ). Equation 4.2 below
shows the particular functional form for this cost: when ρ = 0, the cost is also 0, but as effort
increases, the cost increases exponentially.
c(ρ) = eρ − 1 (4.2)
Figure 4.1 shows a hypothetical example of two redemption spells (τ1 and τ2). The key
aspects of this figure are the fact that the goals are chosen only at the beginning of each spell,
while the effort to be put into collection (ρ) is chosen in every period. The benefits of redeeming
a reward are accrued only at the end of an inter-redemption spell.
I assume that the number of points collected in period t (mt) is distributed log-normal with
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scale parameter σ and location parameter µ.
mt ∼ Log − normal(µt, σ) (4.3)
There are three components that affect µt. One is the baseline collection (denoted by φ0), which
captures the points collected for amounts of money that would have been spent with the focal
retailer (or coalition of retailers) even in the absence of the loyalty program. In practice φ0 can
vary with specific consumer characteristics. In the specific data that I am using, an important
factor which affects the points collection is whether the program participant has a credit card
linked to the program through which they can collect points. Since consumers can make a
large share of their purchases using credit cards, those who collect points with their credit
cards will have overall higher collection patterns. Credit cards linked to the RP program allow
participants to ‘double-dip’: they collect points both for the purchases they make and for the
fact that they use the credit card linked to the program to pay for those purchases. I denoted
the baseline collection for credit card holders with φcc0 and the baseline collection for non credit
card holders with φcc0 .
The second component which affects µt is ρt - the effort that participants put in to change
their behavior and collect more points due to the points pressure mechanism (Kivetz et al.,
2006; Blattberg and Neslin, 2008). This effort is transformed into points at a rate φ1 - a param-
eter to be estimated. These two components form the anticipated component of µt. Besides
these components, there is also an unanticipated component, that stems from the rewarded be-
havior effect (Rothschild and Gaidis, 1981; Blattberg and Neslin, 1990, 2008): φ2eφ3ut , where
φ2 and φ3 are parameters to be estimated (φ2 expected to be positive and φ3 expected to be
negative) and ut is the amount of time that has passed since consumer’s last redemption at time
t. This parametrization captures the idea of the rewarded behavior effect: right after a redemp-
tion consumers are expected to have a boost in collection; this boost decays gradually as time
passes from redemption.
µt = φ0 + φ1ρt︸    ︷︷    ︸
anticipated
+ φ2eφ3ut︸ ︷︷ ︸
unanticipated
(4.4)
Redeeming points for rewards generates utility in the redemption period. Equation 4.5
shows a simple specification for the utility function. S i0 denotes the stock of points that is
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available at t = 0, i.e. in the redemption period, before the redemption actually takes place. In
general, I use the subscript t on the stock of points, (in this case 0), to describe the stock of
points at the end of period t. Here I added the superscript i to suggest an ’intermediary’ stock,
i.e. the stock after all the points have been acquired in period 0, but before the reward was
redeemed. In other words S i0 = S 1 + m0.
According to equation 4.5, if the participant has enough points to achieve his goal, the
utility is given by the value of the goal multiplied by α1 - a parameter to be estimated. However,
if the stock of points is lower than the goal, the participant is assumed to use all the available
stock to acquire a reward and supplement the difference with cash; the utility in this case is
given by α2S 0. The key insight here is that α2 should be less than α1, showing the fact that,
even at similar amounts of points spent, being able to achieve one’s goal by only using loyalty
points is better than being able to cover only partially the cost of the reward.
U(Gτ) =

α1Gτ, if S i0 ≥ Gτ




Equation 4.6 below shows the law of motion for the stock of points. S τ is the stock of
points available right before the spell that leads to a redemption starts. Right before joining the
program, participants don’t have any points, so this quantity is 0 for their first spell. However, if
a previous reward has been redeemed, the quantity of points available right before the beginning
of a new spell is the quantity that was available at the end of the previous spell (S 0). The second
branch shows that the stock at the end of a redemption period, S 0, is 0 if the participant could
not achieve their goal by just using points, or whatever is left after the redemption, if the
goal was achieved. The last branch shows that in all the periods that follow a non-redemption
period, the new stock of points is simply the sum between the the stock of points at the end of
the previous period and the points acquired in the current period.




0, if τ is the first spell since joining the program
S 0, otherwise
S 0 = max(0, S 1 + m0 −Gτ)
S t = S t+1 + mt for t ∈ [1, τ − 1]
(4.6)
Equation 4.7 shows the utility of the consumer in the redemption period. The 3 state vari-
ables that characterize the utility in every period are 1) the number of points at the beginning
of the period; 2) time left until redemption; and 3) the redemption goal. At the beginning of
a redemption period (t = 0), the consumer has S 1 points available into their account, i.e. the
same stock that was available at the end of the previous period. I make the assumption that
the rewards are redeemed at the end of a redemption period, so the consumer can use towards
redemption all the points acquired in the redemption period.
The number of points acquired in the current period, right before redemption, (m(ρ0)) de-
pends on the 3 effects outlined in equation 4.4, but consumers can only affect one of the com-
ponents, namely the effort. This choice affects in expectation the number of points that will
be acquired (Ema(ρ0)), which in turn affects the utility. Moreover, consumers only count on the
anticipated points (see equation 4.4), hence the a superscript. So by choosing an effort level ρ0,
consumers incur the cost c(ρ0), where c(·) is increasing in the level of effort. But higher levels
of effort are also likely to increase the utility U(Gτ) and also the the value of the prospects after
a redemption as captured by V .
U(Gτ) is the utility from redemption described in equation 4.5. Eτ′ is the expectation over
the distribution of the inter-redemption spells and Eξ is the expectation over the distribution
of the deviations from the optimal goal. As discussed above, the idea here is that participants
make a compromise between selecting on the one hand goals that are attainable at reasonable
levels of effort and that provide steady inflows of utility and on the other hand goals that are
appealing to them personally. For example for someone who already has 45,000 points it would
make sense to pursue the goal of redeeming for a cruise that costs 50,000 in a one year’s time,
but they may prefer to use their points to buy a jewelery that only costs 20,000 points. In
this particular case ξ, the idiosyncratic shock for the size of next period’s reward, would be
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negative.






S 0, τ′ − 1,max(G∗τ′ + ξ,Gmin)
)}
(4.7)
In the equation above the utility at the end of an inter-redemption spell is given both by the
utility of the redemption being made (U(Gτ)) and by the prospects that the participant has, as
captured by the value function Eτ′EξV(S 0, τ′,max(G∗τ′ + ξ,Gmin)), discounted by the per-period
discount factor δ. A larger stock of points at the beginning of the new inter-redemption interval
(S 0) leaves the participants better positioned to pursue higher, more rewarding goals, so V is
increasing in S . However V is not monotonic in τ′. The reason is that while indeed lower τ’s
mean shorter waiting times before the next redemption, it may also mean less time available
to work towards one’s goal and thus decreased chances of achieving it, which, as shown by
equation 4.5, comes with a penalty. The optimal goal is chosen at the very beginning of a new
inter-redemption spell, as shown in equation 4.8. However, since the idiosyncratic shock for
the size of next period’s reward (ξ) can be negative, the next period’s actual goal will be the
maximum value between G∗τ′ + ξ and the minimal redeemable amount Gmin.
G∗τ′ = arg maxG
V(S ′τ, τ
′,G) (4.8)
In all the other periods, when no redemption takes place, i.e. for t ∈ [1, τ − 1], consumers
do not derive any direct utility. They still need to decide the level of effort that they put into
collection (ρt). Higher levels of effort are costlier, but the collector may be better ‘tomorrow’
or in the period when he will eventually make the redemption that brings utility (equation 4.9).
V(S t+1, t,Gτ) = max
ρ
−c(ρt) + δEma(ρt){V(S t+1 + mt, t − 1,Gτ)} (4.9)
It is worth noting that the redemption goal does not change after a non-redemption period
(Gτ in equation 4.9), but only after a redemption (G∗τ′ + ξ in equation 4.7). The other two
state variables, (time to redemption and the stock of points) also have different laws of motion
depending on whether a redemption takes or does not take place in the current period, as shown
by the branches of equations 4.1 and 4.6.
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For any given set of parameters, V is solved for through a combination of value function
iteration and backward recursion. Start with a guess for V , call it V0, determine G∗τ′ and plug
it into the right hand side of equation 4.7, to obtain a new value for V (V1) at t = 0, i.e. at the
redemption time. Then, use equation 4.9 recursively to calculate V1 at t = 1, then at t = 2 and
so forth until t = τmax − 1, until V1 is calculated on the whole domain. Use V1 the same way V0
was used to obtain V2. Stop when the distance between Vk and Vk+1 is very small.
4.1.1 An estimable model for dream reward collectors
In this subsection I describe a simpler version of the model above, which I can estimate with
the data that I have. There are 3 aspects which I simplify: 1) the need to estimate a distribution
for the inter-redemption times; 2) the need to estimate σξ - the variance of redemptions due to
idiosyncratic preferences for certain types of rewards and 3) the assumption that participants
are always optimizing their collection. I discuss them in turn.
As stated before, in order to obtain a reliable estimation of the distribution of the inter-
redemption times, one needs a data set that stretches over a long period of time. With rewards
being expensive, the program participants need time to accumulate the required number of
points, so the number of observed redemptions may not be enough to accurately estimate the
distribution of the inter-redemption spells. Moreover, some of the observed inter-redemption
times will be either interval or right censored. Interval censored observations are those where
a redemption is being observed after t0 periods since the beginning of the observation period.
Knowing for how long the consumer has been enrolled in the loyalty program at the moment of
the redemption (T ), one can only say that the inter-redemption spell up to the redemption time
is between t0 and T - hence the interval censoring. After the observed redemption, if no other
redemption is observed until the end of the observation window (tw), the next inter-redemption
spell is also censored; all one can say is that this second spell is larger than tw − t0.
In the simplified version of the model, consumers no longer form expectations on the length
of their next inter-redemption spell. Instead, each new spell represents a new ‘game’ and
the spells used as input into the model are the spells actually observed in the data. A key
feature of the more complex model above was that in a redemption period utility was derived
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both from the reward being redeemed and from the future prospects that the participant had
after the redemption, as captured by the value function V. This key feature is still retained in
the simple version, but instead of capturing the value of the prospects with V, I capture it by
changing the utility function as shown in equation 4.10. Since V was increasing in S , in the new
specification, the flow utility was amended to include a second term that captures all the future
benefits that the remaining stock of points offer. α2 is a parameter to be estimated, expected
to be positive, since more points left after a redemption leave consumers in a better position to
achieve future goals. I take logarithms on both branches of equation 4.10 because additional
remaining points after making a redemption are expected to provide decreasing benefits. In
other words, consumers want to have something left for future redemptions; the difference
between medium and very large stocks of points available at the end of a redemption period
does less to improve one’s prospects than the difference between no mile left into one’s account
and a few hundred points. Also, when consumers fail to achieve their goal (the lower branch
of equation 4.10) any additional mile spend towards the goal that still fails to cover the cost
entirely does little to improve one’s utility. ε is a positive constant that allows taking logarithms
at 0 stocks of points.
U(Gτ) =

α1Gτ + α2log(S i0 −Gτ + ε), if S i0 ≥ Gτ




I modify the value function in the redemption period accordingly, as shown in equation
4.11. Equation 4.9 remains the same, since the problem remains the same in the non-redemption
periods. As the flow utility now includes the residual component that was before associated
with V, V no longer shows up in the right hand side of equation 4.11. In this new specification
the value of the future beyond the redemption time is concentrated into a parameter, α2, and an
observable quantity, log(S i0 −Gτ + ε). Therefore the infinite horizon problem described earlier
is transformed into a finite-horizon problem - each redemption is a separate ‘game’ now. This
problem is easier to solve, as it only requires backwards recursion, starting from t = 0 up to
t = τ − 1.
V(S 1, 0,Gτ) = max
ρ
−c(ρt) + Em(ρt){U(Gτ)} (4.11)
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To recap, the dynamic problem has now been recast as a finite-horizon problem, from
t = τ− 1 to t = 0, as shown in Figure 4.1. The result of this problem is a policy function which
specifies the optimal action - in this case effort ρ. The action of choosing the reward is also
subject to some optimization, but this is done outside the frame of the dynamic problem. The
reward from redemption is realized at the end of the inter-redemption spell and the particular
functional form is presented in Equation 4.10. The costs associated with effort are incurred in
each period and the functional form is shown in equation 4.2.
The second aspect which I simplify is the choice of the reward. In the previous specification
it was assumed that the chosen reward is a compromise between the best reward in terms of size
and best reward in terms of ‘fit’, where fit is given by unobserved, idiosyncratic preferences
for one reward or another. This required the estimation of the dispersion of the chosen reward
around the optimal reward (σξ). In the simplified version, I replace this parameter with an
assumption. The reason is that σξ might be difficult to identify in the absence of information on
how consumers actually choose the rewards they redeem. Typically marketers have data on the
number of points acquired and number of points redeemed in each period by each participant,
with little insight into the driving forces behind these actions.
One idea is to regress the number of points redeemed on the available stock of points at
the beginning of the inter-redemption spell, the duration of the spell and the square of the
duration of the spell and use the mean square error (MSE) of this regression to identify σξ. The
logic is that if there is very little room for idiosyncratic preferences to play a role in choosing
the reward, then participants who have a similar stock of points and a similar spell of time
before the redemption should choose rewards that are quite similar in terms of size; this gives
a small MSE. On the other hand, if individual preferences for particular types of rewards play
a significant role, then we should expect to see a high dispersion of rewards (high MSE) for
participants with similar prospects at the time when the goal is adopted.
Another idea, which I use, is to assume that goals have a chance of being selected propor-
tional to their value function. A consumer who has S τ points available and is τ−1 periods away
from a redemption can select among NG available goals. The probability of selecting goal Gi
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is given by





Finally, in the full specification outlined in the introduction of this chapter, I assumed that
consumers always optimize their points collection with an eye towards redemption. However,
given that the inter-redemption spells can be quite long (six or seven years for example), it
is difficult to imagine that during this whole time consumers are preoccupied with optimizing
for a rather distant event. Instead, I make the simplifying assumption that the optimization
does not start earlier than tmax periods before redemption. When more than tmax periods are
left before a redemption, the consumers do not actively change their behavior to accelerate the
collection; in other words, the choice of effort ρ is always zero in all the time periods that are
far away from a redemption. The program may still have an influence on consumers through
the rewarded behavior effect, but there will be no points pressure. While this assumption
apparently complicates the model, it actually reduces the state space and thus helps speeding
up the estimation.
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 summarize the state and choice variables that characterize con-
sumers’ problem, respectively the structural parameters that characterize the model.
Table 4.1: Summary of the finite-horizon problem: state and choice variables
State variables Choice variables
Symbol Interpretation Symbol Interpretation
t time left to a redemption ρ effort put into collection
S t stock of points at the end of the period t
G the size of the target redemption
(the realized redemption can be smaller than G)
Once the problem has been formulated, the next step is to solve it. In typical reward pro-
grams that offer consumers substantial rewards, both the stock of accumulated points and the
observed redemptions reach the levels of tens of thousands. Moreover even by limiting the
planning horizon (tmax) to one year and considering a time period to comprise two weeks, the
state space still reaches a size of the magnitude of billions. The solution I used was to solve
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0 baseline collection for credit card holders and non holders
φ1 rate of transformation of effort into points
φ2 , φ3 parameters capturing rewarded behavior effect
σ the scale parameter of the log-normal distribution of points collected
k, θ parameters of the distribution of targeted rewards
α1 utility associated with a point redeemed when a goal is achieved
α2 utility associated with a point redeemed when a goal is not achieved
or with a point that will be used for a future redemption
c cost of effort
δ per period discount factor
the problem only for a subset of points in the target reward domain (call the set of these points
G◦ and the stock of points domain (S ◦) and use interpolation for the points where the value
and the policy functions hadn’t been calculated. Specifically, I used interpolation on 2 levels:
1) interpolation on V for those S < S ◦ when calculating V backwards; 2) interpolation on the
policy function for values of S and G that are not in S ◦ and respectively not in G◦. I present
the specific details of interpolation in Appendix B.
4.2 The data
The data for this model is also provided by the AIR MILES Reward Program and includes
daily collection and redemption data for 25,898 individuals from Eastern Canada, observed
between 2009 and 2013. I aggregated both the collection and redemption data at two weeks
intervals and calculated each individual’s balance at the end of each period. 594 appeared to
have a negative balance (redemptions higher than the available stock of points, or ‘miles’ as
they are called in this program) at at least one point during the observation period, so they were
removed; 60 did not have data on the stock of miles at the beginning of the observation period
- i.e. December 31st 2008 - so they were also removed.
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Finally, since I want to analyze and predict the behavior of the average program participant,
I removed individuals with unusual, perhaps idiosyncratic patterns of collection and redemp-
tion. The highest observed balance at the beginning of the observation period was 143,000,
that is about 14,000 dollars waiting to be spent! I removed the 253 participants that had the top
1% of balances, i.e. all those that had in their account more than 13,891 miles as of December
31st 2008 .
I also removed those who showed unusual large collections in at least one period. The
highest observed collection in a two weeks interval was 35,000 miles. Given that participants
usually need to spend at least $20 to obtain a mile, such an influx of miles is thus associated
with an expenditure of at least $700,000 within two weeks. The 99.9th percentile in the distri-
bution of accumulated miles was 800, so I chose this threshold to eliminate all the collectors
who gained more than 800 miles in at least one interval. Such large amounts of collected miles
might be associated with one of a kind situation - for example buying or selling a $400,000
house through Century 21, a real estate agency which is a sponsor of the program, allows col-
lectors to earn 800 miles. The final number of collectors used in the estimation is 23,602 and
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the number of individuals eliminated for each of the reasons
discussed above.
Table 4.3: Cleaning the Data
Number of accounts Condition
594 Had a negative balance at at least one point
60 No data on the balance at the end of 2008
253 Starting balance larger than 13,891 (99th percentile)
1,389 Collected more than 800 miles (99.9th percentile) in a two weeks interval
23,602 Remaining accounts included in the estimation
While the available data spans over 5 years. I use the first and last year only to assess
whether each observed participant makes any redemptions in these years and focus fully on
the 3 years in the middle. Knowing whether someone has recently made a redemption or is
about to make one is important for the model outlined above because recent redemptions create
the rewarded behavior effect and future redemptions create points pressure. So the descriptive
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statistics that I present below are focused on 3 years of observation of 23,602 individuals. As I
split each year into 26 two-week periods, I rely on 1,840,956 observations.
Over the focal 3 years I observe 14,462 redemptions. Of the 23,602 observed participants,
15,440 (65%) do not make any redemption, 4,880 (21%) make one redemption, 1810 (8%)
make two redemptions and the remaining 1472 (6%) make more than two redemptions. By
considering the whole observation interval of 5 years, 55% of the sample participants do not
make any redemption, 22% make one redemption, 10% make two redemptions and the remain-
ing 13% make more than two redemptions.
The size of the rewards redeemed vary widely, from a minimum of 25 miles to a maximum
of 19,120 miles. The distribution is shown in Figure 4.2 below. The mean redemption is
1,460 miles and the standard deviation is 1640. The types of rewards being redeemed also
varies considerably. The company uses 5 types of categories to classify rewards: ‘Flight’,
‘Gift certificate’, ‘Leisure and Entertainment’ (concert tickets), ‘Merchandise’ and ‘Travel’
(car rentals or hotel stays).
Figure 4.3 shows the observed redemptions as a percentage of the available stock of miles
before redemption, focusing on those redemptions smaller than 10,000 (99.5% of the redemp-
tions being less than 10,000 and 77% being less than 2,000). This figure shows that, at least
for small and medium rewards, there is wide variation with respect to the miles redeemed as
percentage of the available stock. This suggests that the idiosyncratic preference for certain
types of rewards is likely to play an important role. If this was not the case, participants with
similar stocks of miles would choose similar goals, would work equally hard to achieve them
and as a result the miles redeemed as a percentage of the available miles would be less spread
out.
The observed redemptions seem to display both the points pressure and the rewarded be-
havior, as shown in Figure 4.4. The left panel of this figure shows two types of points pressure:
towards the redemption moment (with red) and towards achieving the number of miles which
will eventually be redeemed (with blue). When collectors redeem the whole stock of miles that
they have available (or at least redeem a reward for which they did not have sufficient miles one
period before redemptions), the acceleration towards redemption coincides with the accelera-
tion towards the goal. This is the case in only 560 out of the total 14,462 observed redemptions.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of the observed redemptions
In the remaining 13,902 cases, the number of miles which is redeemed was achieved before
the redemption period. Furthermore, out of these 13,902 instances, in 5,469 cases the goal was
achieved either during a previous spell or outside the observation period, so these cases are
not accounted for in Figure 4.4. As shown in Figure 4.5, the number of observations used to
determine the average collection as a function of ‘time to goal’ is much less than the number
of observations used to determine the average collection as a function of ‘time to redemption’
precisely because often times the participants kept collecting for long periods before making a
redemption, or made small redemptions relative to their balance. This should explain the less
smooth averages across periods for the ‘towards goal’ averages. However, the large spike ob-
served at the time of attaining the goal is also partly explained by selection: on average, in 27%
of the periods participants do not collect any miles; however, the period when one attains the
goal is necessarily a period of non-zero collection. And I say only ‘partly explained’ because
the average collection in a period with positive collection is about 24 miles, but the average
collection at the moment when a goal is achieved is almost 82 miles.
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Figure 4.3: Observed redemptions as percentage of the stock of miles available before redemp-
tions (focusing on redemptions smaller than 10,000 miles)
The right panel of Figure 4.4 shows the average number of point collected as a function of
period number after a redemption. The gradually declining slope after redemption is consistent
with the rewarded behavior hypothesis.
4.3 Empirical strategy
4.3.1 Identification
Similar to the Cash model in Chapter 3, I rely on indirect inference to estimate the structural
parameters of interest, collectively denoted by β. The moments are chosen to serve to the
identification of the structural parameters in Table 4.2. The parameter associated with the
utility of achieving one’s goal (α1) is identified mainly from the coefficients of a regression of
the number of miles collected as a function of the logarithm of the number of periods left until
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Figure 4.4: Average number of miles collected as a function of the number of periods up to a
redemption or up to achieving the number of miles that will eventually be redeemed (left panel)
and after a redemption (right panel)
redemption - basically a parametric version of the red surface in the left panel of in Figure 4.4.
Since credit card holders have a higher overall collection and a higher peak as they approach
redemption, I run this regression separately for credit card holders and non credit card holders.
The parameter which characterizes the value of a mile kept for future redemptions or spend to
cover a goal for which not enough miles were accumulated (α2) is identified from the average
number of miles that program participants have in their account at the end of a redemption
period and also from the coefficients of a regression of the number of miles collected as a
function of the logarithm of the number of periods left until achieving the goal - a parametric
version of the blue surface in the left panel of in Figure 4.4. Higher α’s should elicit steeper
slopes in collection leading to redemption/ achieving goals, while a higher α2 should elicit
lower redemptions and leave participants with more miles in their account at the end of a
redemption period.
Steeper slopes (increased collection both towards redemption and towards achieving one’s
goal) can also be triggered by a lower cost of effort. In order to be able to identify α1 and α2, I
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Figure 4.5: The number of observations used to compute the averages shown in Figure 4.4
fixed the cost of effort. Effort can take 11 distinct values (ρ) on an arbitrary scale form 0 to 2
in .2 increments1 and the cost of effort increases exponentially as shown in equation 4.2:
By assumption, participants who are further than 1 year (26 periods) from redemption do
not put in effort to speed up collection. This assumption, together with a moment that captures
the average collection of miles per period, separately for credit card holders and non credit card
holder, pin down parameters φcc0 and φ
cc
0 - the baseline collection rates, or miles corresponding
to purchases that are not generated by the loyalty program. The variance in the numbers of
miles collected per period identifies σ - the scale parameter of the log-normal distribution that
the number of collected miles per period is assumed to follow.
1The reason for which in this model I use an effort scale from 0 to 2, while in the cash model presented in
Chapter 3 I used a scale from 0 to 1, has to do with the discreteness of the choice of effort and the need to smooth
out this discreteness in order to be able to calculate the standard errors of the parameters. Discrete choices may
not be sensitive to small changes in the parameters. However, in order to calculate the standard errors of the
estimated parameters I need to take the numerical derivatives of the moments in the auxiliary model with respect
to the parameters and these derivatives need to be non-negative. In earlier versions of the model I had difficulties
with such zero derivatives. By choosing effort from a larger set, the chances increase that even small changes
in parameters change the optimal effort for some regions of the state space. The change in optimal effort further
triggers changes in the auxiliary moments and renders non-negative derivatives.
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Finally, the decay in the collection rate after a redemption (a parametric version of the right
panel of Figure 4.4) identifies φ2 and φ3. k and θ (the parameters of the Gamma distribution
that characterize the targeted or planned redemptions) are identified from the observed mean
and variance of the redeemed rewards. δ, the per-period discount factor is set to 0.9784.
To make sure that these moments properly identify the parameters of interest, I conducted
an identification exercise similar to the identification exercise for the cash rewards model. More
precisely, I generated data according to known parameters and then tried to recover the known
parameters. The results, reported in Appendix C, support the claim that just one set of param-
eters best fit the auxiliary model.
4.3.2 Estimation
As in Chapter 3, I use indirect inference to estimate the parameters of interest. This method
relies on simulating the behavior of the program participants under different sets of structural
parameters, recording the moments described in section 4.3.1 for each set of parameters (these
simulated moments are denoted by θ˜), and checking how close they are to the true moments
observed in the data (denoted by θˆ). Those parameters that produce a simulated data set which
is closest to the original data set are kept and used for policy analysis. Equation 4.13 below is
the same as the equation used in the previous chapter. Again, W is the inverse of the variance-
covariance matrix of θˆ obtained by bootstrapping, where the off-diagonal elements have been
replaced by 0s.
βˆ = arg min
β
(θˆ − θ˜(β))′W(θˆ − θ˜(β)) (4.13)
Since I observe 23,602 participants over 78 periods (3 years), I simulate an equal number
of individuals over an equal number of periods, for each one using the observed redemption
timings and the observed starting balances as inputs into the model. For a given β the choices of
the simulated individuals are based on the optimal decision (or policy), as given by eqs. (4.9),
(4.11) and (4.12), and the specific random errors of each simulated individual. For example,
the optimal policy for a given constellation of the state variables may be to put in maximum
effort into acquiring miles, but the realized number of miles is given by both this systematic
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influence (‘maximum effort’) and a random error, which varies across simulated individuals
who find themselves at the same constellation of the state variables. The two types of random
errors that I used are related to miles collection, as explained above, and to choosing goals,
since, as shown in equation 4.12, the goals are chosen probabilistically, according to their
value. The two sets of random errors are kept unchanged throughout different sets of β .
4.4 Results
Table 4.4 shows the value of both the true moments and simulated moments at the minimum
value of equation 4.13. The parameters that produce these results, together with their standard
errors are shown in Table 4.6. Simulated moments that have a higher weight (i.e. those that
vary less when bootstrapping the data) are in general closer to the true moments, than those
moments with high high variance in the data. For example, the fifth moment, the slope of
acceleration towards a redemption for collectors who do not have a credit card associated with
the program (CC = 0) is the one with the highest weight: it is -2.33 in the data and -2.70 in the
simulation - a relatively small difference. However, the twelfth moment, the average stock of
miles at the end of a redemption period, with a weight of 0.002, is about 1224 in the data and
1022 in the simulation.
Table 4.5 shows additional moments, not used in the estimation. In this table ‘Q’ stands for
quantile so for example ‘Q25’ is the 25th quantile. In terms of collection it looks as the model
does not emulate particularly well the distribution of the collected miles. In the data, in 27%
of the instances participants did not collect any mile, while in the simulated data, this happens
only 8% of the time. Also, the simulated data is more concentrated: 50% is in the interval
[2,10] while 50% of the true data is in the interval [0,16]. The mean balance across all periods
is matched quite closely, but the distribution is more concentrated in the simulation that in the
real data. Finally, the distribution of the number of miles redeemed is shifted to the right in the
simulation compared to the real data.
The discrepancies outlined above point to possible avenues in which the model could be
improved. To capture the spike at zero in terms of miles collected, the model can be augmented
with engagement/ disengagement periods similar to the model in Chapter 3. Furthermore, in
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Table 4.4: Matched moments, i.e. the moments used in estimation (both the values observed in
the data (θˆ) and the simulated values (θˆ) together with the weight attached to each moment)
Moment True moments Simualted moments Weight
1 E(mit|cc = 0) 10.65 10.74 267.006
2 E(mit|cc = 1) 29.50 29.31 27.050
3 Var(mit) 1718.66 1820.67 0.004
4
mit|toredemption,CC = 0
Intercept 23.60 22.53 42.931
5 log(Count back) -2.33 -2.70 537.910
6
mit|toredemption,CC = 1
Intercept 63.77 63.15 9.696
7 log(Count back) -6.53 -6.74 113.264
8
mit|togoal
Intercept 49.81 48.91 19.045
9 log(Count back) -8.05 -8.34 209.009
10 E(Git) 1471.35 1523.47 0.010
11 Var(Git) 1641.97 1406.66 0.004
12 E(S 0) 1223.75 1021.61 0.002
13
mit| f romredemption
Intercept 43.64 43.85 40.911
14 log(Count fwd) -5.75 -5.57 424.539
objective function 534.639
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order to better match the distribution of redemptions and balances available after a redemption,
the utility function (equation 4.10) can be augmented with an additional parameter to allow
for non-linearities in the utility of goals. However, this added flexibility comes at the cost of
increased number of moments used in the estimation.
Table 4.5: Moments that were not used in the estimation
True Moments Simulated moments
% periods 0 miles collected 26.73 8.32
Q25 miles collected 0 2
Q50 miles collected 5 5
Q75 miles collected 16 10
mean balance across all periods 2049 2114
Q25 balance after redemption 96.25 277.00
Q50 balance after redemption 345.00 505.00
Q75 balance after redemption 1348.00 937.50
Q25 miles redeemed 395.00 450.00
Q50 miles redeemed 950 1094
Q75 miles redeemed 1900 2215
While the point estimates (Table 4.6) are not very meaningful in themselves, they can be
used to gain meaningful insights. For example, as shown in equation 4.10, participants are
assumed to balance high targeted redemptions against the risk of not attaining them, since not
being able to attain one’s goal comes at a penalty. Parameters α1 and α2 control how much
utility participants derive from a mile used to attain one’s goal as opposed to a mile which
is spent for an unattained goal or kept for future redemptions. Using the estimates in Table
4.6, Figure 4.6 below shows the utility for three different goals (395 - the black line, 950 -
the red line and 1900 miles - the blue line) at different levels of available miles. As expected,
being able to achieve one’s goal is associated with marked jumps in utility. But an interesting
aspect is that for small goals, not being able to achieve one’s goal brings higher utility than
barely attaining the goal (the dip in the black line at 395 miles available). This seems counter-
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Table 4.6: Point estimates and standard errors in parenthesis below
Parameter Description Entire sample
φcc0 baseline collection for non credit card holders 1.5982
(0.0102)
φcc0 baseline collection for credit card holders 2.3980
( 0.0095)
φ1 rate of transformation of effort into miles 0.7232
( 0.0022)
σ scale parameter; distribution of miles collected 1.3453
(0.0054)
α1 utility point when goal achieved 0.3190
(0.0032)
α2 utility log(point) when goal not achieved 61.1255
(3.2822)
k target rewards, shape parameter 0.5298
(0.0039)
θ target rewards, rate parameter 0.0004
(0.0000)
φ2 rewarded behavior 0.6261
(0.0200)
φ3 rewarded behavior decay -0.0441
(0.0058)
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intuitive, but my interpretation is that the implicit goal that program participants have is to
make a redemption and have something left into their account for future redemptions. Failing
to attain this second, implicit part of the goal causes reductions in utility. At high values of the
goals, however, participants are more willing to forgo this additional objective of a non-zero
balance after redemption (no dip in the blue line). In other words, someone who barely has
enough miles to buy movie tickets may derive less utility from their redemption thinking that
they have already spend all their available miles for a rather low-value reward than someone
who only covers the half of the cost of their movie tickets using miles, thus feeling that their
out-of-pocket cost was reduced by half.
Figure 4.6: Utilities for three different goals (395, 950 and 1900 miles) at different levels of
miles available at the redemption time
Furthermore, the utility of redemption dictates how much effort is optimal to put into col-
lection. Figure 4.7 shows an example of the optimal effort for a credit card holder who has the
goal of redeeming 2000 miles, in any state of the world (in terms of distance to the redemption
time and balance of miles) she may find herself. The figure shows the stock of miles only in
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multiples of 100, but as explained in Appendix B, I use interpolation to determine the optimal
level of effort for stocks of miles that are in between these multiples. Looking at the bottom
right corner, if the consumer has more than 2300 miles 25 periods before the redemption pe-
riod, it is never optimal to put in effort, because she already has enough miles for her goal and
since the utility of remaining stock of miles is taken in logs, increasing that stock is not worth
the effort. If the consumer has 1500 miles 25 periods before redemption, the optimal policy is
to put in the minimum effort, which is .2. In the next period (that is 24 periods before redemp-
tion or the second row from bottom to top), the consumer will have let’s say 1550 miles. The
optimal policy is to put in .4 effort at a stock of 1500 miles and .2 at a stock of 1600 miles,
so by linear interpolation the consumer will put in a level of effort equal to .3. When the con-
sumer has a balance lower than 600 miles 25 periods before redemption, the optimal policy is
to put in the maximum amount of effort. It is interesting to also look at the periods right before
redemption (the most upward row of Figure 4.7). In general it pays off to put in effort in the
periods that immediately precede a redemption. One exception is when one already has more
than 2200 points (i.e. enough for the goal plus something extra); the other exception is around
balances of 800-1200. The reason for the second exception is that when one has only one or
two periods left to redemption no amount of effort will be enough to accumulate the miles
needed to attain one’s goal; also, since the utility of miles redeemed as part of an unfulfilled
goal enter the utility function in logarithmic form, putting in effort to increase that amount is
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The previous chapter showed that is important to distinguish between heterogeneity and
true program effects. The results outlined so far distinguish between credit card holders and
non credit card holders, but they are oblivious to differences in propensities to collect bonus
miles or to be disengaged. A first step that I take in addressing this other source of heterogeneity
is to estimate the model separately for a priori defined segments. The ideal approach is to use
latent segments estimated flexibly within the model, as I did in Chapter 3, rather than determine
the segments exogenously, outside the model. However, in doing so the model becomes more
complex, it requires an extended auxiliary model to match the increased number of parameters
and requires more computational resources to estimate the parameters. Therefore, here I adopt
an approach that is easier to implement to see if addressing the heterogeneity in collection
patterns changes the results obtained so far.
In the next subsection I run the model separately for each of the 3 identified segments. I
then use both sets of results to see if taking into account participants’ distinct propensities to
collect bonus miles or to be disengaged changes the insights derived from a model which only
distinguishes between credit card holders and non credit card holders.
4.4.1 Results for a priori defined segments
For each participant I calculated the percentage of times they collected bonus miles, the per-
centage of times they did not collect any mile - the remaining periods being those when they
collected positive sums of regular miles. I used this data to split participants into segments, by
using k-means analysis, which revealed that 3 groups strike the right balance between parsi-
mony and minimizing within group variation. Table 4.4.1 below shows the characteristics of
each of the 3 identified groups and labeled post hoc as ‘Core’, ‘Bonus’ and ‘Disengaged’.
% in the % of times collecting % of times collecting % of times collecting
Segment population bonus miles zero miles only non-bonus miles
‘Core’ 43.71 23.44 18.74 57.82
‘Bonus’ 26.70 57.57 5.13 37.31
‘Disengaged’ 29.59 9.42 57.16 33.42
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Table 4.7 is the analog of Table 4.4 - it shows the true moments used in estimation, for
each identified segment, together with the simulated moments and their weights. As was the
case before, the moments for each sub-segment are fit reasonably well. In this table R1 stands
for ‘regression 1’, where the y-variable is the number of miles acquired and the x-variable is
the log of the distance to the redemption moment for participants that don’t have credit cards.
R2 uses the same variables but it includes only credit card holders. R3 regresses the miles
accumulated on the logarithm of the period number until the goal is attained and R4 regresses
the miles accumulated on the log of the period number from redemption.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As I did for the aggregated model, I present below other moments that were not used in the
estimation. As was the case before, the model produces fewer periods with no miles collected
than the data and a narrower distribution of the miles collected; in terms of redemptions, the
model does not capture very well the extreme right tail in the balance after redemptions, while
the distribution of the miles redeemed is captured somewhat more closely.
Table 4.8: Moments that are not used in the estimation for the ‘Bonus’, ‘Core’ and ‘Disen-
gaged’ segments
Moments Bonus Core Disengaged
True Simulated True Simulated True Simulated
% periods 0 miles collected 5.27 0.82 18.74 14.19 57.33 37.75
Q25 miles collected 7 5 1 1 0 0
Q50 miles collected 15 11 5 3 0 1
Q75 miles collected 33 22 13 8 4 3
mean balance across all periods 2957 2614 1922 1927 1421 1654
Q25 balance after redemption 155 395 79 158 57 75
Q50 balance after redemption 636 847 248 334 165.5 189
Q75 balance after redemption 2041 1402 1050 739 677.2 532
Q25 miles redeemed 550 655 350 380 320 410
Q50 miles redeemed 1125 1346 800 943 640 837
Q75 miles redeemed 2268 2614 1650 1962 1360 1655
Table 4.9 shows the point estimates and the standard errors for each of the 3 distinct seg-
ments. As was the case for the model applied on the whole sample, the asymptotic standard
errors are small in general, rendering parameters that are significantly different from zero. One
exception is the α2 parameter for the ‘Disengaged’ segment - estimated to be around 19.47
with a standard error of 13.97. Given the smaller sample size, it is not surprising that one of
the parameters became statistically insignificant.
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Table 4.9: Point estimates and standard errors in parenthesis below, separate for the ‘Bonus’,
‘Core’ and ‘Disengaged’ segments
Parameter Description Bonus Core Disengaged
φcc0 baseline collection for non credit card holders 2.4090 1.2915 0.4155
(0.0431) (0.0096) (0.0174)
φcc0 baseline collection for credit card holders 3.0340 2.2367 1.4106
(0.0277) (0.0116) (0.0276)
φ1 rate of transformation of effort into miles 0.7156 0.7251 0.9439
(0.0500) (0.0132) (0.0275)
σ scale parameter; distribution of miles collected 1.0171 1.4798 1.7918
(0.0800) (0.0316) (0.0355)
α1 utility when goal achieved 0.0994 0.3694 0.6995
(0.0072) (0.0273) (0.0190)
α2 utility log(point) when goal not achieved 45.6986 32.9135 19.4665
(2.8826) (8.8897) (13.9728)
k target rewards, shape parameter 1.2144 0.6520 0.8812
(0.0210) (0.0039) (0.0186)
θ target rewards, scale parameter 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
φ2 rewarded behavior 0.4806 0.4173 0.7063
(0.0544) (0.0540) (0.0745)




Table 4.10 shows the number of miles that are attributable to the program and uses this number
to calculate the break-even margin for the program an the share of sales attributable to the pro-
gram. The first part of this table presents results in terms of miles which are actually observed
in the data. It shows that the average non credit card collector acquires 1.56 extra miles per
period due to the program, while the average credit card collector accumulates 8.25 extra miles
per period due to the program. The share of this ‘extra’ collection that is attributable to points
pressure, (as opposed to rewarded behavior effect) is 49.1% and 32.6% respectively, markedly
less than 65% which was the case for ‘cash’ collectors. This result seems to suggest that ‘dream
rewards’ elicit more goodwill after the redemption than points pressure before redemption, as
opposed to the ‘cash rewards’ for which the points pressure plays the larger role in changing
behavior.
In order to assess how effective the program is, again I needed to make assumptions on the
monetary value associated with each collected mile. Since in this model I don’t distinguish
between bonus and non bonus periods, I assume that each collected mile has a 30% probability
of being collected in bonus period and 70% probability of being collected in a non-bonus
period, since these are the fractions observed in the data. In line with the assumptions that I
used in Chapter 3, I assume that each mile collected in a bonus period is associated with $7 of
sales (70% bonus miles each associated with $.2 sales and 30% regular miles each associated
with $25 sales imply $7.64 sales per mile in a bonus period; I round this number down to $7).
For the regular miles, I tried to further distinguish between miles acquired due to purchases with
the credit card vs. those acquired in other ways, because credit cards collectors need to spend
between $10 and $20 to acquire a mile. As in the previous chapter, I assumed that regular miles
for non credit card holders are associated with $25 of sales. For credit card holders I assumed
that the difference between their average and non credit card collectors’ average is attributable
to credit card collection which rewards each multiple of $10 with 1 mile, while the non credit
card collectors’ average was assumed to be associated with $25 of sales.
Using these assumptions, I calculated that the average program participant spends $58 more
during each two weeks period compared to the situation where there is no loyalty program. This
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large amount is driven mainly by credit card collectors. The break-even margin is 2.3% and
the share of sales attributable to the program is around 27%.
Table 4.10: Program evaluation. Applying the model to the whole sample
No credit Card Credit Card Total
Share in population 64.1% 35.9%
Extra miles due to program 1.56 8.25 3.96
Average redemption 11.09
% due to points pressure 49.1% 32.6%
Additional revenue 30.63 106.80 58.00
Cost 1.33
Break-even margin 2.29%
Revenue with program 211.2 380.8 272.1
Revenue w/out program 180.6 274.0 214.2
% of sales due to the program 17.0% 39.0% 27.1%
These results seem to imply that the ‘Dream rewards’ program is much more efficient than
the ‘Cash rewards’ program. In order to further test the robustness of these results, I also did
analyzed the counter-factual for each of the 3 distinct segments and aggregated over them, in
the idea that perhaps the results above miss-attribute some of the heterogeneity in the propensi-
ties to acquire bonus miles or to be disengaged to the true program effects. Table 4.11 presents
the results. If anything, it shows that by running the model separately on each of the 3 seg-
ments, the implied efficiency of the program is slightly increased: the additional revenue is
now $64.1 instead of $58, while the cost remains approximately the same. In Section 4.5 I
further elaborate on the reasons which might have lead to this result.
Policy Change
Intuitively, encouraging program participants to make redemptions more often should boost
the loyalty program’s effectiveness, since more frequent redemptions are likely to trigger more
often both the points pressure and the rewarded behavior effects. However, this strategy is not
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Table 4.11: Program evaluation. Applying the model to each of the 3 pre-defined segments and
aggregating the results
Bonus Core Disengaged Total
Additional revenue 146.9 45.6 16.6 64.1
Cost 2.7 1.1 0.4 1.3
Share in the population 26.7% 43.7% 29.6%
Break-even margin 2.08%
without risk, as more frequent redemptions may discourage consumers from aiming to sub-
stantial goals that elicit effort or may leave less time for consumers to put in the effort. Also,
persuading consumers to shorten their inter-redemption times may be difficult or costly. In this
exercise I try to see how the cost of the program and the sales it generates would change if
retailers managed to convince consumers to shorten their inter-redemption cycles. An impor-
tant question is whether retailers should aim to convince many participants to slightly decrease
their inter-collection times or whether they should try to convince a few participants to redeem
much more frequently. Should the results suggest that the program’s efficiency is significantly
improved by shortening the inter-redemption timings with any of these two strategies, retailers
can start looking into tactics that they can use to persuade consumers to redeem more fre-
quently. By comparing the cost of those tactics with the extra benefits (if any) that are gained,
retailers can decide whether encouraging redemption is a worthwhile strategy or not.
In the structural model presented above the inter-redemption times (τ’s) are taken to be
exogenous. So in order to asses how shorter spells between redemptions would affect the
program outcomes, I simply modify the input to the model. There are two types of changes
that I consider. Firstly, each inter-redemption time that is larger than 1 (i.e. redeeming in
two consecutive periods) has a 50% chance of being reduced by 20%. I label this ‘Policy I’.
With this policy, for example an inter-redemption spell of 55 periods, if selected to be changed
(with 50% probability), becomes a spell of 44 periods; if it is not selected to be changed, it
stays 55. Secondly, each inter-redemption time that is larger than 1 (i.e. redeeming in two
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consecutive periods) has a 20% chance of being reduced by 50%. This is ‘Policy II’. With this
policy, for example an inter-redemption spell of 55 periods, if selected to be changed (with
20% probability), becomes a spell of 27 periods; if it is not selected to be changed, it stays 55.
Importantly, in both specifications, the censored inter-redemption times are left unchanged.
Table 4.12 shows the outcomes for the current set up and the two changes described above.
It appears that trying to change the behavior of many participants in a small way (Policy I) in-
creases the revenue generated by the program from $57.99 under the current set-up to $60.43,
but requires a slightly higher margin to be profitable (2.34% vs. 2.29%). Trying to change the
behavior of a few participants in a more substantial way (Policy II) also increases sales gener-
ated by the program to $59.00 but does not require a higher margin in order to be profitable. By
comparing Policy I and Policy II, it appears that at margins higher than 7.64% Policy I should
be preferred. However, whether any of the two policies should be implemented depends on the
costs of the marketing campaigns needed to achieve these changes. I can only use the model
to obtain insights on how the reduction in inter-redemption times is likely to affect sales and
profits, but managers have better information on the costs of any campaign that aims to change
participants’ behavior.
Table 4.12: Program outcomes under the current set up and two alternative set ups where the
inter-redemption times are reduced
Current program Policy I Policy II
Extra miles due to program 3.96 4.14 4.03
Average redemption 11.09 11.81 11.25
Additional revenue 57.99 60.43 59.00
Cost 1.33 1.42 1.35
Break-even margin 2.29% 2.34% 2.29%
Revenue with program 272.15 274.34 273.10
Revenue w/out program 214.16 214.16 214.16
% of revenue due to the program 27.08% 28.25% 27.56%
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4.5 Discussion
In this chapter I presented a model applicable to loyalty programs that offer substantial rewards,
for which consumers need time to accumulate the points and for which, presumably, the con-
sumers decide upon some time in advance. Following the exposition of the full, complex
model, I presented a simpler model that is less demanding in terms of data and computation
power and that can be estimated more easily. Specifically, the simplified model no longer re-
quires estimating the distribution of the inter-redemption spells, but uses the spells observed
in the data. It assumes that different goals have a chance of being picked that is proportional
to their value at the time when the choice is made. A final simplifying assumption is that the
points pressure mechanism does not come into play before the collector has more than one year
before redemption.
As was the case for the ‘cash’ collectors model presented in the previous chapter, this model
too addressed both the collection of miles and the redemption of rewards. In terms of redemp-
tion, the inter-redemption spells were assumed to be exogenous and I used the spells observed
in the data as inputs for the model. However, I endogenized the size of the redemption: in my
model participants are more likely to pick goals that have a higher value function associated
with them at the beginning of the inter-redemption spell. The simplified model assumes that
each redemption is a separate ‘game’. In the periods leading up to the redemption consumers
are motivated to put in effort to increase their chances of attaining their goal. The closer the
redemption time, the less heavily discounted the reward and the higher chances that it pays off
to put in additional effort to collect more miles. After a redemption consumers are under the
rewarded behavior effect, so they are still likely to spend more than they would have spent in
the absence of the RP.
I estimated the parameters for this model using data from AIR MILES’ ‘Dream rewards’
program. In one specification I applied the model on the whole available sample. In the second
specification, I first split the data into 3 distinct segments, based on participants’ propensities
to collect bonus miles or not to collect miles at all; then I applied the model to each of three a
priori identified segments and aggregated over the segments, to obtain results comparable to the
ones obtained in the first specification. In both specifications, in terms of fit, it seems that the
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model could be improved by allowing for an engaged/not engaged switch (similar to PT = 0, or
period of type ‘disengaged’ that I had in the model presented in Chapter 3), which would help
to better match the observed spike at 0 in the collection pattern. The assumption that different
redemption goals are selected proportional to their value at the moment of the redemption
timing also seems too rigid; by relaxing this assumption and introducing additional parameters
to better capture the value of different goals, the match of the distribution of the redeemed
rewards could also potentially be improved. However, these changes (and particularly the
second one) may entail difficulties in terms of estimation and identification.
The reason behind applying the model separately to the 3 segments was the insight from
Chapter 3, which showed that sample heterogeneity can be confounded with true program
effects, so it needs to be teased apart in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of the
program. Therefore, my expectation was that this specification should imply a higher break-
even margin for the program to be profitable and a lower share of sales that is attributable to
the program. Contrary to this expectation, the results revealed that in the second specification,
if anything, the program appears to perform even better.
This unexpected result can be explained in several ways. First, latent heterogeneity may
play a smaller role among dream rewards collector than it played among ‘cash’ collectors. One
idea in support of this conjecture is the fact that for the cash collectors I used the binary variable
of whether they have a credit card linked to the loyalty program through which they can collect
points for all the payments they make with that card, to stipulate different baseline collection
rates for credit card holders and non credit card holders. This observable variable may have
well captured the a large share of the variance in individual collection patterns, and since it was
already accounted for, further dividing the sample into a priori latent groups did not change
much the results.
The second explanation is that by a priori dividing the sample into latent segments and
then applying the model to each segment was not a good technique to partial out the effects of
heterogeneity. As opposed to deriving latent segments within the model (the technique which I
used in Chapter 3), this method is more rigid: when applying the model, individuals have been
already assigned with a probability equal to 1 to each of the sub-samples.
Finally, in this Chapter, I changed the inter-redemption times used as inputs for the model.
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The results showed that shorter inter-redemption times boost retailer’s revenue while also in-
creasing the costs. However, whether launching a campaign that encourages redemptions is a
good recommendation depends on the campaign’s costs.
In the final chapter of the dissertation I further discuss the differences between this model
and the model presented in the previous chapter, as well as the different estimates of profitabil-





In this dissertation I reviewed the literature on reward programs, clearly differentiating between
the general concept of customer loyalty and the loyalty fostered through reward programs. I
addressed both the theoretical mechanisms that can drive increased sales for merchants who
offer RPs (mainly points pressure and the rewarded behavior effect), as well the empirical
studies that aimed to quantify the effectiveness of the RPs on driving sales.
I proposed two structural models for analyzing loyalty programs which do not automat-
ically grant rewards to qualifying members and which do not put participants in a situation
where they need to make trade-offs between using their points to gain status upgrades and us-
ing their points to redeem rewards. There are several advantages to using structural models.
Using a combination of data and assumptions, they are like ‘conceptual X-rays’ that allow
researchers and practitioners to understand how different mechanisms concur to create the pat-
terns in the observed data. This deeper understanding implies that the results of these models
are in a better position to be used to make cogent managerial recommendations.
The particular structural model estimated in Chapter 3 for ‘cash’ collectors showed how
participants selecting the time of the redemption and the sample heterogeneity can be con-
founded with the effect of the loyalty program (Figure 3.4). Thus, in order to evaluate the im-
pact of the program on sales, first I parsed out these two effects. The results of the model help
managers decide whether the RP is profitable for them and assess how changes in the structure
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of the program will affect profitability. I used thus the results of the structural model like an
experimental laboratory to answer questions such as what is the optimal redemption multiple
or what is the optimal reward per redeemed mile? The results suggested that that the current
multiple of 95 mile is optimal but that, depending on the contribution margins, increasing the
amount of money offered per redeemed mile (e.g. offering $12 instead of $10 to consumers
who redeem 95 miles) may increase profitability. The structural model estimated in Chapter
4 for dream rewards collectors was again used to assess the profitability of the program and
the increase in profitability that could be obtained by persuading participants to shorten their
inter-redemption times.
The two models described in this dissertation are the first structural models in the literature
that are applicable to the typical programs in the retail and financial sectors, where most of the
recent expansion of RPs has taken place (Berry, 2013). The main two features of the programs
in these industries are that consumers are able to decide the size and timing of their rewards
and that the customer tier component is less important and not likely to play a role in the re-
demption decision. Lewis (2004) and Hartman and Viard (2004) develop structural models for
loyalty programs with a relatively simple structure, where the reward is granted automatically
to the qualifying program participants. Kopalle et al. (2007) and Kopalle et al. (2012) develop
structural models for loyalty programs that are specific to the airline and hospitality industries:
in these set-ups consumers face the trade-off between using the accumulated points to make a
redemption and hoarding them in order to receive a tier upgrade.
However, unlike frequent flyers or business travelers who accumulate airline (and hotel
respectively) points in lumpy, infrequent amounts, participants in RPs offered by retailing or
financial services companies accumulate points in a more continuous way and make redemp-
tions that do not crowd out their opportunities to collect points. For example a frequent flyer
who redeems for a free flight forgos collecting a substantial amount of points that could have
brought him a status upgrade, for example from silver to gold. Unlike the frequent flyer, a
participant into the AIR MILES program who uses her points to redeem for a free flight may
at most forgo collecting a few hundred points if she has a credit card linked to her AIR MILES
account, so for her there is no significant trade-off between redemption and status upgrade mo-
tives. These fundamental differences in the structures of the programs imply that the models
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developed by Kopalle and his co-authors cannot be simply tweaked and applied to industries
other than airlines and hotels. The main contribution of this dissertation is therefore to develop
and estimate structural models to evaluate the impact of RPs that can be applied to the typical
programs in the growing sectors of retail and financial services.
The conceptual difference between the two models that I have presented and estimated
stems from the way consumers think about the two types of rewards that they offer: with cash-
like rewards they evaluate on an on-going basis whether to make a redemption or not (condi-
tional on having enough points for the minimal redemption), while with dream-like rewards
consumers are more likely to form a stable redemption goal and accelerate their collection to
achieve their goal and improve their prospects after the redemption. In estimation, one of the
major differences between the two models was the way heterogeneity was incorporated. In
the case of ‘cash’ collectors (Chapter 3), I used the model to estimated 6 latent segments that
differ with respect to their propensities to redeem and their propensities to collect bonus or
only regular miles or to be disengaged. In the model for dream rewards collectors (Chapter 4)
I divided the sample a priori into segments that I labeled ‘Core’, ‘Bonus’ and ‘Disengaged’,
using k means analysis and then I applied the model separately to each of these 3 segments.
While the approach that I took in Chapter 3 is has significant advantages, I regard the second
approach as a useful exercise to gain more insights into how heterogeneity plays out with the
true RP effects. Using latent segments in the dream rewards model would have required more
computational power and a more complex auxiliary model (additional moments) which could
be prone to difficulties with the estimation and identification issues.
The results imply that the ‘Dream rewards’ program is more effective than the ‘Cash re-
wards’ program. For ‘Cash rewards’, depending on the assumptions, the break-even margin
ranged from 2.84% to 5.64%, while for the ‘Dream rewards’, under the assumptions listed in
Chapter 4, this rate is 2.29%. The share of revenue attributable to the program ranged between
12.20% and 15.65% (again depending on the assumptions) in the case of ‘Cash’, while for the
‘Dream’, under the current assumptions it is estimated to be 27.1%.
For both models, in the model development and analysis, I considered the general frame-
work of one retailer that runs the RP. While this is a general and flexible framework, the data
that I used to estimate the parameters of the model is provided by AIR MILES - a coalition RP.
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In this coalition, AIR MILES issues the points and sells it to its sponsors; the sponsors give
away the points to their patrons as they see fit. The cycle is closed by the program participants
who redeem their rewards from AIR MILES in exchange for the points that they have accu-
mulated. In the coalition set-up, the residual claimant, or the party that bears the risk of low
breakage or high redemption, is the party which administers the program - AIR MILES, in this
case. The individual sponsors pay for all the miles that they issue and are unaffected by the
redemption rates. In my results, I adopted AIR MILES’ point of view and calculated the cost
of the redemptions based on the observed redemptions (which are about 60% of the observed
collections). However, the retailers who participate in the program pay for all the miles that
they issue, not only for those that are redeemed. As I showed in Chapter 3, the redemption
rates have a significant impact on the minimum margin rate that make the program profitable:
at the current level of redemptions this rate is 4.3% but when 100% of the issued points are
redeemed, the rate is 7.1%. In other words, the average program sponsor who pays upfront for
the cost of all the miles they issue, needs to have a contribution margin which is at least 7.1%
to find the program attractive.
In sum, this dissertation presents two structural models that can be used to evaluate the
typical loyalty programs offered in retail and financial services. The unique features of RP’s
in these industries are the endogenous nature of redemption and the fact that the prospect
of upgrades to superior customer tier does not act as a counter-balance to the tendency of
making redemptions. These features require models that different substantively from the ones
developed so far in the literature. My models disentangle between true program effects and two
important confounds (selection of the redemption timing and sample heterogeneity), in order
to provide unbiased estimates of the effectiveness of the program and insights into the changes
that can further bolster their profitability. Therefore they are a valuable managerial tool that
can be used to evaluate RPs and assess different RP designs.
5.2 Limitations
A significant challenge with any model that tries to assess the causal impact of a loyalty pro-
gram on sales is is the risk of confounding the true program effects with a spurious relationship
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between the increase in miles collection around the redemption time and the redemption act. In
Chapter 3 I showed that even if the RP does nothing to change the behavior of consumers there
is a positive correlation between collection amounts and the redemption moments, driven by
sample heterogeneity and by the fact that the redemption moment is more likely to be selected
after a streak of high-collection periods that were produced by chance, in the absence of any
systematic effect.
However, there may be factors that encourage consumers to both accumulate and redeem
more miles. Around any special occasions, like anniversaries or holidays, consumers are more
likely to both increase their collection of miles and make a redemption. If this case, it is the
special occasion that drives the positive correlation observed between collection and redemp-
tion, and not the loyalty program. So models that don’t take into account this special occasion
effect miss attribute the observed correlation to the program. This situation can lead to more
or less bias in the estimated effectiveness of the program, depending on how large the increase
in collection around holidays and other personal important events is and on how strongly these
moments are correlated with an increased tendency to redeem.
The solution of simply controlling for special occasions is not easily implementable, since
different consumers have different special occasions that are not observable by the researcher.
A first step could be accounting for any ‘December effect’ when people tend to spend more
money. However, if program participants genuinely prefer to make redemptions at these spe-
cial occasions and are thus more likely to put in more effort into collection precisely in these
periods, then the ‘December effect’ or ‘special occasion’ control swipes away completely the
RP effect and leads to the opposite kind of bias, where the effectiveness of the program is
under-estimated.
I believe that such confounds are not likely to play a major role in the cash rewards model,
but they may be a more serious limitation of the dream rewards model, especially for those
collectors that have a credit card linked to their RP account. The credit card is a powerful
tool for collecting points, that allows participants to have a wide variation in their collection,
i.e., allows them to increase substantially their collection during those special occasion periods
when they spend more.
To illustrate how credit card holders are more prone to such confounding effects, a scenario
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could unwind as following: a program participant uses her credit card to pay for flights for
the family holiday, accumulates an increased amount of points as a result, and then uses the
points to make hotel bookings for the same holiday. In this scenario, it is the holiday that
drives both the accumulation of an increased amount of points and the redemption, so the
correlation between increased collection of points and redemption is spurious. This type of
effect may explain why the model presented in Chapter 4 implies such a high share of revenue
attributable to credit card holders. Unfortunately, controlling for it requires richer, survey data
where consumers provide details on the context in which they made their redemptions - such
as whether the redemption was part of a suite of expenditures generated by an exogenous event
- holiday, anniversary or any other special event.
Another limitation that has to do with the data used to estimate the model for dream rewards
collectors in Chapter 4 is the fact that I only use 3 years of data for the actual estimation
and keep the 1 year before and 1 year after to collect information on whether participants
make redemptions within these periods. During the 3-year observation window, only 35%
of the participants make at least one redemption. This short observation window allows for
the possibility that those participants who have higher baseline collections are more likely to
also be redeemers. If this is the case, the model that I estimated erroneously attributes the
increased collection to the loyalty program, when in fact there may be a selection effect. A
solution to alleviate this concern is to observe participants over longer periods of time. In this
way, the group of redeemers becomes more heterogeneous (collectors with both higher and
lower propensities to collect baseline miles) and they will be less likely to be confounded with
collectors with high baseline collection. Thus it is possible that by using data that stretches
over longer periods of time, the estimated profitability of the dream rewards program to be
revised downwards.
5.3 Future research
An immediate area for further research is to increase the complexity of the models that I have
developed and try to achieve a better fit to the data, which would lend more credibility to
the obtained results. Specifically, for the cash collectors model such attempts could focus on
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modeling a correlational structure among the 6 identified segments, increasing the state space
to account for the seasonal effects (‘December’) and check how the results obtained with that
specification compare with the results reported in Chapter 3, or expanding the sample to include
the participants who have a credit card linked to their RP account.
Another avenue for future research is testing the bounds of the assumption that the propen-
sity to acquire bonus miles or be disengaged from the program is unchanging over time and
independent from the stock of miles that one has already accumulated. To achieve this, the
auxiliary model should be extended to include two additional regressions: in the first addi-
tional regression the dependent variable is whether an instance of zero collection is observed
and in the second the dependent variable is whether bonus miles are acquired or not - while
the explanatory variable is the distance to the redemption moment. Two additional parameters
should be included in the model. Specifically, instead of capturing the propensity to be disen-
gaged by q0, it can now be a function of the stock of miles accumulated: q01e−q02S , where S is
the stock of miles. Similarly, instead of capturing the propensity to be disengaged by qb, it can
also become a function of the stock of miles. The additional moments in the auxiliary model
will help identify the additional parameters that confer extra flexibility to the model.
For the dream rewards model there is even more opportunity for further research. This
can range form incremental improvements to the model (introducing an engaged/ not engaged
switch; allowing for a more flexible choice of the redeemed rewards; estimating latent segments
within the model; accounting for seasonal effects), to more radical improvements, that rely
on augmenting the observed data data with survey data, which collects information on the
specific context in which redemptions took place, for example for how long it has been planned
or whether it coincided with any special event that would normally determine the program
participant to accumulate more points.
The results suggest that the ‘Dream rewards’ program is more effective in increasing sales
than the ‘Cash’ rewards program. More research is needed to explain this difference and inves-
tigate whether the dream reward program elicits more engagement or simply attracts program
participants who are more responsive to the incentives of the program, while those who are not
as responsive to the incentives of the program opt for the ‘Cash’ set-up.
I estimated the models using data from AIR MILES, Canada’s largest coalition loyalty
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program. However, I did not exploit at all the ‘coalition’ feature of the data. On the one hand
this makes the models more general, applicable to programs run by individual retailers. On
the other hand, this leaves room for asking further questions. The models I used assumed that
consumers have a cost of changing their behavior and collect more points in order to generate
points pressure. It may be the case that this cost is different among different sponsors, so some
may benefit more from the points pressure effect than others. It may also be the case that the
rewarded behavior effect is stronger for the retailer where the consumer made the redemption
than for other sponsors of the program. In this case retailers where consumers are more like
to cash in their miles are advantaged. These sponsor-specific effects, if they exist, could have
major implications for how the coalition loyalty program is run: it may turn out that some
sponsors are benefiting more from the program, being subsidized by the others. If this is the
case, AIR MILES can asses the possibility of differentiated tariffs for its sponsors. So a major
avenue for future research is to assess whether such differentiated effects exist among sponsors
and designing a differentiated pricing scheme that could increase AIR MILES’ profitability.
In my analysis I assumed that the retailer’s objective is always profitability, not sales vol-
ume. It may be the case that sometimes retailers use loyalty programs for other short-term
objectives, like increasing sales or helping with inventory management, so retailers may some-
times sacrifice contribution in the short term. Loyalty programs are then a tool which allows
achieving this flexibility, so they may have additional value beyond that of increasing contri-
bution. Exploring how retailers actually use RPs and quantifying the benefits of the flexibility
that they provide can also be an area ripe for future research.
In a more general sense, it would be interesting and managerially relevant to see how the
RPs’ design affect their efficiency. In this dissertation I studied RPs where the redemption in
endogenous - i.e. barring expiration, it is at the participants’ latitude when and how much to
redeem, while much of the previous structural models in this area focused on RPs where the
reward is granted automatically. Comparing the performance of these different designs would
be valuable for a retailer deciding which type of program to implement. In theory both RP
structures have advantages and disadvantages: the endogenous redemption allows participants
to choose the rewards that they best like and are thus likely to be motivated by them to increase
their collection effort, while the automatic redemption avoids the problem of participants being
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indecisive and may therefore keep them better engaged.
Furthermore, other details of the RP design may be important for its success. For example,
in the case of programs with automatic redemption a key question is what should the amount
of points required for a reward be? Very large required amounts may discourage most of
the participants, while small amounts may end up rewarding participants who do not change
their behavior at all in response to the program. In the case of programs with endogenous
redemption it is important to know what are the rewards that best motivate participants - e.g. do
vacation-related rewards elicit more points pressure and/ or a higher rewarded behavior effect
than merchandise rewards? Another relevant question is what is the right balance between
flexibility and complexity? Offering large sets of available rewards increases flexibility and the
chances that each program participant finds a reward that is motivating them to increase their
points collection. But on the other hand such large sets of rewards might increase the burden of
choice and leave the consumers incapable of selecting and committing to a goal. In the absence
of a specific goal consumers may not be very keen to increase their collection of points.
Finally, even though in this dissertation I only studied points or miles as a currency that
consumers accumulate and spend, I hope that the insights gained here, especially those that
referred to how consumers seem to save up points for occasions where they might enjoy them
more, can spark further research in areas of broader interest, for example saving behavior.
Appendix A
Identification for the ‘Cash’ model in
Chapter 3
To ensure that the model developed in Chapter 3 is identified - i.e. that the same set of moments
cannot be generated by different sets of parameters, I conducted the exercise described below.
I generated data (and moments) using known parameters. The parameters that I picked
are shown in Table A.1. In order to obtain a confidence interval around these parameters,
one needs the Jacobian matrix (the numeric first order partial derivatives of each moment with
respect to each parameter) and a weighting matrix (W). In the spirit of the generalized methods
of moments literature, the weighting matrix can be any positive-definite matrix. So I used W
obtained as the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the moments in the real data, with
the off-diagonal elements replaced by 0. The last column of Table A.1 shows the standard errors
obtained in this fashion. The more time-consuming alternative would be to do bootstrapping
on the generated data to obtain W.
Then I picked 4 sets of random starting points within +\− two standard errors from the true
parameters (shown in Table A.2) and different sets of idiosyncratic errors (e, ξ and ) and tried
to recover the true parameters. Table A.3 shows the obtained estimates for each of the four
starting points and Table A.4 shows how far (in the metrics of standard errors) the obtained
parameters are from the true parameters.
The results of the exercise show that in all the 4 tests, with few exceptions, the recovered
parameters are within + \ − two standard errors from the true parameters, lending support to
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Table A.1: Parameters used to generate the data
true parameters std errors
1 Φ1 1.5717 0.0067
2 Φ2 1.1422 0.0097
3 Φ3 1.4214 0.0052
4 σ1 0.7195 0.0063
5 σ2 0.4115 0.0046
6 ar1 -3.6977 0.0408
7 a2 2.8101 0.0467
8 Φ4 0.5566 0.0064
9 Φ5 3.2486 0.1024
10 qIb 0.1303 0.0044
11 qId 0.5676 0.0113
12 QI 0.1945 0.0065
13 qIIb 0.2723 0.0035
14 qIId 0.1346 0.0052
15 QII 0.4546 0.0110
16 qIIIb 0.6359 0.0017
17 qIIId 0.0031 0.0011
18 anr1 -7.7545 0.1417
19 pr 0.7464 0.0053
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the claim that the model is well identified.
Table A.2: Starting points - within + \ − two standard errors from the true parameters
Starting points
Φ1 1.5855 1.5699 1.5603 1.5720
Φ2 1.1482 1.1450 1.1430 1.1535
Φ3 1.4160 1.4171 1.4134 1.4187
σ1 0.7114 0.7175 0.7242 0.7206
σ2 0.4129 0.4059 0.4114 0.4092
ar1 -3.6933 -3.6903 -3.7037 -3.7267
a2 2.7253 2.7410 2.8019 2.8631
Φ4 0.5550 0.5494 0.5534 0.5605
Φ5 3.1513 3.1116 3.3578 3.2568
qIb 0.1322 0.1306 0.1277 0.1218
qId 0.5704 0.5690 0.5799 0.5771
QI 0.1969 0.1989 0.1867 0.1985
qIIb 0.2753 0.2717 0.2776 0.2743
qIId 0.1449 0.1391 0.1289 0.1329
QII 0.4389 0.4572 0.4616 0.4673
qIIIb 0.6378 0.6349 0.6315 0.6366
qIIId 0.0033 0.0039 0.0030 0.0029
anr1 -7.9105 -7.6978 -7.7719 -7.9618
pr 0.7419 0.7560 0.7396 0.7502
Objective function 4192.5200 9405.8400 16574.6300 784.3500
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Table A.3: Estimated parameters
Ending points
Φ1 1.5816 1.5800 1.5622 1.5690
Φ2 1.1500 1.1592 1.1350 1.1482
Φ3 1.4133 1.4130 1.4303 1.4241
σ1 0.6995 0.7051 0.7204 0.7192
σ2 0.4069 0.4054 0.4146 0.4118
ar1 -3.6995 -3.7010 -3.6982 -3.7097
a2 2.8199 2.7626 2.8519 2.8116
Φ4 0.5552 0.5651 0.5606 0.5571
Φ5 3.1603 3.1411 3.3455 3.2630
qIb 0.1277 0.1281 0.1220 0.1224
qId 0.5638 0.5651 0.5755 0.5701
QI 0.1977 0.1981 0.1879 0.1911
qIIb 0.2741 0.2820 0.2791 0.2787
qIId 0.1351 0.1291 0.1325 0.1340
QII 0.4476 0.4724 0.4744 0.4672
qIIIb 0.6320 0.6470 0.6412 0.6385
qIIId 0.0045 0.0014 0.0011 0.0019
anr1 -7.7719 -7.8288 -7.6680 -7.8309
pr 0.7461 0.7541 0.7385 0.7484
Objective function 12.7500 12.2600 21.2900 17.1400
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Table A.4: Distance (in standard errors) of the estimated parameters form the true parameters
Φ1 1.4831 1.2453 -1.4265 -0.4070
Φ2 0.7994 1.7500 -0.7411 0.6092
Φ3 -1.5608 -1.6067 1.6923 0.5123
σ1 -3.1827 -2.2908 0.1417 -0.0548
σ2 -1.0001 -1.3328 0.6745 0.0593
ar1 -0.0428 -0.0807 -0.0118 -0.2930
a2 0.2115 -1.0176 0.8966 0.0330
Φ4 -0.2227 1.3289 0.6243 0.0765
Φ5 -0.8617 -1.0496 0.9462 0.1404
qIb -0.5948 -0.5117 -1.8758 -1.7902
qId -0.3407 -0.2262 0.6984 0.2216
QI 0.4920 0.5624 -1.0160 -0.5224
qIIb 0.5122 2.7871 1.9494 1.8350
qIId 0.1101 -1.0495 -0.3881 -0.1150
QII -0.6336 1.6137 1.8006 1.1420
qIIIb -2.2694 6.4489 3.1058 1.5082
qIIId 1.2271 -1.5335 -1.8123 -1.0355
anr1 -0.1228 -0.5242 0.6103 -0.5391
pr -0.0456 1.4417 -1.4796 0.3731
Appendix B
Interpolation for the ‘Dream’ model in
Chapter 4
Target rewards (G’s) are modeled as a distributed Γ(k, θ); for each set of k and θ that is tried
out in the process of finding the best fitting parameters, I calculate every 5th percentile of the
distribution and use that value as an interpolation point - relying thus on 21 points for G. Thus,
G◦ is the set of percentiles.
In order to calculate the set of interpolation points for the stock of miles, S ◦, I follow
several steps. First, I calculate the maximum value of the balance that a simulated individual
could conceivably attain during the simulation window (tw). This situation happens when the
simulated individual starts with a high balance, denoted maxS 0, has just made a redemption
right before being observed, so their collection is boosted by the rewarded behavior effect; will
make a new redemption right at the end of the observation period, putting in all the possible
effort (ρ = ρmax) and is always very lucky receiving the highest number of miles, given the
location and scale of the distribution from which the miles are drawn. maxS 0 is observed
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Thus, the maximum stock of miles that can be attained during the observation period is maxS ,
given by the sum of the maximum stock at the beginning period and the maximum number of
miles that can be attained per period, multiplied by the number of observed periods:
maxS = maxS 0 + tw · F−1(.9999) (B.3)
In the equation above F(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the log-normal distribution
with location parameter µmax and scale parameter σ.
Given that maxS captures the very extreme case when all the random factors collude to
create a large observed balance, I use a combination between an exponential scale and a linear
scale to determine the interpolation points for the stock of miles between 0 and maxS . I use in
total 51 points of interpolation for S (so the size of S ◦ is 51). The first 21 points are linear -
starting from 0 up to 2000 in 100 increments. The remaining 30 are at an increasing distance
form each other. I divide the interval [log(2000), log(maxS )] into 30 equally spaced intervals
and use as an interpolation point for S, all the values that correspond to the ends of these
intervals. This combination of linear and exponential grid has the advantage that has a higher
density for the lower values of S , where most observations lie, but in the same time it covers
all the interval of values that the stock of miles could imaginably take.
In solving the finite horizon problem, I first solve for the utilities in the redemption period
(at t = 0) for all the 21 · 51 interpolation points. Using these values, I solve for the value and
policy functions at all t ∈ [1, tmax] and at all G◦ in the grid, by interpolating only for S . For
example, in order to calculate V[S 2, 1,Gτ], I need to know all V[ς, 0,Gtau], where ς represents
all the possible levels of the balance at t = 1, i.e.the current balance S plus all the possible
number of miles that can be accumulated in a period. Since not all ς’s are in the interpolation
set S ◦, I use the set V[·, 0,Gtau] at the interpolation points.
Though, in the current version of the model I use only rewards that are in the interpolation
set, for rewards that are outside this set the optimal level of effort for can be computed by
interpolating the optimal effort at the points within the interpolation grid.
Appendix C
Identification for the ‘Dream’ model in
Chapter 4
To ensure that the model developed in Chapter 4 is identified, I conducted an exercise similar
to the one described in Appendix A.
I generated data (and moments) using known parameters. The parameters that I picked are
shown in Table C.1. In order to obtain a confidence interval around these parameters, again I
used the Jacobian matrix and a weighting matrix (W), obtained as the inverse of the variance-
covariance matrix of the moments in the real data, with the off-diagonal elements replaced by
0. The last column of Table C.1 shows the standard errors obtained in this fashion.
Then I picked 4 sets of random starting points within + \ − two standard errors from the
true parameters (shown in Table C.2) and different sets of idiosyncratic errors (the two sets of
idiosyncratic errors are related to the shocks in miles collection and the shocks in the size of
the redeemed rewards) and tried to recover the true parameters. Table C.3 shows the obtained
estimates for each of the four starting points and Table C.4 shows how far (in the metrics of
standard errors) the obtained parameters are from the true parameters.
The results of the exercise show that the recovered parameters are in general within + \ −
two standard errors from the true parameters, lending support to the claim that the model is
well identified. The major exception is the shape parameter of the distribution of rewards in
the first test, which is 15 standard errors larger than the true parameter. However, in the other
3 tests this parameter is within reasonable distance from the its true value: 3.17, -.70 and -.70.
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Table C.1: Parameters used to generate the data











Table C.2: Starting points - within + \ − two standard errors from the true parameters
Parameter
φcc0 2.3127 2.3164 2.3173 2.3242
φ1 0.7400 0.7410 0.7574 0.7462
σ 1.1424 1.1490 1.1378 1.1362
α2 36.9270 39.2058 35.0475 38.1293
k 1.2692 1.2784 1.2431 1.2537
θ 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005
φ2 0.6260 0.5820 0.6137 0.5970
φ3 -0.0409 -0.0406 -0.0227 -0.0325
α1 0.1118 0.1120 0.1116 0.1165
φcc0 2.8261 2.8291 2.8371 2.8455
Objective function 58.48 6.86 538.02 531.53
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Table C.3: Estimated parameters
φcc0 2.3094 2.3160 2.3086 2.2941
φ1 0.7403 0.7409 0.7599 0.7661
σ 1.1407 1.1491 1.1030 1.1606
α2 39.6398 39.2153 39.3289 36.6905
k 1.3349 1.2791 1.2678 1.3700
θ 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
φ2 0.6001 0.5825 0.6004 0.6095
φ3 -0.0370 -0.0408 -0.0282 -0.0348
α1 0.1135 0.1122 0.1050 0.1042
φcc0 2.8175 2.8286 2.8339 2.7960
Objective function 2.45 1.57 14.92 5.33
Table C.4: Distance (in standard errors) of the estimated parameters form the true parameters
φcc0 -1.104657 -0.275719 -1.199176 -3.003085
φ1 0.057480 0.116210 1.959899 2.565022
σ -0.713010 0.525466 -6.253172 2.223130
α2 0.870380 0.664704 0.719736 -0.558768
k 5.946741 1.141570 0.169079 8.965637
θ 1.606681 0.140721 -1.856587 2.068021
φ2 0.242404 0.058794 0.245298 0.341053
φ3 0.463631 -0.004990 1.558901 0.741222
α1 0.213874 -0.487856 -4.272067 -4.718497
φcc0 -0.813118 -0.314112 -0.077197 -1.774889
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